🇧🇷Brazil

Evidence for missing indicators

Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.

• Embrapa, a fifty-year bet on tropical agriculturelinked to Government foresight capacity, started 1973, still operating

  Brazil created a public agricultural research corporation in 1973 to make acidic tropical soils productive, kept it funded across every change of government since, and cereal production rose from 46.5 million tonnes in 2000 to 155.9 million in 2023.

  155,877,082 tonnes, cereal production, 2023. World Bank, from FAO, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A public research corporation with its own budget line, staffed by researchers sent abroad to train and then brought back, mandated against one specific national constraint rather than research in general.

  Limits: Production is an outcome and the credit is shared with land expansion, subsidised credit and private plant breeding, so this number cannot separate the research from the rest. It also cannot see the cost: much of the expansion came from converting cerrado and forest. What the record actually evidences is fifty years of continuity in a public research mandate, which is the part no dataset measures.

• Lei de Informática, a sectoral industrial policylinked to Long-horizon research share, started 1991, still operating

  Law 8.248/1991 tied information-technology incentives to annual research, development and innovation investment of at least 5 percent of eligible domestic gross revenue, creating a predictable regime for sectoral capability.

  5 % of eligible domestic gross revenue, minimum annual r&d and innovation investment, 1991. Presidência da República, Lei 8.248/1991, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: The state exchanges a sector-specific incentive for commitments to domestic research, development, training and innovation, giving firms a reason to make longer-horizon plans within a stable policy frame.

  Limits: The legal investment requirement is an input, not evidence of research quality, exports or firm growth. The regime is narrow, has been amended repeatedly and creates a renewal pressure that makes continuity part of the case rather than a settled result.

• CGEE, the strategic studies centerlinked to Government foresight capacity, started 2001, still operating

  Created in 2001, the Centro de Gestão e Estudos Estratégicos was designed to produce prospective studies and long-term recommendations for Brazilian science, technology and innovation policy, with 273 researchers and specialists signing its creation record.

  273 researchers and specialists, participants signing the creation record, 2001. Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, CGEE report, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: Government creates a distinct organization to turn evidence and expert networks into long-horizon options, giving policymakers a place to ask what future conditions require before a crisis sets the agenda.

  Limits: The creation record and a mandate for prospective studies show institutional intent, not whether foresight changes decisions or survives political pressure. CGEE operates within the science and technology policy system, so its reach does not cover every part of government.

Evidence for missing indicators

Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.

• Itaipu Binacional, the treaty-built power systemlinked to Public-private collaboration, started 1974, still operating

  Brazil and Paraguay built and operate Itaipu through a treaty-based binational entity, which reached 14,000 megawatts of installed capacity and has supplied both countries since the first unit entered operation in 1984.

  14,000 MW, installed generating capacity, 2007. Itaipu Binacional, institutional information, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: Brazil and Paraguay converted a contested shared river into a jointly governed operating institution with its own legal personality, fixed allocation rules and a long-lived technical system.

  Limits: Installed capacity shows the scale of the physical system, not the quality of the bilateral relationship, the project's cost or the distribution of its benefits. A treaty structure can hold a joint asset together while leaving wider coordination between the countries unresolved.

Behavioral check, not scored

Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.

• Bribery incidenceWorld Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS), 2025

  9.832 % of firms, lower is better. Firms asked for at least one bribe payment across six public transactions covering utilities, permits, licences and taxes.

  Experience rather than reputation: the question asks whether the responding firm was itself asked, so it is not the perception composite D23 retired. It covers 49 of 52 countries and 44 of them at 2023 or later. It is not scored because it carries income. On a rank-normalised estimate it correlates with log GDP per capita at about 0.66 alone and takes the two-indicator Trust dimension to about 0.53, against 0.14 for contract enforcement days by itself, which is a larger wealth contribution than the one D44 retired an indicator over. Read it beside the score, not as the score.

Evidence for missing indicators

Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.

• Cadastro Único, the unified social registrylinked to Trust in public institutions, started 2001, still operating

  Since 2001, Cadastro Único has identified and characterized low-income families across Brazil and has become the entry point for more than 40 federal, state and municipal social programmes.

  40 programmes, social programmes using the registry, 2026. Ministry of Development and Social Assistance, Cadastro Único, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: One shared identity and needs record lets multiple programmes see the same household, reducing the need for each programme to build its own eligibility system and making the state more legible to people it serves.

