Each record describes something a country built that the indicators miss. The source provides the number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 44 of 44 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Brazil created a public agricultural research corporation in 1973 to make acidic tropical soils productive, kept it funded across every change of government since, and cereal production rose from 46.5 million tonnes in 2000 to 155.9 million in 2023.
155,877,082 tonnes, cereal production, 2023. World Bank, from FAO, retrieved 2026-08-26.
The move, and what it needed
A public research corporation with its own budget line, staffed by researchers sent abroad to train and then brought back, mandated against one specific national constraint rather than research in general.
Preconditions
A named constraint worth fifty years of work
Budget continuity across governments
A private sector able to absorb the results
Where it travelled: The model of a mission-specific public research corporation is highly transferable. The fifty years of funding continuity is the part nobody can procure.
Limits: Production is an outcome and the credit is shared with land expansion, subsidised credit and private plant breeding, so this number cannot separate the research from the rest. It also cannot see the cost: much of the expansion came from converting cerrado and forest. What the record actually evidences is fifty years of continuity in a public research mandate, which is the part no dataset measures.
🇳🇱Netherlandssince 2010still operatingbears on Government foresight capacity
The Netherlands legislated a standing programme against flooding and fresh-water shortage, run by an independent Delta Commissioner and paid from a dedicated Delta Fund that expects 27.4 billion euros to be available through 2050.
Parliament wrote the Delta Act: a permanent commissioner proposes a rolling programme each year, statutory safety standards make the work non-optional, and a ring-fenced fund keeps the money out of annual budget fights.
Preconditions
A shared national threat no party disputes
Water authorities with their own tax base, older than the state
Fiscal room to ring-fence a billion a year for decades
Where it travelled: Bangladesh's Delta Plan 2100 was written with Dutch help and copies the programme form. The statutory fund and the commissioner's independence are the parts that travel least, because they require a legislature to give up annual control.
Limits: A budget is an input: the number shows money committed, not risk reduced, and the same page says 30.8 billion is needed, so the fund is currently short of its own task. Spending on water at this scale is also ordinary for the Netherlands, which has run such works for a century. What the record evidences is the institutional form, a legally required programme, commissioner and fund that outlive governments, not the size of the number.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1991still operatingbears on Long-horizon research share
Law 8.248/1991 tied information-technology incentives to annual research, development and innovation investment of at least 5 percent of eligible domestic gross revenue, creating a predictable regime for sectoral capability.
The state exchanges a sector-specific incentive for commitments to domestic research, development, training and innovation, giving firms a reason to make longer-horizon plans within a stable policy frame.
Preconditions
A government able to target fiscal incentives at a defined industrial sector
Firms with enough domestic revenue to sustain the investment requirement
Administrative capacity to review projects and monitor the obligation
Limits: The legal investment requirement is an input, not evidence of research quality, exports or firm growth. The regime is narrow, has been amended repeatedly and creates a renewal pressure that makes continuity part of the case rather than a settled result.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 2001still operatingbears on Government foresight capacity
Created in 2001, the Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos was designed to produce prospective studies and long-term recommendations for Brazilian science, technology and innovation policy, with 273 researchers and specialists signing its creation record.
Government creates a distinct organization to turn evidence and expert networks into long-horizon options, giving policymakers a place to ask what future conditions require before a crisis sets the agenda.
Preconditions
A ministry willing to give a foresight body room to examine its own assumptions
A network of researchers and institutions that can contribute expertise
A route from prospective studies into planning and policy decisions
Limits: The creation record and a mandate for prospective studies show institutional intent, not whether foresight changes decisions or survives political pressure. CGEE operates within the science and technology policy system, so its reach does not cover every part of government.
Germany funds the Fraunhofer-Gesellschaft's institutes in proportion to what they earn from industry, and in 2025 the society performed 3.2 billion euros of contract research, 966 million euros of it paid by industry.
The state pays each institute a base grant that grows with the industrial income it wins, so every institute director is structurally forced to sell applied research to firms while the public base keeps the science honest.
Preconditions
An industrial base, especially the Mittelstand, that buys research it cannot do in-house
A funding rule stable across decades, since the incentive works only if institutes believe it
Careers competitive enough to keep researchers who could leave for industry
Where it travelled: Carnot in France and Catapult in the United Kingdom are explicit copies. Most copies struggle to replicate the base-grant-follows-industry-income rule, which is the part that does the work.
Limits: The figures are the society's own. Revenue measures demand for applied research, not whether knowledge moves between universities and firms, which is what the indicator asks about, and Fraunhofer sits beside the university system rather than inside it, so a reader can argue the model routes around university-industry collaboration as much as it evidences it. Roughly two-thirds of the budget is still public money.
🇰🇪Kenyasince 2007still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration
Kenya's central bank let a phone company build a national payments system in 2007 and supervised it into ubiquity, and by June 2026 Kenya had 94.2 million registered mobile money accounts and 572,104 agents, in a population of about 55 million.
The central bank issued a letter of no objection instead of demanding a banking licence, set conditions on trust accounts holding customer float, and wrote the e-money regulations after the system worked, legalising what it had learned rather than licensing what it could imagine.
