- Raw value
- 519.85articles per million people
- Year
- 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.JRN.ARTC.SC)
- History
Zimbabwe
No dimension reaches 50 on usable evidence. Raise Anticipation first, at 25.9. Coordination needs more evidence: confidence is 0.25.
Raise, lowest first
| Dimension | Confidence | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Anticipation | 0.46 | 25.9 |
| Building | 0.57 | 27.2 |
| Learning | 0.55 | 37.2 |
| Adaptability | 0.62 | 45.6 |
Measure before managing
| Dimension | Confidence | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Coordination | 0.25 | 58.1 |
| Shared Purpose | 0.29 | 35.5 |
| Experimentation | 0.41 | 1.5 |
| Trust | 0.41 | 16.7 |
| Agency | 0.44 | 44.7 |
These lists are the country's capability agenda, computed from the scores. Read the full agenda. It names comparable evidence from other countries and the 18 gaps in the registry.
Why this country is included: Added in the 9.0.0 completion, which takes every country of a million people or more that is measurable in all nine capabilities.
Read Zimbabwe beside up to three other countries, down to the indicator behind every row.
- Usable or good evidence
- Thin evidence, hollow point. The dashes open further as confidence falls.
- The point still sits at the score, because confidence never moves it.
- Click any axis to see every country on that dimension.
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
| Coordination | 0.25 | 2 of 5 | 0.88 | no trend | 36.0 | -22.1 | |
| Adaptability | 0.62 | 4 of 6 | 1.00 | no trend | 38.0 | -7.6 | |
| Agency | 0.44 | 3 of 5 | 0.81 | no trend | 42.0 | -2.7 | |
| Learning | 0.55 | 3 of 4 | 0.81 | no trend | 38.0 | +0.8 | |
| Shared Purpose | 0.29 | 3 of 6 | 0.64 | no trend | 29.0 | -6.5 | |
| Building | 0.57 | 4 of 6 | 0.90 | +2.2(3) | 21.0 | -6.2 | |
| Anticipation | 0.46 | 2 of 4 | 0.96 | +23.2(2) | 20.0 | -5.9 | |
| Trust | 0.41 | 4 of 7 | 0.92 | no trend | 14.0 | -2.7 | |
| Experimentation | 0.41 | 4 of 9 | 1.00 | +0.5(2) | 8.0 | +6.5 |
How to read this page
Each dimension has a score from 0 to 100. It shows where this country sits among all 125 countries in the comparison frame, not a percentage. Confidence sits beside the score. A dashed radar edge and hollow point mean the evidence is thin. The records below show each indicator, its raw value, year and source.
A panel estimate, when present, is a separate judgment about what the indicators miss. It does not change the score or confidence. The panel's provenance is shown beside the estimate.
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Confidence
- very thin0.00 to 0.25
The score rests on one or two indicators. Do not quote it on its own.
- thin0.25 to 0.45
A minority of indicators, or evidence old enough to have moved. Read with care.
- usable0.45 to 0.65
Enough evidence to compare countries, with known holes.
- good0.65 and above
Most indicators observed, recent, from official or intergovernmental sources.
A row marked no dataset exists is a gap: the benchmark wants data that nobody publishes. A retired row has a source this project chose not to use. Both reduce confidence. The glossary defines each term, and the limits page lists where these numbers are known to be wrong about the world.
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
+23.2 over 10 years, from 2.7 in 2016 to 25.9 on 2 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
- Raw value
- 66.802index 0-100
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IQ.SPI.OVRL)
- History
Government foresight capacity
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No comparable international dataset. OECD and UN work is descriptive, not scored. Envisioning would have to build this.
Long-horizon research commitments
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of new grants
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked for the share of R&D spending classed as basic research, which is the make-up of a spending stock, the construct D142 retired business R&D share for. OECD MSTI publishes that share for its members only, and UNESCO UIS no longer serves R&D by type of research (construct audit, 2026-10-02). The behaviour behind it is a funder committing to a horizon: a grant awarded for five years or more is a decision to wait for a result. Untried: no memo has triaged a grant register. National funders publish award lists one by one with their own durations, and commercial grant aggregators fail the inspectability rule. Wireable on a grant-level register with award and end dates, on one definition of a competitive public grant, for half the frame or more.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
R&D expenditureWorld Bank (GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS)
No value for this country. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: money committed to research is what a country spends, and spending it does not show the country reads the future well (D122).
Researchers in R&DWorld Bank (SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6), 2012
95.1 per million people, rank 86 of 114. Full-time-equivalent researchers per million people.
A condition, not scored: a standing stock of people who could investigate is what a country has, not a record of what they found (D122). Correlates with income but survives size normalization.
