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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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4 of 863 deliveries

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Tajikistansince 2008still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Adult learning centres of the Agency of Labour and Employment

Tajikistan's Agency of Labour and Employment trained 55,361 people in 2024 in its network of adult learning centres, built up since the 2008 government decree that created the Adult Education Centre of Tajikistan, and 20,100 of them were sent and paid for by the agency.

55,361 people, people trained in the adult learning centres of the agency of labour and employment, 2024. 20,100 people, people sent to short-term vocational training by the agency, with a stipend, 2024. European Training Foundation, Tajikistan: active labour market measures for youth (working paper, 2025), section 4 and Table 2, citing the Agency of Labour and Employment's 2024 annual report and the Agency on Statistics under the President, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The labour ministry turned a handful of former vocational schools into a national chain of short-course adult learning centres under its employment agency, which sends registered jobseekers on stipends and also sells courses and skills validation to anyone aged 15 and over.

Preconditions

  • A shortage of places in formal vocational schools that pushed adults toward short courses
  • A government decree creating a lead adult education institution with regional branches
  • Large flows of returning labour migrants who want their skills certified

Limits: Both figures are read from a PDF working paper that the ETF commissioned from a national author; the 55,361 total comes from the agency's own 2024 annual report, and the 2024 column of Table 2 is marked as preliminary. The total mixes very different things: 34,660 of the 55,361 paid for their own course, 12,033 of those bought validation of skills they already had rather than training, and the centres also run life-skills, language and basic literacy courses, so the count is not a count of vocational learners. It is a count of people, not a share of adults, and it covers one public network only. The agency-funded referrals barely moved over a decade (18,397 in 2015 against 20,100 in 2024) while registrations rose by more than half. In 2025 the government moved the Adult Education Centre out of the agency and renamed it, so the series may break.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Tajikistansince 1998delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Emergency Flood Assistance Project after the 1998 and 1999 floods

After floods in 1998 caused damage estimated at US$40 million, about 2 percent of GDP, Tajikistan's Republican Project Coordination Unit for Liquidation of Consequences of Natural Disasters had repaired about 210 km of roads and fully completed seven bridges and structures by the credit's closing on 31 December 2001, with about 80 km of road repairs and three bridges unfinished, and the World Bank rated the outcome unsatisfactory.

210 km, road repairs completed at closing (about 80 km more unfinished), 2001-12-31. 40 million US dollars, damage from the 1998 floods as estimated, 1998. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Tajikistan Emergency Flood Assistance Project (IDA-31230, IDA-31231), Report No. 24209, 2002, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A government emergency coordination unit repaired flood-damaged bridges, roads and embankments with an emergency IDA credit through local contractors, without the supervision capacity to hold them to quality.

Preconditions

  • An emergency lending window that disburses within months
  • Local contractors with experience of the work, which were scarce after the civil war
  • A coordination unit with financial controls the lender trusts, which it lacked

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Unsatisfactory and sustainability Unlikely, mainly over poor works quality and financial management; it refused a further extension and closed the credit as planned. The record is filed as evidence of weak recovery capacity, not of success. The report says the roads actually damaged totalled about 105 km of the 210 km repaired, that works quality was poor because local firms lacked experience and supervision, and that only three of eight planned power substations were completed. The project came a year after the end of a five-year civil war, with a supplemental credit after further floods in 1999, so capacity was at a low point. The text is OCR of a scanned 2002 report, and the data sheet and narrative disagree on the original closing date (January 2000 against June 2001).

Tajikistansince 2016dismantledbears on Institutional responsiveness

Bank bailout of 2016, and the liquidation of both banks

The Government of Tajikistan injected TJS 3.3 billion of public money into Agroinvestbank and Tojiksodirotbank in 2016, after both had been in difficulty since 2015, and in May 2021 the National Bank of Tajikistan revoked both licences and the Economic Court of Dushanbe ordered their compulsory liquidation.

3.3 TJS billion, public funds injected into the two banks, 2016. World Bank, Tajikistan Country Economic Update, Summer 2021, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The government recapitalised two failing banks from the budget, and when their governance problems persisted the central bank closed both five years later.

Preconditions

  • Supervision able to impose governance change as the price of public capital
  • A resolution framework that lets the state close a large bank early
  • Fiscal room to fund a rescue of several percent of GDP

Limits: The number sits in a World Bank report PDF (pages 19 and 20), not in a statistical series, and the report does not break the TJS 3.3 billion down by bank. The World Bank's 2017 update (page 22, https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/963071514451761441/pdf/122285-WP-Tajikistan-PUBLIC.pdf) counts the 2016 financial sector bailout at 6.1 percent of GDP, a wider figure that may include more than these two banks. The 2021 report says structural and corporate governance problems were not resolved but gives no recovery figure, so the record does not show how much of the injection was lost. A bailout is a response to a shock, and its failure says the response did not fix the cause; it does not measure how fast Tajik institutions change rules or programmes in general. The 2021 liquidation was itself a decision that followed international recommendations, which the report treats as the correct outcome.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Tajikistansince 2007still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Rogun hydropower plant

The Government of Tajikistan resumed construction of the Soviet-era Rogun hydropower plant in 2007 from the state budget, signed the main dam contract in 2016 and commissioned two temporary units (400 MW) in 2018 and 2019. It invested about US$3.3 billion in 2007 to 2022, and in November 2024 the World Bank put the cost to complete the plant at US$6.29 billion, with construction completion moved to 2033 and full reservoir impoundment not before 2039, 63 years after construction first began in 1976.

6.29 billion USD, estimated cost to complete the rogun hpp programme, November 2024. 3.3 billion USD (about), government of tajikistan investment in rogun hpp, 2007 to 2022, 2007-2022. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document PAD00208, Sustainable Financing for Rogun Hydropower Project (P181029), 19 November 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Tajik government restarted a stalled Soviet megaproject from its own budget and a Eurobond, brought two temporary turbines online early to earn revenue during construction, then used World Bank-backed safety and environmental studies to draw in a donor financing package for the rest.

Preconditions

  • A site with Soviet-era works, surveys and tunnels already in place
  • A state willing to divert a large share of GDP to one project for over a decade
  • Riparian water agreements and an independent dam-safety review credible enough for international lenders

Limits: No cost overrun can be computed: the appraisal document gives no original budget or baseline completion date to set the US$6.29 billion against, so the gap's unit (percent overrun) is not met. The US$6.29 billion is a forward estimate of remaining cost with contingencies, not an outturn, and adding it to the US$3.3 billion already spent is our arithmetic, not the Bank's. The schedule slip is our reading of milestone dates: construction began in 1976, the Soviet works stopped in 1992, and completion is now 2033 with impoundment in 2039. The Bank itself expects 'some further delays' to the March 2024 milestones. It attributes slow progress to financing shortfalls. The source is the lender's appraisal for its own grant, written to justify financing. The project is now financed by ten development partners, so delivery after 2024 is shared rather than purely Tajik. Spending close to 39 percent of GDP and a US$500 million Eurobond left the country at high risk of debt distress. 'Operating' means two temporary units run, not that the 3,780 MW plant is built.