Preconditions
A regulator senior enough to carry the risk of saying yes
A mobile operator with national agent reach and its own fraud controls
A banking sector too small in reach to block the entrant
Where it travelled: Mobile money spread across Africa and South Asia, but mostly where regulators copied the permissive sequencing. Where banking law was applied first, including in some of Kenya's neighbours for years, adoption stalled.
Limits: The delivery was Safaricom's, a majority-private company, so the record bears on public-private collaboration only through what the state did: permit, then supervise, then regulate interoperability. Registered accounts overstate people, since many Kenyans hold several, and account counts say nothing about fees, which are materially higher than card rails elsewhere. A single dominant operator is also a concentration the indicator's construct does not reward.
🇨🇭Switzerlandsince 2004still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration
Switzerland runs most upper-secondary education through firms: of 218,259 students enrolled in vocational education and training in 2020, 90.6 percent, 197,782, were apprentices trained inside companies under federal law.
Federal law makes firms, cantons and professional associations joint owners of training: associations write the curricula for their own occupations, firms hire and pay apprentices to do real work, and the state examines and certifies, so the labour market signals what to teach.
Preconditions
Employer associations strong enough to write and update curricula
Apprentice wages low enough that training pays for the firm
Social standing for the vocational route, so strong students choose it
Where it travelled: Germany and Austria run sibling systems; exports to countries without employer associations mostly produce school-based programmes with the dual name, which drops the part that works.
Limits: Enrolment counts participation in the system, not what the training is worth; the wage and employment evidence sits in separate studies. The system long predates the number: 2004 is the current federal act, not the start of apprenticeship in Switzerland, and the record cannot show how much of the outcome is the law versus a century of employer habit. Firms train because it pays them net of apprentice output, and that arithmetic, not the statute, is the load-bearing part.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1974still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration
Brazil and Paraguay built and operate Itaipu through a treaty-based binational entity, which reached 14,000 megawatts of installed capacity and has supplied both countries since the first unit entered operation in 1984.
Brazil and Paraguay converted a contested shared river into a jointly governed operating institution with its own legal personality, fixed allocation rules and a long-lived technical system.
Preconditions
A legal agreement that specifies rights, obligations and decision authority
A physical project large enough to create mutual dependence
Technical and financial institutions able to keep the partnership operating for decades
Limits: Installed capacity shows the scale of the physical system, not the quality of the bilateral relationship, the project's cost or the distribution of its benefits. A treaty structure can hold a joint asset together while leaving wider coordination between the countries unresolved.
Since 2001, Cadastro Único has identified and characterized low-income families across Brazil and has become the entry point for more than 40 federal, state and municipal social programmes.
One shared identity and needs record lets multiple programmes see the same household, reducing the need for each programme to build its own eligibility system and making the state more legible to people it serves.
Preconditions
A national identity key that can link people across programmes
Municipal service points able to collect and update household information
Rules that let several programmes use the same record while preserving eligibility distinctions
Limits: A registry and its programme count show administrative reach, not whether citizens trust the state or whether benefits arrive accurately and on time. The source is the ministry responsible for the registry, and coverage depends on families keeping their records current.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 2004still operatingbears on Trust in public institutions
Launched in 2004, Portal da Transparência has spent 20 years publishing federal revenue, expenditure, personnel and transfer information so citizens can inspect how public money is used.
The government turns its own administrative records into a public interface, so oversight can begin with the same transaction detail that the bureaucracy uses to execute and audit spending.
Preconditions
Administrative records detailed enough to publish at transaction level
A legal duty to disclose public spending
An oversight body able to maintain the interface and respond to findings
Limits: Publication creates the possibility of scrutiny, not evidence that people use the data or trust the institutions being scrutinized. The portal mainly covers federal government execution and excludes some state-owned and non-federal activity.
Singapore gave every citizen aged 25 and over an individual training account in 2016 and keeps topping it up, and in 2024 260,000 Singaporeans spent credit on courses, up 35 percent on the year before.
The state deposits money in a named account each citizen owns, publishes a course registry with subsidies, and lets individual demand rather than employers decide what gets learned, with top-ups aimed at mid-career workers.
Preconditions
A single national identity and payments rail to run the accounts on
A subsidised training market large enough to spend the credit in
Fiscal surpluses to fund top-ups a decade running
Where it travelled: France's Compte Personnel de Formation is the closest sibling. Both show the same failure mode of low-value courses chasing the credit, which each has had to prune from its registry.
Limits: Usage is the programme reporting on itself, and a usage count says nothing about whether the training raised skills or wages. About 260,000 users in a year is under a tenth of the adult citizen population, and separate reporting notes most citizens had not touched their top-up. The record evidences a durable mechanism for adult learning, not a transformation of participation.
🇫🇮Finlandsince 1928still operatingbears on Adult learning participation
Finland runs the world's most used public library system under a statutory duty dating to 1928, and in 2024 Finns borrowed 85.4 million items, 15.3 per inhabitant, and visited libraries 50.7 million times.