Secure internet serversWorld Bank (IT.NET.SECR.P6), 2024
90 per million people, rank 100 of 125. Servers using encryption in internet transactions, per million people.
A condition, not scored: a diffusion stock of digital adoption that money buys, not an act of anticipation (D122). Spans four orders of magnitude, so its rank is read on the published value and its correlations on the logged one.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 19.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Statistics are mid-frame, but the state has repeatedly failed to foresee the results of its own monetary choices. Household dollar hedging is not institutional anticipation, so I hold low.
- 20.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Statistical capacity is mid-frame, but research output is minimal and the state has repeatedly failed to anticipate its own currency collapses. Household dollar hedging earns a little.
- 25.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Statistical performance is mid-frame, but repeated currency regimes were not anticipated and research output is near the floor. I move down from 27 toward the other panelists.
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
- Raw value
- 2.772per 1,000 aged 15-64
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS)
- History
Time to start a business
direct capability measureretired, see notes- Raw value
- no datadays
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (IC.REG.DURS.MA.DY)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-17 (D167). Doing Business stopped in 2019 and the World Bank archived the code. Its successor, B-READY, publishes the time and cost to register a firm as a score, and business entry efficiency carries that construct. See D23.
Business entry efficiency
direct capability measuremissing- Raw value
- no datascore 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BRE.BE.P3)
- History
- no data
Note: Activation energy, measured directly: the third pillar of B-READY business entry, which replaces time to start a business (D167). The World Bank publishes a score, not days, and the score adds the registration cost and the route for a foreign firm, so a cheap but slow registration and a fast but costly one can score alike. B-READY covered 74 of 125 countries in the 2025 round, and the countries it has not reached have no value.
- Raw value
- 9count
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.REG.PROC.MA.NO)
- History
Adults doing digital tasks
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of adults
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- ITU / UNESCO UIS (SDG 4.4.1, ICT skills by type)
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked whether adults can perform standard digital tasks, which reads a skill level, the kind of stock D122 moved out of the scores with internet users. It now counts the act: a person who did the task. It is not the internet users condition beside it, which counts access. Candidate: ITU ICT skills by type (SDG 4.4.1) through the UNESCO UIS API, probed 2026-10-02. Sent a message with an attached file reaches 33 of the 53 countries then in the frame, 25 at 2018 or later, with no United States, India or China and most of Africa and Central America missing; two other task items reach 31 and 16. The items are self-reported and the task list has changed between rounds. Wireable on one task observed for half the frame or more at 2018 or later.
- Raw value
- 7.3mean 1-10
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (A173)
- History
- one year
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Individuals using the internetWorld Bank (IT.NET.USER.ZS), 2024
41.6 % of population, rank 105 of 125. Share of the population that used the internet in the last three months.
A condition, not scored: access to the basic tool of modern agency is what people have to act with, not a record of them acting (D122). Saturates near 95%, which compresses the top of the range.
Financial account ownershipWorld Bank (FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS), 2024
49.5 % aged 15+, rank 98 of 122. Adults with an account at a bank or mobile money provider.
A condition, not scored: holding an account is the precondition for almost any economic action, not the action (D122). Global Findex, published every three years.
Credit to the private sectorWorld Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS), 2023
6.5 % of GDP, rank 122 of 124. Domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations.
A condition, not scored: financial depth is a stock of money available to actors, not what they do with it (D122). High values can also signal a credit bubble, so more is not always better.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 37.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Perceived control is above the middle, which lifts me slightly. Vendors and cross-border traders compensate for institutional failure and rarely build durable firms, so I stay well below panelist B.
- 52.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Registered density of 2.8 per 1000 misses the vendors, cross-border traders and artisanal miners who sustain most households, and perceived control is above mid-frame. C is right that much of it is survival under high procedure cost, so I take six points off.
- 42.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Perceived control is above mid-frame and entry procedures are average, but formal density is low. The informal economy is partly survival under high cost, so I stay between panelists A and B.
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
Government effectiveness
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_GE.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. The WGI aggregate the opinions of experts and firms, and in this set the four WGI series correlate with each other between 0.93 and 0.98 while correlating with log GDP per capita at 0.91. That is one perception of national wealth counted in three dimensions. Cross-agency delivery records are the replacement and they are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Regulatory quality
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_RQ.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. Same measurement as government effectiveness, filed under a different name, correlating with it above 0.93. See D23 and A4.
Logistics performance
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataindex 1-5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (LP.LPI.OVRL.XQ)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. The LPI is a survey of international freight forwarders, so it records how a country looks to global logistics firms. A small country with a small port scores low whatever its state can organise, which is artefact A9. Container throughput and border time are observable and stay. See D23.
