Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism6 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Zimbabwesince 2019still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Beitbridge Border Post modernisation (Zimborders build-operate-transfer concession)

Zimbabwe's government contracted the Zimborders consortium under a build-operate-transfer concession to rebuild the Beitbridge Border Post with a US$300 million investment; works began in March 2019 and the President commissioned the modernised post in September 2022.

300 US$ million, investment in the beitbridge border post upgrade, 2021-02. Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), news release 'Beitbridge Border upgrade takes shape', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Finance concessioned the rebuild of the country's busiest port of entry to a private consortium under build-operate-transfer, so the consortium financed construction and recovers it from user fees before handing the facility back.

Preconditions

A border post whose traffic volume can repay private capital through user fees
A government willing to cede fee revenue for a fixed concession term
Financial closure achievable despite sovereign arrears that cut the state off from most concessional lenders

Limits: The US$300 million is a headline project value stated in a revenue authority news release during construction, not an audited outturn, and the release itself credits 'the government' with the investment, which blurs how much the concessionaire financed. The concession's term, tariff and risk allocation are not given in the official sources behind this record. One concession, however large, says little about the frequency of public-private delivery, which is half of what the indicator asks; the Treasury's own text shows the model only 'being considered' for other border posts. The record has no official series on clearance times or traffic before and after, so it shows that the facility was built and commissioned, not that it performs better.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Zimbabwesince 2015still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Non-formal education in Zimbabwe's schools

Under its 2015 Non-Formal Education Policy, Zimbabwe's Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education ran literacy, adult basic education (ZABEC) and part-time continuing secondary classes (PTCEC) in ordinary schools, and recorded 105,138 non-formal enrolments in 2019, with the number of schools offering the programmes rising from 1,503 in 2015 to 4,401 in 2019.

105,138 learners, enrolment in non-formal education programmes, primary and secondary levels, 2019. 4,401 schools, primary and secondary schools offering non-formal education programmes, 2019. Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, Zimbabwe, 2019 Primary and Secondary Education Statistics Report (May 2020), Chapter 10, Tables 10.1 and 10.10, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The education ministry wrote a non-formal education policy and delivered it through the existing school network, so ordinary primary and secondary schools open afternoon and evening classes for adults and out-of-school learners, with courses that let a learner move back into the formal track.

Preconditions

A dense network of public schools with teachers who can take extra classes
An annual school census that already collects enrolment, so the new classes are counted from the start
Equivalence between non-formal courses and formal grades, so the classes lead to a recognised certificate

Limits: The gap asks for a share of adults in education and training, and this is a head count of enrolments in one ministry's non-formal classes, read from tables in a PDF. The report does not break the count down by age, and the policy also serves out-of-school children and youth, so an unknown part of the 105,138 are not adults. The figure leaves out vocational colleges, universities, employer training and NGO classes. The ministry does not host the report on an openable page of its own; the URL is a copy held by Policy Vault Africa, a policy archive, and the figure is the ministry's administrative return. 2019 is the latest year with a published count that could be checked: a 2025 newspaper report says the 2024 statistics report shows a notable increase in non-formal enrolment, but gives no number. The school count fell from a high of 4,779 in 2017 to 4,401 in 2019 in the same table, and secondary PTCEC enrolment of 23,324 was below the ministry's own 2019 target of 33,500. Enrolment says nothing about completion, attendance or what was learned.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Zimbabwesince 2026still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe regulatory sandbox

The Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe published a list of seven innovative financial technology solutions approved for testing in its regulatory sandbox in July 2026, among them asset, securities and infrastructure tokenisation platforms, a crowdfunding platform and a blockchain capital raising platform.

7 solutions, solutions approved for participation in regulatory sandbox testing, 2026-07-24. Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe, Public Notice SCZ24072026 'Update on approved regulatory sandbox participants', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The securities regulator approves named solutions into a timed, supervised sandbox under its own guidelines and publishes the list as a public notice so investors can tell a sandbox participant from a licensed firm.

Preconditions

Sandbox guidelines issued by the securities regulator
A fintech unit to monitor and evaluate the tests
Demand from tokenisation and crowdfunding firms with no licence category to apply under

Limits: The notice is a one-page PDF listing approvals; it calls itself an update but gives no earlier list, no admission date per firm, no testing period and no exits, so the figure is a stock of approved participants at July 2026, not an annual admissions count, and started is set to the notice year because no earlier admission was read at a source. Approval for testing is not testing: the notice warns that representations beyond testing are misleading, and some entries (Financial Securities Exchange, a licensed exchange) are incumbents. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has run a separate fintech regulatory sandbox since March 2021, whose admissions are not counted here because no current count was read at an official source today. Seven approvals against about 16 million people is about 0.4 per million.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Zimbabwesince 2008dismantledbears on Institutional responsiveness

Dollarisation against hyperinflation, and its reversal in 2019

Zimbabwe moved to full dollarisation in late 2008 to break hyperinflation and held annual consumer price inflation between minus 2.4 and 3.7 percent from 2010 to 2017, then reintroduced a domestic currency in February 2019, after which inflation reached 557.2 percent in 2020.