The state made libraries a statutory municipal duty with national subsidy, kept them free by law including reservations and inter-library loans, and municipalities compete on quality, with the flagship in Helsinki placed opposite parliament as a statement.
Preconditions
Near-universal literacy and a reading culture that predates the statute
Municipal finance strong enough to fund a non-mandatory-feeling service
A language community small enough that the state subsidises publishing too
Where it travelled: The Nordic neighbours run the same model at slightly lower intensity. Elsewhere the statutory free-of-charge rule is the part that erodes first, and with it the usage.
Limits: Borrowing is reading, not structured adult learning, so the record sits one step from the indicator's construct, which asks about participation in education and training; it is filed because the library statute explicitly assigns libraries a lifelong-learning duty and no better-measured Finnish delivery covers the gap. Loans per head are also falling slowly here as everywhere, and the world-leading claim depends on which countries publish comparable statistics.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1951still operatingbears on Research citation impact
Founded in 1951, CAPES built a national postgraduate funding and evaluation system, and by 1995 Brazil's system had more than 60,000 students across over 1,000 master's and 600 doctoral courses.
60,000 students, postgraduate students in the national system, 1995. CAPES, História e missão, retrieved 2026-08-29.
The move, and what it needed
A federal agency combines funding with peer evaluation and a national standard, so postgraduate programmes coordinate around a common definition of quality instead of growing as isolated local institutions.
Preconditions
A stable public agency with authority over funding and evaluation
A research community willing to participate in a shared assessment system
Long-term public support for postgraduate training
Limits: Student and course counts show the scale of the postgraduate system, not the quality or international impact of its research. CAPES reports the institutional history and its own programmes, while citation impact requires a separate bibliometric source.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1937still operatingbears on Research citation impact
Created in 1937, INEP built a standing education statistics and census system that lets federal, state and municipal actors see schools, students and policy results across Brazil, while its historical archive now spans 218.68 linear metres.
A permanent statistical institution gives education policy a memory and a common set of objects, so schools, students and results can be compared across territories and governments.
Preconditions
A mandate to collect comparable information across levels of government
Schools and secretariats able to report through a shared system
Analytical staff and archival practice that preserve series across reforms
Limits: An archive and a census show that a state can record itself, not that the resulting policy improves learning or research quality. The data system also depends on reporting by schools and education secretariats, and its history includes institutional redesign.
The United Kingdom's financial regulator built the first regulatory sandbox in 2016, and by the end of 2022 had accepted 168 firms and products to test with real customers under supervision.
The regulator wrote a bounded testing regime: a firm without full authorisation can trial a product on real customers for a fixed period, with disclosure requirements and an exit plan, while the regulator watches from inside.
Preconditions
A single conduct regulator with statutory room to waive its own rules
A fintech sector dense enough to fill cohorts
Political cover for a regulator explicitly helping firms it will later police
Where it travelled: The sandbox is Britain's most copied regulatory export, and several dozen jurisdictions now run one. Most copies keep the name and drop the supervisory intensity that makes it work.
Limits: The count is the regulator reporting on its own programme, and acceptance is not success: the FCA does not publish how many tests led to authorisation, funding or a product that survived. One hundred and sixty-eight firms over seven years is small next to the sector, so the number evidences that the mechanism runs, not that it moves the industry.
🇮🇱Israelsince 1993delivered and closedbears on Venture capital investment
Israel put 100 million dollars of public money into ten hybrid venture funds from 1993, with foreign partners and a buy-out option, and by 2002 the country had 131 venture funds with around 10 billion dollars under management.
The state capitalised new private funds rather than picking companies, required each fund to bring a foreign venture firm as partner, and sold the government's stake cheaply to the private partners once a fund worked, so the subsidy was the upside, and it expired by design.
Preconditions
A stock of investable technology and founders already present
Foreign venture firms willing to teach the craft for cheap equity
A government able to exit a working programme instead of scaling it
Where it travelled: Yozma is the most copied venture policy in the world, and most copies fail on the same two points: no credible foreign-partner requirement, and no willingness to sell the state's stake at the moment of success.
Limits: Attribution is the weak joint: the ten funds were one cause among several, alongside a million-person skilled immigration wave, military technology spillovers and a US stock market that wanted Israeli listings, and the OECD paper credits Yozma as catalyst rather than cause. The 10 billion figure is capital under management, not investment made or returns earned, and roughly 70 percent of it was foreign money. The programme was deliberately closed once private capital led, which is why the status is concluded.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 2013still operatingbears on Business share of R&D
Created in 2013, EMBRAPII connects companies to public and private research units through shared-risk funding, and it contracted a record 811 new industrial research projects in 2025.
811 projects, new projects contracted in the year, 2025. EMBRAPII, 2025 results, retrieved 2026-08-29.
The move, and what it needed
Public funding follows an industry's defined technical problem into a research unit, sharing early risk while leaving the company and researchers responsible for solving a concrete challenge.
Preconditions
Research units with equipment and technical depth ready to work with firms
Companies able to define a problem and contribute a financial counterpart
A funding body with enough flexibility to contract applied work faster than ordinary grants
Limits: Project counts show the throughput of a funding network, not the commercial value, technical success or additionality of the research. EMBRAPII's own results report the programme's activity, and projects vary widely in scale and maturity.