Border compliance time to export
direct capability measureretired, see notes- Raw value
- no datahours
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (TRD.ACRS.BRDR.EXPT.BRDR.COMP.HR.DB1619)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-17 (D167). Doing Business stopped in 2019 and the World Bank archived the code. B-READY trade efficiency carries the construct, the time and cost of border compliance, now reported by firms. See D23.
Trade compliance efficiency
direct capability measuremissing- Raw value
- no datascore 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BRE.IT.P3)
- History
- no data
Note: Observable throughput of several agencies acting together at the border: the third pillar of B-READY international trade, which replaces border compliance time to export (D167). It is a score, not hours, and it adds imports, compliance cost and goods ordered online. The World Bank reads it from firm surveys, where Doing Business asked experts about one standard shipment. The series note also names participation in digital trade and perceived obstacles to trade; the 2023 scoring table weighed only time and cost, and the revised weights were not read. B-READY covered 74 of 125 countries in the 2025 round.
- Raw value
- 127.877percentage points from approved budget
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (GF.XPD.BUDG.ZS)
- History
University-industry collaboration
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Innovation Index
- History
- no data
Note: GII carries it, but the underlying item is a WEF executive opinion survey whose microdata is not inspectable. Excluded on principle 4.
- Raw value
- 0.757index 0-1
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- V-Dem (v2x_cspart)
- History
- one year
Public-private collaboration
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No comparable dataset. PPP investment databases measure infrastructure finance, not collaboration capacity.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Customs clearance time for exportsWorld Bank (IC.CUS.DURS.EX), 2025
3.293 days, lower is better. Average number of days to clear direct exports through customs, as reported by manufacturing firms that export directly, in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Days a manufacturer that exports directly says its goods took to clear customs, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. It is the time the border took on firms' own shipments, current where the Doing Business border time this capability scores is frozen at 2019. It is not scored for two reasons. The number of firms behind each country's figure is published only in the survey microdata, and on a proxy from the published tables 37 of the 53 countries in the frame when it was checked clear 30 exporting firms; Mexico, the Philippines, Israel and nine others may not. And the question changed: surveys fielded from 2024 also ask how long release took across all border agencies, and drop an answer where customs alone took longer, so a country surveyed on both sides of the change can move severalfold with nothing at its border changing. India reads 17.3 days in 2022 and 2.5 in 2025, on more than 9,000 firms each time. No country in the frame has two surveys on the new questionnaire yet. Income is not why it is left out: it barely tracks log GDP per capita.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Beitbridge Border Post modernisation (Zimborders build-operate-transfer concession)
Zimbabwe's government contracted the Zimborders consortium under a build-operate-transfer concession to rebuild the Beitbridge Border Post with a US$300 million investment; works began in March 2019 and the President commissioned the modernised post in September 2022.
300 US$ million, investment in the beitbridge border post upgrade, 2021-02. Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA), news release 'Beitbridge Border upgrade takes shape', retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Ministry of Finance concessioned the rebuild of the country's busiest port of entry to a private consortium under build-operate-transfer, so the consortium financed construction and recovers it from user fees before handing the facility back.
Limits: The US$300 million is a headline project value stated in a revenue authority news release during construction, not an audited outturn, and the release itself credits 'the government' with the investment, which blurs how much the concessionaire financed. The concession's term, tariff and risk allocation are not given in the official sources behind this record. One concession, however large, says little about the frequency of public-private delivery, which is half of what the indicator asks; the Treasury's own text shows the model only 'being considered' for other border posts. The record has no official series on clearance times or traffic before and after, so it shows that the facility was built and commissioned, not that it performs better.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 32.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
A 28 point budget overrun is among the worst in the frame and the PVO amendment constrains NGOs. Burial societies and church networks coordinate within groups, which earns a little, so I move up two points.
- 37.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Budget execution is poor and the PVO amendment represses independent organisation. Burial societies, savings clubs and church networks coordinate below the state, so I stay above A, three points down from round 1.
- 36.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
A 28 point budget deviation is among the worst in the frame and the state represses independent organisation. The civil society index looks generous, so I stay well under 58.
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
Rule of law
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_RL.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. A WGI perception composite correlating with control of corruption above 0.95 and with log GDP per capita at 0.83. Court throughput and case clearance rates are the observable replacement and are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Control of corruption
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_CC.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. A WGI perception composite. It measures reputation for corruption, which is not the same thing as corruption, and it tracks income closely. Prosecution and audit records are the observable replacement and are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Time to enforce a contract
direct capability measureretired, see notes- Raw value
- no datadays
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (ENF.CONT.DURS.DY)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-17 (D167). Doing Business stopped in 2019 and the World Bank archived the code. B-READY dispute resolution efficiency carries the construct, the time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute and enforce the decision. See D23.