  Limits: A registry and its programme count show administrative reach, not whether citizens trust the state or whether benefits arrive accurately and on time. The source is the ministry responsible for the registry, and coverage depends on families keeping their records current.

• Portal da Transparência, the federal open-books systemlinked to Trust in public institutions, started 2004, still operating

  Launched in 2004, Portal da Transparência has spent 20 years publishing federal revenue, expenditure, personnel and transfer information so citizens can inspect how public money is used.

  20 years, years since launch, 2024. Controladoria-Geral da União, Portal da Transparência, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: The government turns its own administrative records into a public interface, so oversight can begin with the same transaction detail that the bureaucracy uses to execute and audit spending.

  Limits: Publication creates the possibility of scrutiny, not evidence that people use the data or trust the institutions being scrutinized. The portal mainly covers federal government execution and excludes some state-owned and non-federal activity.

Evidence for missing indicators

Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.

• CAPES, federal postgraduate fundinglinked to Research citation impact, started 1951, still operating

  Founded in 1951, CAPES built a national postgraduate funding and evaluation system, and by 1995 Brazil's system had more than 60,000 students across over 1,000 master's and 600 doctoral courses.

  60,000 students, postgraduate students in the national system, 1995. CAPES, História e missão, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: A federal agency combines funding with peer evaluation and a national standard, so postgraduate programmes coordinate around a common definition of quality instead of growing as isolated local institutions.

  Limits: Student and course counts show the scale of the postgraduate system, not the quality or international impact of its research. CAPES reports the institutional history and its own programmes, while citation impact requires a separate bibliometric source.

• INEP, the standing education statistics institutionlinked to Research citation impact, started 1937, still operating

  Created in 1937, INEP built a standing education statistics and census system that lets federal, state and municipal actors see schools, students and policy results across Brazil, while its historical archive now spans 218.68 linear metres.

  218.68 linear metres, historical archive, 2022. INEP, institutional history and historical archive, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: A permanent statistical institution gives education policy a memory and a common set of objects, so schools, students and results can be compared across territories and governments.

  Limits: An archive and a census show that a state can record itself, not that the resulting policy improves learning or research quality. The data system also depends on reporting by schools and education secretariats, and its history includes institutional redesign.

Evidence for missing indicators

Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.

• EMBRAPII, industry-led applied researchlinked to Business share of R&D, started 2013, still operating

  Created in 2013, EMBRAPII connects companies to public and private research units through shared-risk funding, and it contracted a record 811 new industrial research projects in 2025.

  811 projects, new projects contracted in the year, 2025. EMBRAPII, 2025 results, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: Public funding follows an industry's defined technical problem into a research unit, sharing early risk while leaving the company and researchers responsible for solving a concrete challenge.

  Limits: Project counts show the throughput of a funding network, not the commercial value, technical success or additionality of the research. EMBRAPII's own results report the programme's activity, and projects vary widely in scale and maturity.

Evidence for missing indicators

Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.

• Plano Real, the 1994 currency stabilisationlinked to Institutional responsiveness, started 1993, delivered and closed

  Brazil ended four decades of high inflation with a staged currency reform, taking annual consumer price inflation from 2,075.9 percent in 1994 to 3.2 percent in 1998.

  3.2 % per year, annual consumer price inflation, 1998. World Bank, from IBGE, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A stable unit of account was introduced alongside the failing currency, prices were re-anchored to it while it was still only a reference, and it became legal tender only once the anchoring had happened.

  Limits: Disinflation was held in place with an overvalued exchange rate and high interest rates, and that arrangement broke in the 1999 devaluation and again in the 2002 confidence crisis. One macroeconomic outcome is not a general measure of how fast Brazilian institutions respond to new conditions. The design and the sequencing are the capability here, and no number in this record captures them.

• Proalcool, the fuel substitution after the oil shocklinked to Institutional responsiveness, started 1975, still operating

  Brazil answered the 1973 oil shock by mandating ethanol blending and building a national fuel alcohol industry, taking production from 580 thousand cubic metres in 1975 to 38,199 in 2025, and from 2003 flex-fuel engines moved the choice to the driver.