Brazil ended four decades of high inflation with a staged currency reform, taking annual consumer price inflation from 2,075.9 percent in 1994 to 3.2 percent in 1998.
3.2 % per year, annual consumer price inflation, 1998. World Bank, from IBGE, retrieved 2026-08-26.
The move, and what it needed
A stable unit of account was introduced alongside the failing currency, prices were re-anchored to it while it was still only a reference, and it became legal tender only once the anchoring had happened.
Preconditions
A technical team with authority to sequence the reform
Enough reserves to defend the new currency
Public exhaustion with inflation deep enough to accept the transition
Where it travelled: The staged unit-of-account move is the transferable idea and it has been studied everywhere. The exchange rate anchor that held it in place broke in 1999, which is the part not to copy.
Limits: Disinflation was held in place with an overvalued exchange rate and high interest rates, and that arrangement broke in the 1999 devaluation and again in the 2002 confidence crisis. One macroeconomic outcome is not a general measure of how fast Brazilian institutions respond to new conditions. The design and the sequencing are the capability here, and no number in this record captures them.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1975still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness
Brazil answered the 1973 oil shock by mandating ethanol blending and building a national fuel alcohol industry, taking production from 580 thousand cubic metres in 1975 to 38,199 in 2025, and from 2003 flex-fuel engines moved the choice to the driver.
A blending mandate created guaranteed demand, subsidised credit built the mills against it, and flex-fuel engines two decades later moved the choice from the state to the driver.
Preconditions
A crop and land base able to supply at scale
A state able to hold a mandate for decades
Domestic vehicle manufacturing that can be made to adapt
Where it travelled: The mandate-then-credit sequence is transferable and has been tried widely. The flex-fuel step is what made it durable and it required the car industry to move.
Limits: The programme was heavily subsidised in the 1980s and nearly collapsed when oil prices fell in the 1990s, so the line is not a story of steady success. Production volume says nothing about land use, cane labour conditions, or how the emissions accounting works out. What this evidences is a state changing an entire fuel system in response to an external shock, which is the construct the indicator asks for.
🇦🇷Argentinasince 1991dismantledbears on Institutional responsiveness
Argentina ended hyperinflation by fixing the peso to the dollar by law in April 1991, taking annual inflation from 4,923 percent in 1989 to 3.9 percent in 1994, and the regime held until it collapsed in the 2001-2002 crisis.
Congress fixed the exchange rate one-to-one to the dollar by statute and barred the central bank from printing unbacked pesos, which converted a monetary promise nobody believed into a law that was costly to break.
Preconditions
Dollar reserves large enough to back the monetary base
A legislature willing to bind itself and its successors
Prices and contracts already partly dollarised, so the anchor was credible on day one
Where it travelled: Currency boards were copied widely in the 1990s, from Estonia to Bulgaria, and they worked as stabilisers. Argentina is the case every copy now studies for the exit problem: the law had no honest way out.
Limits: The IMF and World Bank series for Argentina do not reach these years, so the numbers come from a teaching case that republishes the official table, and the 1989 figure is a December-to-December change where other publications give 3,079 percent as the annual average. Ending inflation is what the indicator asks for, but the fixed parity that delivered the stabilisation also removed the tools that could have absorbed the shocks of 1999-2001, so the case evidences a response that consumed its own durability. The collapse later cost Argentina its statistical credibility too, which is why the official series is hard to cite today.
🇩🇪Germanysince 2008delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness
Germany answered the 2008-2009 collapse in manufacturing orders by paying firms to cut hours instead of jobs, and short-time work covered 1.44 million workers at the May 2009 peak, about 5 percent of insured employment, while unemployment barely rose.
The employment agency reimburses firms most of the net wage for hours not worked when demand collapses, converting the existing unemployment-insurance fund into a payroll bridge, and the 2009 government lengthened the entitlement and cut the paperwork.
Preconditions
A standing legal instrument and fund, so scaling needed a regulation rather than a new law
Works councils and employers used to negotiating hours
A shock read as temporary, since the bridge only pays off if demand returns
Where it travelled: Short-time work schemes spread across the OECD after 2009 and nearly everywhere in 2020. The lesson that travelled worst is fiscal: the bridge is cheap only when the crisis is short.
Limits: The count says how many workers were covered, not what the scheme cost, how much of the covered work would have survived anyway, or whether it slowed reallocation to better firms, which are the standard criticisms. The instrument long predates 2008; what the episode evidences is the speed at which an existing legal instrument was expanded inside one year. The same instrument covered over six million people in 2020, so the 2009 number is not its ceiling.
🇹🇷Turkeysince 2001operating below its peakbears on Institutional responsiveness
Turkey answered its 2001 banking collapse with central bank independence, bank restructuring and fiscal rule, taking inflation from 54.4 percent in 2001 to 8.6 percent in 2004, and after 2018 the same framework was overridden until inflation reached 72.3 percent in 2022.