Dispute resolution efficiency
direct capability measuremissing- Raw value
- no datascore 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BRE.DR.P3)
- History
- no data
Note: Confidence in contracts, measured as court throughput rather than opinion: the third pillar of B-READY dispute resolution, which replaces time to enforce a contract (D167). It is a score, not days, and it adds cost, the reliability of the process and the recognition of a decision. B-READY covered 74 of 125 countries in the 2025 round.
- Raw value
- 44.462% of firms
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS)
- History
- Raw value
- 1.116scale 0-4 (never to always)
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- V-Dem (v2jucomp_osp)
- History
- one year
Intentional homicide rate
downstream outcomeretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataper 100,000 people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (VC.IHR.PSRC.P5)
- History
- no data
Note: Added 2026-08-26 by D23 as the observable replacement for two retired WGI perception composites, and retired 2026-08-27 by D44 when the diagnostic built in D42 measured what it was doing. It raised this dimension's correlation with log GDP per capita by 0.288, from 0.096 to 0.385, the largest single wealth contribution anywhere in the model. It was added to fix wealth contamination and it was the wealth contamination. The dataset is sound and the objection is to what it measures here: homicide is driven heavily by organised crime, a society can be physically safe while trusting very little, and across this country set the variation it carries is mostly income. Behavioural trust measures remain a gap.
- Raw value
- 2.1% agreeing
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (A165)
- History
- one year
Trust in public institutions
perception proxyno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% expressing confidence
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD Trust Survey / WVS
- History
- no data
Note: The OECD survey covers members only. Mixing it with WVS items for India and South Africa would break comparability. The Joint EVS/WVS confidence battery (E069) reaches 37 countries from one release, and confidence in the courts (E069_17) is published beside Trust as a check under this id rather than scored: every item of the battery tested (courts, civil service, police, parliament and government) reads higher in the closed and electoral autocracies of the frame than in its democracies, which is deference as much as confidence (A13). The gap stays open for a measure that does not reward a court that cannot rule against the state. See D132.
- Raw value
- 25.9% expressing trust
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (G007_34_B)
- History
- one year
Court case clearance rate
downstream outcomeno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of incoming cases
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- CEPEJ / OECD / national court statistics
- History
- no data
Note: Whether a court finishes what it starts, counted from case records rather than asked in a survey. D23 named it as the observable replacement for the two retired WGI composites and it has stayed unfilled since. CEPEJ publishes it for Council of Europe members and OECD for its own members, so no single publisher reaches this country set, and a harmonised series needs the project second source adapter. See D57.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Confidence in the courtsJoint EVS/WVS (E069_17), 2022
17.4 % a great deal, higher is better. Share of survey respondents saying they have a great deal of confidence in the justice system and courts, of the four answers a great deal, quite a lot, not very much and none at all, in the Joint EVS/WVS 2017 to 2022 survey round.
Confidence in the courts is the public half of what this capability asks: whether people expect the rules to be enforced when a stranger breaks them. It is not scored because the survey answer reads two things the number cannot tell apart. Where courts are independent, confidence is a judgment of how they perform. Where they answer to the state, it is also deference, and saying otherwise to an interviewer has a cost. In this frame the pattern runs the wrong way. India, the Philippines and Indonesia, all electoral autocracies in the V-Dem 2025 classification, lead on the share saying a great deal, and Vietnam and China, the two closed autocracies surveyed, lead once quite a lot is counted too. The ten electoral autocracies average 21.8 percent saying a great deal and the two closed autocracies 28.1, against 13.6 for liberal and 8.4 for electoral democracies. Scored, it would rank highest the states whose courts are least able to rule against them. Income is not why it is left out: the share correlates about -0.18 with log GDP per capita. The value is the share saying a great deal; the share saying quite a lot is in the source note.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 14.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.65
Interpersonal trust at the frame floor, high bribery and weak court compliance agree. I hold.
- 15.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.60
Interpersonal trust is the frame floor, bribery is common and court compliance is weak. Savings clubs show trust in small groups that does not reach strangers.
- 13.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.60
Interpersonal trust at 2.1 percent is the frame floor, bribery is common and courts rarely rule against the state. Three direct signals agree and all panelists are within 13 to 15.
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
- Raw value
- 0.467index 0-1
- Year
- 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (HD.HCI.OVRL)
- History
- Raw value
- 23.59% of firms
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.FRM.TRNG.ZS)
- History
Adult learning participation
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no data% of adults
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Eurostat / OECD PIAAC
- History
- no data
Note: The best available measure of continuous learning capacity, and it exists only for European and OECD members.