  38,199.192 thousand cubic metres, ethanol production, 2025. National Petroleum Agency, via IPEADATA, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A blending mandate created guaranteed demand, subsidised credit built the mills against it, and flex-fuel engines two decades later moved the choice from the state to the driver.

  Limits: The programme was heavily subsidised in the 1980s and nearly collapsed when oil prices fell in the 1990s, so the line is not a story of steady success. Production volume says nothing about land use, cane labour conditions, or how the emissions accounting works out. What this evidences is a state changing an entire fuel system in response to an external shock, which is the construct the indicator asks for.

• Telebras, the telecom system that was dismantledlinked to Institutional responsiveness, started 1972, delivered and closed

  Created in 1972, Telebras coordinated Brazil's state telecom system until its 1998 privatisation, when 54 concessionaires were split out and the state moved from operating the network to regulating and universalising service.

  54 companies, concessionaires controlled before the split, 1998. Telebras, historical financial report, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: The state first assembled a fragmented telecom sector into one planning and investment system, then dismantled that holding structure when a new regulatory and private operating model was judged more suitable for expansion.

  Limits: The number of controlled companies shows the structure of the old system, not whether privatisation delivered affordable, reliable service everywhere. The transition also left a continuing Telebras with a different role, so the record concerns a model that ended rather than a company that disappeared.

Evidence for missing indicators

Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.

• Pix instant payment systemlinked to Large project delivery, started 2020, still operating

  Brazil's central bank specified, built and ran a mandatory instant payment rail that settled 7.98 billion transactions in July 2026, for 152 million people and 14 million firms transacting in that month.

  7,975,213,950 transactions, pix transactions settled in the month, 2026-07. Banco Central do Brasil, Pix statistics API, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: The central bank wrote the standard, mandated participation for every institution above a size threshold, ran the settlement infrastructure itself and set the price to zero for individuals.

  Limits: Transaction volume shows adoption of one payment rail. It says nothing about cost or schedule performance on a capital project, which is what this indicator asks for. Pix was specified and enforced by a single institution with regulatory power over the participants, so it is weak evidence about delivery that needs several agencies to hold position.

• GOV.BR federal identity and service platformlinked to Large project delivery, started 2019, still operating

  Brazil consolidated federal public services behind one identity platform, reporting 175 million active accounts and 5,179 digital services in May 2026.

  175,000,000 accounts, active gov.br accounts, 2026-05. Governo Digital, Ministry of Management and Innovation in Public Services, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: One identity provider for every federal service, with assurance levels tied to records the state already held, and a rule that services migrate to it rather than build their own login.

  Limits: An account count measures registration and a service count measures listing. Neither shows whether a service completes, how long it takes, or what it costs to run. Both numbers are published by the programme about itself, with no external audit attached.

• Sistema Unico de Saude, universal public health systemlinked to Large project delivery, started 1988, still operating

  Brazil wrote a right to health into the 1988 constitution and built a single public system that covers everybody in the country, and the WHO service coverage index for Brazil rose from 71 in 2000 to 84 in 2023.

  84 index 0-100, uhc service coverage index, 2023. World Health Organization, Global Health Observatory, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A right to health written into the constitution, funded by earmarked federal transfers and delivered by municipalities under national rules.

  Limits: A service coverage index counts whether services reach people. It says nothing about waiting times, quality, or the difference between a capital city and the interior, and it credits private provision alongside the public system. Brazil spends less per head on public health than most countries with a comparable index, which this number cannot show.

• Programa Nacional de Imunizacoes, and its erosionlinked to Large project delivery, started 1973, operating below its peak

  Brazil's national immunisation programme reached 99 percent DPT coverage in 2003 and held above 95 percent for a decade, then fell to 68 percent by 2021 and had recovered to 91 percent by 2024.

  91 % of children, dpt immunisation coverage, children aged 12-23 months, 2024. 99 % of children, dpt immunisation coverage at its 2003 peak, 2003. World Bank, from WHO and UNICEF estimates, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: Free universal vaccination delivered through the primary care network, with national campaign days that made coverage a visible public event.

  Limits: This record is here because it runs both ways. A delivery capability that reached the whole country lost a third of its coverage in five years and has not fully recovered, which is evidence about durability rather than about peak performance. Coverage is administratively reported, DPT is one antigen among many, and the fall has several causes that the series cannot separate.