A crisis government handed monetary policy to an independent central bank by law, recapitalised and closed broken banks through an autonomous agency, and held a primary surplus, which together made the anti-inflation promise credible for fifteen years.
Preconditions
A crisis deep enough to make the political cost of reform payable
External anchors, the IMF programme and EU accession prospect, that rewarded holding the framework
A technocratic team with authority to execute across ministries
Where it travelled: The package was the standard post-crisis prescription and worked as designed. What the case adds is the second half: formal independence survived on paper while governors were replaced until policy followed the executive, a path other countries have since repeated.
Limits: Inflation is an outcome with many causes: the 2001-2004 fall also rode an IMF programme and a global disinflation, and the post-2018 rise includes a currency crisis and imported energy prices, so neither number isolates the institutions. The record runs both ways by design: the same state that built a working stabilisation framework later demonstrated that the framework had no defence against its own executive. The institutions were not abolished, which is why the status is eroded rather than dismantled.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1972delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness
Created in 1972, Telebras coordinated Brazil's state telecom system until its 1998 privatisation, when 54 concessionaires were split out and the state moved from operating the network to regulating and universalising service.
The state first assembled a fragmented telecom sector into one planning and investment system, then dismantled that holding structure when a new regulatory and private operating model was judged more suitable for expansion.
Preconditions
Authority to consolidate regional operators under one national plan
A public investment and research base large enough to build the network
A legal and regulatory framework able to transfer operating assets without abandoning the public objective
Limits: The number of controlled companies shows the structure of the old system, not whether privatisation delivered affordable, reliable service everywhere. The transition also left a continuing Telebras with a different role, so the record concerns a model that ended rather than a company that disappeared.
Brazil's central bank specified, built and ran a mandatory instant payment rail that settled 7.98 billion transactions in July 2026, for 152 million people and 14 million firms transacting in that month.
The central bank wrote the standard, mandated participation for every institution above a size threshold, ran the settlement infrastructure itself and set the price to zero for individuals.
Preconditions
A central bank with regulatory authority over the institutions it needs to compel
Near-universal account ownership to build on
A national identity number to key accounts to
Where it travelled: The instant rail is not novel and India built one first. What Brazil added was compulsory participation and a zero price, and those are the parts most copies drop.
Limits: Transaction volume shows adoption of one payment rail. It says nothing about cost or schedule performance on a capital project, which is what this indicator asks for. Pix was specified and enforced by a single institution with regulatory power over the participants, so it is weak evidence about delivery that needs several agencies to hold position.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 2019still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil consolidated federal public services behind one identity platform, reporting 175 million active accounts and 5,179 digital services in May 2026.
One identity provider for every federal service, with assurance levels tied to records the state already held, and a rule that services migrate to it rather than build their own login.
Preconditions
Existing federal databases good enough to verify identity against
Authority to force agencies off their own systems
Limits: An account count measures registration and a service count measures listing. Neither shows whether a service completes, how long it takes, or what it costs to run. Both numbers are published by the programme about itself, with no external audit attached.
🇪🇪Estoniasince 2001still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Estonia has run one data exchange layer for the whole state since 2001, and in July 2026 it carried 374.9 million queries between 1,000 connected organizations, 251 of them government bodies, across 3,785 services.
A distributed exchange layer between agency systems, with a legal once-only rule: an agency may not ask a citizen for data another agency already holds.
Preconditions
A legal mandate strong enough to bind every agency
A national identity system
Small enough administration to move together
Where it travelled: Finland, Iceland and others run the same software. The once-only law is the part that does the work and the part that is hardest to pass.
Limits: Query volume measures use of a layer that grew over 25 years. That is evidence of sustained operation and not of bringing one large project in on cost and on schedule, which is what this indicator asks for. The factsheet is published by the authority that operates the system.
🇮🇳Indiasince 2014still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Existing banks were given a national target and a stripped-down account product, and the identity system removed the documentation barrier that had excluded people.
Preconditions
A bank branch and agent network with national reach
A digital identity covering the population
Political priority high enough to hold banks to a target
Limits: An account count measures opening. Part of the stock is dormant or holds very little, and the release carries no external audit. Reaching 590 million people through banks that already existed is a different problem from delivering a physical project on a schedule.
🇺🇾Uruguaysince 2010still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Uruguay rebuilt its electricity supply between 2010 and 2017 through public tenders and long-term contracts, and in 2025 fossil fuels produced 293 GWh of the 15,855 GWh generated, so 98.2 percent came from hydro, wind, biomass and solar.
Long-term power purchase agreements at fixed prices, awarded by competitive auction, with the state utility as a single creditworthy buyer carrying the offtake risk.
Preconditions
A solvent state utility that private investors will contract with
A wind or solar resource worth bidding for
Cross-party agreement to hold the policy across governments
Where it travelled: The auction plus single-buyer design is the most transferable piece and has been used across Latin America. The decade of political continuity behind it is not a design choice.
Limits: The share is computed from the published generation series by source and is not itself a published headline figure. A generation mix is an outcome, and it hides the cost and schedule record of the projects behind it. A wet or dry year moves the hydro share by several points, so one year is not the programme.