- Raw value
- 1.263ratio to world average
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- OpenAlex (citation_normalized_percentile.is_in_top_10_percent)
- History
- one year
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Tertiary enrolmentWorld Bank (SE.TER.ENRR), 2024
7.7 % gross, rank 111 of 124. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education.
A condition, not scored: enrolment counts people in formal education and records nothing learned (D122).
Public education expenditureWorld Bank (SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS), 2023
0.39 % of GDP, rank 124 of 125. Government expenditure on education as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: public spending on education is a pure input, and learning is what the dimension asks about (D122).
Vocational share of secondaryWorld Bank (SE.SEC.ENRL.VO.ZS), 1997
0 % of secondary, rank 123 of 125. Vocational pupils as a share of total secondary enrolment.
The value is from 1997, more than 15 years old.
A condition, not scored: the share of secondary pupils on a vocational track describes how a school system is built, not what anyone learns in it, and higher is not unambiguously better (D141). It marks a route into skilled work that does not run through university. Learning reads research citation impact, firm training and the human capital index instead.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Non-formal education in Zimbabwe's schools
Under its 2015 Non-Formal Education Policy, Zimbabwe's Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education ran literacy, adult basic education (ZABEC) and part-time continuing secondary classes (PTCEC) in ordinary schools, and recorded 105,138 non-formal enrolments in 2019, with the number of schools offering the programmes rising from 1,503 in 2015 to 4,401 in 2019.
105,138 learners, enrolment in non-formal education programmes, primary and secondary levels, 2019. 4,401 schools, primary and secondary schools offering non-formal education programmes, 2019. Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, Zimbabwe, 2019 Primary and Secondary Education Statistics Report (May 2020), Chapter 10, Tables 10.1 and 10.10, retrieved 2026-10-17.
How it worked: The education ministry wrote a non-formal education policy and delivered it through the existing school network, so ordinary primary and secondary schools open afternoon and evening classes for adults and out-of-school learners, with courses that let a learner move back into the formal track.
Limits: The gap asks for a share of adults in education and training, and this is a head count of enrolments in one ministry's non-formal classes, read from tables in a PDF. The report does not break the count down by age, and the policy also serves out-of-school children and youth, so an unknown part of the 105,138 are not adults. The figure leaves out vocational colleges, universities, employer training and NGO classes. The ministry does not host the report on an openable page of its own; the URL is a copy held by Policy Vault Africa, a policy archive, and the figure is the ministry's administrative return. 2019 is the latest year with a published count that could be checked: a 2025 newspaper report says the 2024 statistics report shows a notable increase in non-formal enrolment, but gives no number. The school count fell from a high of 4,779 in 2017 to 4,401 in 2019 in the same table, and secondary PTCEC enrolment of 23,324 was below the ministry's own 2019 target of 33,500. Enrolment says nothing about completion, attendance or what was learned.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 36.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
The school system was built as an institution and still outperforms regional peers, and panelists B and C argue that well. Brain drain of teachers and doctors erodes it, so I move up only part way.
- 38.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
HCI is low, but literacy has long been high and research impact is mid-frame. A's point on the brain drain of teachers and doctors takes two points off.
- 38.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
HCI and citation impact exceed what income predicts, from a literacy legacy, which is conversion. Brain drain erodes the carriers of it, so I drop slightly from 40.
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
+0.5 over 10 years, from 0.2 in 2016 to 0.7 on 2 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
- Raw value
- 26per million people
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.PAT.RESD)
- History
- Raw value
- 390per million people
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.TMK.RSCT)
- History
- Raw value
- 21per million people
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.IDS.RSCT)
- History
- Raw value
- 44292per million people
- Year
- 2026. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- GitHub Innovation Graph (data/repositories.csv)
- History
- no data
Venture deals
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataper million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD / national VC associations
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The id keeps its first name so evidence records, links and published files still resolve. The row asked for venture capital deployed as a share of GDP, a level of financial depth of the kind private credit is (D122). A count of first rounds counts attempts started with outside risk money, which is what this capability asks about, and a large round counts once. Candidates, none wireable: the OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Financing scoreboard carried venture capital for 6 of the 16 countries the frame held on 2026-08-26, as amounts in national currency, latest year 2022, with Brazil, India, South Africa and Singapore absent (D21); national venture capital associations publish counts on their own definitions; commercial deal databases cover the world and are not inspectable (D10). Wireable on an inspectable deal count with one definition of a first round for half the frame or more. Read A1 before treating this dimension as measured.
Early-stage entrepreneurial activity
direct capability measuremissing- Raw value
- no data% aged 18-64
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, TEA rate)
- History
- no data
Note: From the GEM Adult Population Survey, entered by hand because GEM has no open API. TEA counts every new business, so necessity self-employment scores the same as a funded startup, which is why Chile and Argentina sit above the United States here. Read it as how many people are trying, not as how much value the attempts create. GEM does not run every economy every year: Singapore last took part in 2014 and the recency term marks that value down hard.