557.2 % per year, annual consumer price inflation after the domestic currency was reintroduced, 2020. 3 % per year, annual consumer price inflation in the first year with a published value under dollarisation, 2010. World Bank, World Development Indicators, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The authorities stopped defending a collapsing national currency and let the US dollar and other foreign currencies serve as money, which removed the printing of money as a source of inflation. A decade later the government and the Reserve Bank reintroduced a domestic currency, and with it the room to monetise deficits.

Preconditions

A currency already so discredited that people were transacting in foreign money
Enough foreign currency in circulation from exports and remittances to function as money
Fiscal discipline to live without a lender of last resort, which is what failed by 2019

Where else it has been used: Ecuador dollarised in 2000 and kept it. Zimbabwe's reversal shows that a dollarisation without the fiscal rule behind it can be undone by decision, and the same rise in inflation followed.

Limits: The inflation series is empty from 2005 to 2009, so the hyperinflation the move ended does not appear in it and the record cannot show its scale. The dates of both moves come from a second source, the IMF press release approving the 2019 Staff-Monitored Program (https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2019/05/31/pr19189-zimbabwe-imf-managing-director-approves-a-staff-monitored-program), which states them in one line each and does not say how much of the 2008 move was the public abandoning the Zimbabwe dollar before the authorities followed. Dollarisation gave up monetary policy, so low inflation is evidence that a rule change stopped a collapse and not that the institutions managed prices. Inflation had already risen to 10.6 percent in 2018, before the new currency, and the series cannot separate the currency decision from other causes of the 2019 and 2020 rise. The series has no value after 2022.

Zimbabwesince 2024delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Food Deficit Mitigation Programme, the 2024 El Niño drought response

After the El Niño-ravaged 2023/2024 summer season, Zimbabwe's government distributed 197,628.796 tonnes of grain to vulnerable and food-insecure households under the Food Deficit Mitigation Programme between February and 5 November 2024.

197,628.796 tonnes, grain distributed by government under the food deficit mitigation programme, cumulative since february 2024, 2024-11-05. 244,296 tonnes, strategic grain reserve stock at the same date, 2024-11-05. Government of Zimbabwe, Cabinet, 36th Post-Cabinet Press Briefing (5 November 2024), as distributed by Veritas, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare drew grain from the Strategic Grain Reserve held by the Grain Marketing Board and moved it in timed distribution rounds to households identified as food insecure, with Cabinet tracking tonnes moved each week.

Preconditions

A state grain reserve and a marketing board with depots and collection points across rural provinces
A household vulnerability assessment able to set targets by province before the lean season
Import capacity, public or private, when the domestic harvest fails

Limits: The government reports on its own programme, and the briefing text is read from a copy distributed by Veritas, a civil-society archive, not from a government-hosted copy; the figure is on page 1 of an 11-page PDF. Tonnes moved say nothing about how many people received a full ration, on time, or how targeting worked, and the 6.54 million figure in the 3 December 2024 briefing is a target, not a count of people reached. The briefings give no closing total for the 2024 to March 2025 response. The private sector imported 974,658 tonnes of maize, wheat and flour over the same period against 39,916 tonnes imported by government, so the relief rested on imports, not on reserve stock built before the drought. Development partners distributed about 10 percent of the grain in the third round. The programme recurs: its October 2025 to March 2026 round covered 77.53 percent of 1,293,657 targeted households.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Zimbabwesince 2020still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Harare-Masvingo-Beitbridge highway rehabilitation, behind schedule

Zimbabwe's government, funding the works from the budget, set out in its 2021 Budget to finish upgrading the roughly 580 km Harare-Beitbridge highway by 2022; it had opened 355 km to traffic by October 2022, and in July 2025 the Finance Ministry still reported 88 km outstanding, more than two and a half years past the 2022 target.

88 km, kilometres of the harare-masvingo-beitbridge highway still outstanding, against a 2022 completion target, 2025-07. 355 km, kilometres of the 580 km harare-beitbridge highway opened to traffic, 2022-10. Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion of Zimbabwe, 2025 Mid-Term Budget and Economic Review, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Transport split the corridor into sections and paid local contractors from the national budget, opening the road section by section as money arrived.

Preconditions

Budget space for a large capital programme during high inflation and currency redenomination
Domestic contractors able to build trunk-road sections to regional standards
A political commitment to a flagship corridor strong enough to survive successive missed targets

Limits: This is a schedule record with no cost figure: the ministry publishes allocations in a currency that was redenominated twice in the period (ZWL to ZiG) and gives no baseline budget for the whole road, so no cost overrun can be computed. The schedule slip of more than two and a half years (end of 2022 to July 2025) is our arithmetic from targets and progress the same ministry wrote in successive budget documents. It is not an audited figure, and the ministry itself kept moving the target (2022, then 2023, then 2025). The documents give the road's length as 560 km in 2020 and 580 km from 2022 onward without explaining the change. Kilometres 'opened to traffic' are self-reported and say nothing about pavement quality. The start year is that of the earliest official progress note, July 2020. Delivery used several local contractors under a national emergency programme, so this is evidence about a fiscally funded, multi-contractor build, not a single tender.