🇺🇾Uruguaysince 2007still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Uruguay gave a connected laptop to every child in public primary school from 2007, the first country to do it nationally, and the household survey found a Ceibal computer in the homes of 35.8 percent of the population in 2018.
A dedicated agency outside the education ministry procured devices and connectivity at national scale and used schools as the distribution channel.
Preconditions
A small enough country to reach every school
Budget held outside the ministry it serves
Electricity and connectivity to the schools
Limits: Household reach peaked at 40.1 percent in 2014 and the series stops in 2018, so this number says nothing about the programme now. A device in the home measures distribution and says nothing about learning. The record is here because the delivery is documented and the measure of it is weak.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1988still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil wrote a right to health into the 1988 constitution and built a single public system that covers everybody in the country, and the WHO service coverage index for Brazil rose from 71 in 2000 to 84 in 2023.
A right to health written into the constitution, funded by earmarked federal transfers and delivered by municipalities under national rules.
Preconditions
A constitutional moment able to carry the commitment
A municipal layer capable of delivering services
Earmarked funding that survives annual budget fights
Limits: A service coverage index counts whether services reach people. It says nothing about waiting times, quality, or the difference between a capital city and the interior, and it credits private provision alongside the public system. Brazil spends less per head on public health than most countries with a comparable index, which this number cannot show.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1973operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
Brazil's national immunisation programme reached 99 percent DPT coverage in 2003 and held above 95 percent for a decade, then fell to 68 percent by 2021 and had recovered to 91 percent by 2024.
91 % of children, dpt immunisation coverage, children aged 12-23 months, 2024. 99 % of children, dpt immunisation coverage at its 2003 peak, 2003. World Bank, from WHO and UNICEF estimates, retrieved 2026-08-26.
The move, and what it needed
Free universal vaccination delivered through the primary care network, with national campaign days that made coverage a visible public event.
Preconditions
A primary care network with national reach
A cold chain
Public trust in the health system, which is what later eroded
Limits: This record is here because it runs both ways. A delivery capability that reached the whole country lost a third of its coverage in five years and has not fully recovered, which is evidence about durability rather than about peak performance. Coverage is administratively reported, DPT is one antigen among many, and the fall has several causes that the series cannot separate.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 2003delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery
Brazil connected the last rural households to electricity through a national programme run with the state and private distributors, taking access from 94.4 percent of the population in 2000 to 99.8 percent in 2024.
The federal government paid the connection cost and delivered through the existing distribution concessionaires, with connection targets written into their contracts.
Preconditions
Concessionaires already operating in the territory
A grid close enough to extend
Subsidy large enough that the last connections are not loss-making
Limits: Access counts a connection. It says nothing about how often the power fails, what it costs, or the isolated Amazon communities that make up most of the remaining gap. Access was already rising before 2003, so the programme accelerated a trend rather than starting one.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 2003still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil built one national registry of low-income households and paid conditional transfers through it, going from 6.6 million benefits in December 2004 to a peak of 21.0 million in 2022 and 18.6 million in December 2025.
One registry of low-income households shared across every social programme, with payments made directly to a card held by the mother, conditional on school attendance and health checks.
Preconditions
A payments network reaching poor municipalities
Civil registration good enough to identify households
Municipal staff to maintain the registry
Where it travelled: The conditional transfer plus single registry has been adopted across Latin America, Africa and Asia. The registry, not the transfer, is the reusable asset.
Limits: A benefit count is administrative and says nothing about whether the transfers reduced poverty. The programme was renamed and restructured twice between 2021 and 2023, so the series covers more than one design. The capability worth copying is the registry and the targeting, and neither has a number in this record.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1996still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil has run every election on electronic voting machines since 2000, across an electorate that reached 155.9 million voters in 2024, with results published the same evening.
One election authority owns the machines, the software and the count, with public audit ceremonies and results published the same evening.
Preconditions
A single national election authority with its own budget
Enough institutional standing to be trusted with the count
Logistics able to reach every polling place
Limits: The electorate measures the scale of the operation and not the speed or the integrity of the count. The Superior Electoral Court publishes result timing and audit results separately and neither is in this number. Electronic voting has been contested politically in Brazil despite repeated public audits, which is a fact about trust rather than about delivery.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1997still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Brazil developed deepwater extraction, found the pre-salt fields in 2006 and produced them at depths of more than 5,000 metres, with national oil production rising from 71,844 thousand cubic metres in 2000 to 219,032 in 2025.
A state oil company sustained deepwater research for decades, and licensing rules concentrated the learning from each field in one operator.
Preconditions
A state company with a real research budget
Reserves worth the exploration risk
Capital markets willing to fund very long payback
Limits: Production is an outcome shared between Petrobras and foreign operators, and several individual platforms ran years late and over budget, which is exactly the cost and schedule record this indicator asks for and which this number hides. Expanding oil output also sits against Brazil's climate commitments, and a production figure cannot weigh that.