Tolerance of entrepreneurial failure
perception proxymissing- Raw value
- no data% not deterred
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, fear of failure rate)
- History
- no data
Note: Stored as 100 minus the published GEM fear of failure rate, so the direction matches the rest of the registry. GEM measures that rate among adults who already see good opportunities, not among all adults, so the denominator differs from the label. Attitudinal: bankruptcy law and time to discharge would be the observable substitute and are still worth wiring beside it.
Firms through regulatory sandboxes
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no datafirms per million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- national regulators
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked for the number and breadth of live sandboxes, which is a policy stock: a regime can exist with nobody in it. It now counts what passes through: firms a regulator let test under relaxed rules, and firms that came out, authorised, withdrawn or failed. Regulators publish cohort lists and exit reports one by one. The evidence corpus holds 22 records against this row, most of them counts of firms admitted or exited, each on the definition and window of its own regulator, and no register assembles them on one definition (O1 triage sweep, 2026-10-01). A realistic candidate for Envisioning to build from those lists. Wireable on a register that counts admissions and completions on one definition for half the frame or more.
University spinouts
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataper million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- national TTO associations
- History
- no data
Note: Reported nationally with incompatible definitions of what counts as a spinout.
Business share of R&D
capability inputretired, see notes- Raw value
- no data% of R&D
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD MSTI / RICYT
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-02. The only working source, OECD MSTI joined with RICYT for Latin America, covers 34 of the 53 countries then in the frame, but the row reads the make-up of a spending stock: who performs the R&D a country pays for. R&D spending itself is a condition since D122, and the share is high both where business research is large (Israel) and where total research is tiny and one firm dominates it (Thailand). State enterprises count as business, so China and Vietnam read their ownership model. UIS stopped publishing the series in 2023. Firms trying new things are read through patents, trademarks, designs and entrepreneurship instead. See D142.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe regulatory sandbox
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe published a list of seven innovative financial technology solutions approved for testing in its regulatory sandbox in July 2026, among them asset, securities and infrastructure tokenisation platforms, a crowdfunding platform and a blockchain capital raising platform.
7 solutions, solutions approved for participation in regulatory sandbox testing, 2026-07-24. Securities and Exchange Commission of Zimbabwe, Public Notice SCZ24072026 'Update on approved regulatory sandbox participants', retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The securities regulator approves named solutions into a timed, supervised sandbox under its own guidelines and publishes the list as a public notice so investors can tell a sandbox participant from a licensed firm.
Limits: The notice is a one-page PDF listing approvals; it calls itself an update but gives no earlier list, no admission date per firm, no testing period and no exits, so the figure is a stock of approved participants at July 2026, not an annual admissions count, and started is set to the notice year because no earlier admission was read at a source. Approval for testing is not testing: the notice warns that representations beyond testing are misleading, and some entries (Financial Securities Exchange, a licensed exchange) are incumbents. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has run a separate fintech regulatory sandbox since March 2021, whose admissions are not counted here because no current count was read at an official source today. Seven approvals against about 16 million people is about 0.4 per million.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 5.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Filings and repositories are near the floor and sudden currency and price controls punish risk. EcoCash was one firm's product, and the regulator later restricted it; that is not a setting that supports trying.
- 15.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.30
EcoCash, multi-currency pricing and improvised supply show people trying new approaches under constant shocks. A and C are right that currency and price controls punish trying, so I take five points off but stay above them.
- 8.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Filings and repositories are near the floor and currency controls and reversals make trial costly. EcoCash and multi-currency pricing are real trying, so just above the floor.
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
- Raw value
- 9.293% of labour force
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS)
- History
- Raw value
- 48.2% of unemployed
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- ILOSTAT (DF_UNE_TUNE_SEX_AGE_DUR_NB)
- History
- one year
- Raw value
- 0.419index 0-1, lower = more diversified
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- UNCTAD (US.ConcentDiversIndices)
- History
- one year
- Raw value
- 1.59% of products not exported competitively at the start
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Harvard Growth Lab (hs92_country_product_year_4.csv (doi:10.7910/DVN/T4CHWJ))
- History
- one year
Disaster preparedness and recovery
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- INFORM / UNDRR
- History
- no data
Note: No source observes a country preparing for or recovering from a real shock. INFORM publishes its lack of coping capacity apart from hazard and exposure, but that dimension averages government self-assessments and governance perception indices with stocks such as roads, phones and physicians, which is the perception layer D23 retired plus conditions money buys (D122). Sendai and WHO reporting are governments grading themselves. A warning-reach survey item is a check candidate. See the disaster preparedness memo.