• Luz para Todos, rural electrificationlinked to Large project delivery, started 2003, delivered and closed

  Brazil connected the last rural households to electricity through a national programme run with the state and private distributors, taking access from 94.4 percent of the population in 2000 to 99.8 percent in 2024.

  99.8 % of population, access to electricity, 2024. World Bank, from national and utility sources, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: The federal government paid the connection cost and delivered through the existing distribution concessionaires, with connection targets written into their contracts.

  Limits: Access counts a connection. It says nothing about how often the power fails, what it costs, or the isolated Amazon communities that make up most of the remaining gap. Access was already rising before 2003, so the programme accelerated a trend rather than starting one.

• Bolsa Familia and the single registry behind itlinked to Large project delivery, started 2003, still operating

  Brazil built one national registry of low-income households and paid conditional transfers through it, going from 6.6 million benefits in December 2004 to a peak of 21.0 million in 2022 and 18.6 million in December 2025.

  18,618,236 benefits, benefits paid in december, 2025. Ministry of Social Development, via IPEADATA, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: One registry of low-income households shared across every social programme, with payments made directly to a card held by the mother, conditional on school attendance and health checks.

  Limits: A benefit count is administrative and says nothing about whether the transfers reduced poverty. The programme was renamed and restructured twice between 2021 and 2023, so the series covers more than one design. The capability worth copying is the registry and the targeting, and neither has a number in this record.

• Fully electronic national electionslinked to Large project delivery, started 1996, still operating

  Brazil has run every election on electronic voting machines since 2000, across an electorate that reached 155.9 million voters in 2024, with results published the same evening.

  155,908,437 voters, registered electorate, 2024. Superior Electoral Court, via IPEADATA, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: One election authority owns the machines, the software and the count, with public audit ceremonies and results published the same evening.

  Limits: The electorate measures the scale of the operation and not the speed or the integrity of the count. The Superior Electoral Court publishes result timing and audit results separately and neither is in this number. Electronic voting has been contested politically in Brazil despite repeated public audits, which is a fact about trust rather than about delivery.

• Deepwater and pre-salt oil productionlinked to Large project delivery, started 1997, still operating

  Brazil developed deepwater extraction, found the pre-salt fields in 2006 and produced them at depths of more than 5,000 metres, with national oil production rising from 71,844 thousand cubic metres in 2000 to 219,032 in 2025.

  219,032.409 thousand cubic metres, oil production, 2025. National Petroleum Agency, via IPEADATA, retrieved 2026-08-26.

  How it worked: A state oil company sustained deepwater research for decades, and licensing rules concentrated the learning from each field in one operator.

  Limits: Production is an outcome shared between Petrobras and foreign operators, and several individual platforms ran years late and over budget, which is exactly the cost and schedule record this indicator asks for and which this number hides. Expanding oil output also sits against Brazil's climate commitments, and a production figure cannot weigh that.

• BNDES, the national development banklinked to Large project delivery, started 1952, still operating

  Founded in 1952, Brazil's federal development bank provides long-term financing and investment across the national economy, and it disbursed R$169.7 billion in 2025.

  169.7 R$ billions, bndes disbursements, 2025. BNDES, Agência de Notícias, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: The federal development bank converts public capital and long-term finance into patient support for firms and infrastructure projects that commercial lenders may not carry through their formation period.

  Limits: Disbursement volume measures the bank's activity, not whether the projects it finances arrive on time, within budget or with durable public value. The source is the institution reporting on itself, and the number mixes market-rate lending with policy-directed finance.

• Casa da Moeda do Brasil, the national mintlinked to Large project delivery, started 1694, still operating

  Founded in 1694, Brazil's national mint has remained a public institution through colonial, imperial and republican regimes and now produces currency, identity documents and passports after more than 330 years of operation.

  330 years, reported institutional history, 2026. Casa da Moeda do Brasil, history of the CMB, retrieved 2026-08-29.

  How it worked: A permanent public production institution carries the state's credential infrastructure across political and monetary transitions, preserving practical capability while its outputs change with the regime around it.

  Limits: Institutional survival and the ability to produce state credentials show continuity, not the cost, quality or strategic value of every product made by the mint. The institution also changed its technologies and functions over time, so continuity does not mean an unchanged organisation.