🇲🇽Mexicosince 2003dismantledbears on Large project delivery
Mexico built public health insurance for people outside social security from 2003 and abolished it in 2020, and CONEVAL measured the share of the population without access to health services rising from 16.2 percent in 2018 to 39.1 percent in 2022.
The abolition is the mechanism recorded here: a new government replaced a funded, enrolment-based entitlement with a budget-line service that required no affiliation, and affiliation-based coverage disappeared faster than the replacement could deliver care.
Preconditions
A programme identified with the previous political coalition, which made it removable
Centralised budget authority able to redirect earmarked health funds
No statutory or constitutional floor under the entitlement
Where it travelled: The replacement, INSABI, was itself dissolved in 2023 and replaced by IMSS-Bienestar, the second replacement in four years. The case travels as a warning: an entitlement without a legal floor is one election from removal.
Limits: The metric measures the dismantling, not the programme: CONEVAL's deprivation number is self-reported affiliation, not care received, and Seguro Popular at its peak was itself criticised for shallow coverage and uneven state-level spending. The 2018-2022 change spans the pandemic, which stressed every health system, so not all of the 23-point rise is the reform. CONEVAL itself lost autonomy in a later reorganisation, so the continuity of this series is not assured.
🇬🇧United Kingdomsince 1998operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
England built a national network of early-childhood centres reaching 3,632 sites by August 2009, then closed or hollowed out a large part of it after funding was cut, with the official count at 3,123 by October 2017 and independent estimates near 1,000 closures.
3,123 centres, children's centres open, official count, 2017-10. 3,632 centres, children's centres open at the peak, 2009-08. The Sutton Trust, Stop Start report summary, retrieved 2026-08-27.
The move, and what it needed
Central government funded local one-stop centres for under-fives, ring-fenced the money, and targeted the most deprived areas first; when the ring-fence was removed in 2010, local authorities under cuts converted, merged or closed centres faster than any national decision was ever taken.
Preconditions
Local authorities able to deliver a nationally specified service
A ring-fenced grant, whose removal was also what let the network erode
Cross-departmental agreement that early childhood was infrastructure
Where it travelled: The 2025 Best Start family hubs programme is the same state rebuilding a version of what it closed, fifteen years later, which is the strongest available evidence that the erosion was a loss.
Limits: A site count is the crudest measure of the service: many surviving centres kept the building and lost the staff, which is why the Sutton Trust's estimate of real closures is roughly double the official fall shown here. The count stops in 2017 and later parliamentary answers show further decline. The record shows the erosion of delivered infrastructure under budget cuts, not the effect on children; the IFS separately measured lasting health benefits from the programme at its peak, which is what makes the erosion a loss rather than housekeeping.
🇿🇦South Africasince 1994operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
South Africa ran one of the world's cheapest reliable grids and extended it to most of the population after 1994, then under-invested and lost the surplus, reaching 335 days of load shedding in 2023 before recovering to 83 days in 2024.
The erosion is the mechanism recorded here: a state monopoly was told to electrify without being allowed to charge for or build ahead of demand, new-build decisions were delayed for a decade, and the two giant plants finally ordered were too large for the delivery capability that remained.
Preconditions
A single vertically integrated utility, so one balance sheet carried every deferral
Tariffs held below cost for political reasons, which financed under-maintenance
Procurement institutions too weakened to deliver a mega-project on schedule
Where it travelled: The failure pattern, defer, then order two of the largest coal plants ever attempted, is a caution for any state that skips a build cycle and tries to catch up in one leap.
Limits: The day counts are read from the annual chart in the CSIR report rather than a stated table, and a day with any load shedding counts the same as a day of stage six, so the unit understates severity differences. The 2024 recovery also leans on private rooftop solar that households bought in self-defence, which the report itself notes, so the improvement is not all Eskom's. What the record shows is a delivered capability, generation adequacy, lost over roughly fifteen years of deferred maintenance and failed new build, with Medupi and Kusile late and over budget.
🇺🇸United Statessince 2000operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery
The United States eliminated endemic measles transmission by 2000 through school-entry vaccination requirements, and falling coverage brought 2,777 confirmed cases by August 2026, the most since 1991, against 285 in all of 2024.
The erosion is the mechanism recorded here: vaccination requirements are enforced at school entry by states, so a delivery that took federal purchasing and decades of practice is being undone state by state through widening exemption rules and falling trust, with no single decision anywhere.
Preconditions
Enforcement located at fifty state legislatures rather than one national rule
A generation of parents with no memory of the disease
An information environment that carries vaccine doubt faster than health agencies answer it
Where it travelled: The same coverage decline is visible across several high-income countries; the American case is the cleanest because elimination was formally certified in 2000, which fixes the baseline the erosion is measured against.
Limits: A case count is the lagging end of the erosion; the leading end is kindergarten vaccination coverage, which CDC reports separately as falling from about 95 percent before the pandemic to under 93 percent, below the outbreak-prevention threshold. The 2026 number is a year in progress and will rise. Elimination status is a WHO-defined property of transmission chains, not of case counts, and had not been formally revoked at retrieval; what the record documents is a maintained public-health achievement being lost while the infrastructure that delivered it still exists.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1952still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Founded in 1952, Brazil's federal development bank provides long-term financing and investment across the national economy, and it disbursed R$169.7 billion in 2025.