Institutional responsiveness
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No dataset exists. Measurable in principle from legislative and regulatory timestamps, which no one has assembled comparably.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Labour force participationWorld Bank (SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS), 2025
68.5 % aged 15+, rank 75 of 125. Share of the working-age population in the labour force.
A condition, not scored: how much of the population is in the labor force at all is what a country has to reallocate, a level set by norms, schooling and age, not a record of it reallocating (D141). Participation norms confound it, especially for India. Adaptability reads reallocation through long-term unemployment and export diversification instead.
Fixed broadband subscriptionsWorld Bank (IT.NET.BBND.P2), 2024
1.9 per 100 people, rank 99 of 125. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people.
A condition, not scored: installed infrastructure is what a country has to change with, not a record of it changing (D122). Penalizes mobile-first countries such as India and South Africa.
Electricity transmission lossesWorld Bank (EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS), 2024
20.7 % of output, rank 106 of 117. Power lost in transmission and distribution, including unbilled use.
A condition, not scored: the state of the grid, and whether its operator can bill what it delivers, is infrastructure a country has to change with, not a record of it changing (D141). Read it beside broadband, the other installed network beside Adaptability.
Informal employmentILOSTAT (DF_SDG_0831_SEX_ECO_RT), 2025
84.3 % of employment, rank 79 of 102. Informal employment as a share of total employment, SDG indicator 8.3.1.
A condition, not scored: how much work carries no contract, registration or social protection describes the labor market a country reallocates through, not it reallocating (D150). Read it beside the unemployment rate: where most work is informal, a person who loses a job takes any work within weeks, so a low rate is not a fluid market. Its direction for Adaptability cannot be defended, since informal work is both the slack that absorbs a shock and the precarity that keeps a worker from moving up, so the rank orders values and is not a verdict. Comparability is weak: the European values come from an income survey (EU-SILC) with a proxy definition, and the rest from labor force or household surveys processed by the ILO. ILOSTAT has no value for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Malaysia, China, the Philippines or Cuba, and some values are old (Haiti and Nicaragua 2012).
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Dollarisation against hyperinflation, and its reversal in 2019
Zimbabwe moved to full dollarisation in late 2008 to break hyperinflation and held annual consumer price inflation between minus 2.4 and 3.7 percent from 2010 to 2017, then reintroduced a domestic currency in February 2019, after which inflation reached 557.2 percent in 2020.
557.2 % per year, annual consumer price inflation after the domestic currency was reintroduced, 2020. 3 % per year, annual consumer price inflation in the first year with a published value under dollarisation, 2010. World Bank, World Development Indicators, retrieved 2026-10-16.
How it worked: The authorities stopped defending a collapsing national currency and let the US dollar and other foreign currencies serve as money, which removed the printing of money as a source of inflation. A decade later the government and the Reserve Bank reintroduced a domestic currency, and with it the room to monetise deficits.
Limits: The inflation series is empty from 2005 to 2009, so the hyperinflation the move ended does not appear in it and the record cannot show its scale. The dates of both moves come from a second source, the IMF press release approving the 2019 Staff-Monitored Program (https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2019/05/31/pr19189-zimbabwe-imf-managing-director-approves-a-staff-monitored-program), which states them in one line each and does not say how much of the 2008 move was the public abandoning the Zimbabwe dollar before the authorities followed. Dollarisation gave up monetary policy, so low inflation is evidence that a rule change stopped a collapse and not that the institutions managed prices. Inflation had already risen to 10.6 percent in 2018, before the new currency, and the series cannot separate the currency decision from other causes of the 2019 and 2020 rise. The series has no value after 2022.
Food Deficit Mitigation Programme, the 2024 El Niรฑo drought response
After the El Niรฑo-ravaged 2023/2024 summer season, Zimbabwe's government distributed 197,628.796 tonnes of grain to vulnerable and food-insecure households under the Food Deficit Mitigation Programme between February and 5 November 2024.
197,628.796 tonnes, grain distributed by government under the food deficit mitigation programme, cumulative since february 2024, 2024-11-05. 244,296 tonnes, strategic grain reserve stock at the same date, 2024-11-05. Government of Zimbabwe, Cabinet, 36th Post-Cabinet Press Briefing (5 November 2024), as distributed by Veritas, retrieved 2026-10-16.
How it worked: The Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare drew grain from the Strategic Grain Reserve held by the Grain Marketing Board and moved it in timed distribution rounds to households identified as food insecure, with Cabinet tracking tonnes moved each week.