The federal development bank converts public capital and long-term finance into patient support for firms and infrastructure projects that commercial lenders may not carry through their formation period.
Preconditions
A public balance sheet able to lend beyond ordinary commercial horizons
A pipeline of firms and projects able to turn finance into productive capacity
A mandate that can survive changes of government
Where it travelled: Development banks exist across emerging economies, but the Brazilian case shows the value and the risk of keeping one institution large enough to shape an industrial system: patient capital can build capability, while political allocation can weaken it.
Limits: Disbursement volume measures the bank's activity, not whether the projects it finances arrive on time, within budget or with durable public value. The source is the institution reporting on itself, and the number mixes market-rate lending with policy-directed finance.
🇧🇷Brazilsince 1694still operatingbears on Large project delivery
Founded in 1694, Brazil's national mint has remained a public institution through colonial, imperial and republican regimes and now produces currency, identity documents and passports after more than 330 years of operation.
A permanent public production institution carries the state's credential infrastructure across political and monetary transitions, preserving practical capability while its outputs change with the regime around it.
Preconditions
A public mandate for products whose authenticity the state must guarantee
Security and production capabilities that can be renewed across technology shifts
Administrative continuity strong enough to outlast constitutional change
Limits: Institutional survival and the ability to produce state credentials show continuity, not the cost, quality or strategic value of every product made by the mint. The institution also changed its technologies and functions over time, so continuity does not mean an unchanged organisation.
Estonia has run legally binding internet voting since 2005, and at the 2023 Riigikogu election 312,182 votes, 51.1 percent of all votes cast, came in online, the first national election anywhere in which more than half the vote was digital.
The state let any voter cast and re-cast a ballot online during the advance period, with the last vote counting and a paper vote overriding, which turned the coercion problem into a game the voter can always exit.
Preconditions
A universal cryptographic identity already in every pocket
An electoral authority with the engineering staff to own the system rather than rent it
Small scale, which keeps the attack surface and the audit tractable
Where it travelled: Twenty years on, no other country runs internet voting at national scale: Switzerland trials and withdraws, Norway tried and stopped. The Estonian lesson is that the identity system came first, and copies that start with the voting app fail.
Limits: Turnout by channel measures adoption, not democratic quality: an online share says nothing about coercion outside the polling station, verifiability, or trust in the count, and Estonian i-voting has standing academic critics on all three. Adoption also rides on the national identity infrastructure recorded elsewhere in this dataset, so as evidence for civic participation it shows a lowered cost of voting rather than a raised desire to participate; overall turnout moved far less than the channel share.
🇦🇺Australiasince 1924still operatingbears on Civic participation
Australia has required citizens to vote since 1924 and turnout at the 2025 federal election was 90.7 percent of enrolled voters, a level no large voluntary-voting democracy reaches.
Parliament made voting a legal duty with a token fine, paired it with automatic-style enrolment, Saturday voting and easy postal and early options, so the state removed every excuse at the same time as it imposed the duty.
Preconditions
Cross-party agreement to keep the duty, since either side could repeal it
An electoral commission trusted to run painless voting
A fine large enough to state the norm and small enough not to embitter
Where it travelled: Around twenty countries mandate voting and fewer enforce it; Belgium and Luxembourg are the closest working siblings. Where compulsion was dropped, as in Chile in 2012, turnout fell by tens of points within two elections.
Limits: Turnout under compulsion measures compliance, not civic desire, which is exactly the objection to filing it under civic participation; the record is here because the indicator's construct is participation behaviour, and ninety percent of a country voting for a century is behaviour, whatever its cause. The denominator is enrolled voters, and enrolment itself is near-complete only because it is also compulsory. The fine is small and enforcement light, so the mechanism is closer to a maintained norm than to coercion.
🇷🇼Rwandasince 2007still operatingbears on Volunteering
Rwanda requires a morning of community work on the last Saturday of each month, and the government's own assessment reports average participation of 91.3 percent of adults countrywide in fiscal year 2015-2016, up from 87.8 percent two years earlier.
The state fixed a single national morning each month, closed roads and shops for it, assigned works through the lowest administrative level, and had officials up to the president participate visibly, converting an old rural practice into a synchronised national institution.
Preconditions
An administrative structure that reaches every village
A governing party able to enforce a norm without visible coercion
A rebuilding narrative in which refusing communal work reads as defection
Where it travelled: The practice descends from communal-labour traditions found across East Africa; Rwanda's addition is the synchronisation and the enforcement. Copies without the administrative reach, or the pressure, produce a cleanup day rather than an institution.
Limits: The number is the state assessing its own compulsory programme in a country where declining to participate carries social and administrative cost, so it cannot be read as volunteering in the survey sense the indicator intends, and no independent measurement exists. Participation is legally required, which is the opposite of the construct's voluntariness. The record is filed anyway because the indicator is a gap and the case is the strongest documented instance of state-organised mass civic labour, provided the compulsion is read alongside the number.