Limits: The government reports on its own programme, and the briefing text is read from a copy distributed by Veritas, a civil-society archive, not from a government-hosted copy; the figure is on page 1 of an 11-page PDF. Tonnes moved say nothing about how many people received a full ration, on time, or how targeting worked, and the 6.54 million figure in the 3 December 2024 briefing is a target, not a count of people reached. The briefings give no closing total for the 2024 to March 2025 response. The private sector imported 974,658 tonnes of maize, wheat and flour over the same period against 39,916 tonnes imported by government, so the relief rested on imports, not on reserve stock built before the drought. Development partners distributed about 10 percent of the grain in the third round. The programme recurs: its October 2025 to March 2026 round covered 77.53 percent of 1,293,657 targeted households.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 33.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Households switch currency fast, but that is adaptation around the state; formal reallocation is weak and new export products are few. I move up slightly for moderate diversification and stay below the indicator.
- 45.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Households survived hyperinflation and several currency changes by switching fast between currencies and activities. A treats this as working around the state, but the question asks how the system responds, and households are part of it. Few new export products take five points off.
- 38.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Households adapted fast to hyperinflation and currency change, but few new export products and dollarisation and emigration are people working around the state. I stay below the indicator and below panelist B's 50.
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
+2.2 over 10 years, from 13.5 in 2016 to 15.7 on 3 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
- Raw value
- 14.908% of GDP
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (NV.IND.MANF.ZS)
- History
- Raw value
- 2.798% of manufactured exports
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS)
- History
Logistics infrastructure quality
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataindex 1-5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (LP.LPI.INFR.XQ)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. An LPI sub-index, so the same freight-forwarder survey as logistics performance and the same problem. Electricity connection speed stays as the observable infrastructure measure in this dimension. See D23.
- Raw value
- 61.739score 0-100
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.ELC.TIME.DFRN)
- History
- Raw value
- 0.027index
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (EF.EFM.UNIV.XD)
- History
Large project delivery
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no data% overrun
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: The single best measure of execution capability and there is no comparable international dataset. Assembling one is a defensible Envisioning project. Building mixes industrial output with state delivery capacity, and this indicator carries the delivery side: the other six indicators cannot see a national programme that was delivered. Documented deliveries are recorded in data/evidence and never scored, see D20.
Firm scale-up rate
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of firms
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD DynEmp
- History
- no data
Note: OECD business dynamics work covers members irregularly. Nothing comparable for India, Brazil or South Africa.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Output per workerWorld Bank (SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD), 2025
15,074 constant 2021 PPP $, rank 103 of 123. GDP per person employed, constant purchasing power parity.
A condition, not scored: output per worker is income per worker, the wealth the benchmark tests capability against, so it is published beside Building as context (D122).
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Harare-Masvingo-Beitbridge highway rehabilitation, behind schedule
Zimbabwe's government, funding the works from the budget, set out in its 2021 Budget to finish upgrading the roughly 580 km Harare-Beitbridge highway by 2022; it had opened 355 km to traffic by October 2022, and in July 2025 the Finance Ministry still reported 88 km outstanding, more than two and a half years past the 2022 target.
88 km, kilometres of the harare-masvingo-beitbridge highway still outstanding, against a 2022 completion target, 2025-07. 355 km, kilometres of the 580 km harare-beitbridge highway opened to traffic, 2022-10. Ministry of Finance, Economic Development and Investment Promotion of Zimbabwe, 2025 Mid-Term Budget and Economic Review, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Ministry of Transport split the corridor into sections and paid local contractors from the national budget, opening the road section by section as money arrived.
Limits: This is a schedule record with no cost figure: the ministry publishes allocations in a currency that was redenominated twice in the period (ZWL to ZiG) and gives no baseline budget for the whole road, so no cost overrun can be computed. The schedule slip of more than two and a half years (end of 2022 to July 2025) is our arithmetic from targets and progress the same ministry wrote in successive budget documents. It is not an audited figure, and the ministry itself kept moving the target (2022, then 2023, then 2025). The documents give the road's length as 560 km in 2020 and 580 km from 2022 onward without explaining the change. Kilometres 'opened to traffic' are self-reported and say nothing about pavement quality. The start year is that of the earliest official progress note, July 2020. Delivery used several local contractors under a national emergency programme, so this is evidence about a fiscally funded, multi-contractor build, not a single tender.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 21.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Economic fitness and high-tech exports are near zero and the grid suffers long outages. The panel agrees and I hold.
- 21.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Economic fitness and high-tech exports are near zero, and power and water systems have decayed. Manufacturing share overstates a largely informal industry.
- 20.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
High-tech exports and fitness are near the floor and power outages and late Hwange delivery show weak execution. Manufacturing share overstates a largely informal industry.