- Raw value
- 158.35articles per million people
- Year
- 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.JRN.ARTC.SC)
- History
Tajikistan
Strongest usable evidence: Agency, at 61.9. Raise Anticipation first, at 22.9. Experimentation needs more evidence: confidence is 0.28.
Raise, lowest first
| Dimension | Confidence | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Anticipation | 0.46 | 22.9 |
| Learning | 0.55 | 23.2 |
| Building | 0.55 | 31.8 |
| Trust | 0.55 | 36.0 |
Measure before managing
| Dimension | Confidence | Score |
|---|---|---|
| Experimentation | 0.28 | 1.1 |
| Shared Purpose | 0.43 | 48.7 |
These lists are the country's capability agenda, computed from the scores. Read the full agenda. It names comparable evidence from other countries and the 18 gaps in the registry.
Why this country is included: Added in the 9.0.0 completion, which takes every country of a million people or more that is measurable in all nine capabilities.
Read Tajikistan beside up to three other countries, down to the indicator behind every row.
- Usable or good evidence
- Thin evidence, hollow point. The dashes open further as confidence falls.
- The point still sits at the score, because confidence never moves it.
- Click any axis to see every country on that dimension.
A score from 0 to 100 is a position inside the frame that all the benchmark countries set: zero is the weakest on a dimension and 100 is the strongest. A score of 10 puts a country near the floor of that frame and does not mean 10 percent of a capability.
| Agency | 0.54 | 4 of 5 | 0.73 | no trend | 40.0 | -21.9 | |
| Adaptability | 0.46 | 3 of 6 | 1.00 | no trend | 40.0 | -14.1 | |
| Coordination | 0.45 | 3 of 5 | 0.94 | no trend | 27.0 | -23.9 | |
| Shared Purpose | 0.43 | 3 of 6 | 0.94 | -2.2(2) | 34.0 | -14.7 | |
| Trust | 0.55 | 5 of 7 | 0.93 | no trend | 26.0 | -10.0 | |
| Building | 0.55 | 4 of 6 | 0.88 | -8.3(3) | 26.0 | -5.8 | |
| Learning | 0.55 | 3 of 4 | 0.81 | no trend | 23.0 | -0.2 | |
| Anticipation | 0.46 | 2 of 4 | 0.96 | +11.9(2) | 18.0 | -4.9 | |
| Experimentation | 0.28 | 4 of 9 | 0.67 | no trend | 4.0 | +2.9 |
How to read this page
Each dimension has a score from 0 to 100. It shows where this country sits among all 125 countries in the comparison frame, not a percentage. Confidence sits beside the score. A dashed radar edge and hollow point mean the evidence is thin. The records below show each indicator, its raw value, year and source.
A panel estimate, when present, is a separate judgment about what the indicators miss. It does not change the score or confidence. The panel's provenance is shown beside the estimate.
- direct capability measuredirect capability measure Measures the thing itself.
- capability inputcapability input Measures something that supports the capability.
- downstream outcomedownstream outcome Measures a result that usually follows from the capability.
- perception proxyperception proxy Records what people or experts say, not what they did.
Confidence
- very thin0.00 to 0.25
The score rests on one or two indicators. Do not quote it on its own.
- thin0.25 to 0.45
A minority of indicators, or evidence old enough to have moved. Read with care.
- usable0.45 to 0.65
Enough evidence to compare countries, with known holes.
- good0.65 and above
Most indicators observed, recent, from official or intergovernmental sources.
A row marked no dataset exists is a gap: the benchmark wants data that nobody publishes. A retired row has a source this project chose not to use. Both reduce confidence. The glossary defines each term, and the limits page lists where these numbers are known to be wrong about the world.
Anticipation
How capable is the country of identifying and preparing for emerging change?
+11.9 over 10 years, from 11.0 in 2016 to 22.9 on 2 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
- Raw value
- 63.869index 0-100
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IQ.SPI.OVRL)
- History
Government foresight capacity
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No comparable international dataset. OECD and UN work is descriptive, not scored. Envisioning would have to build this.
Long-horizon research commitments
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of new grants
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked for the share of R&D spending classed as basic research, which is the make-up of a spending stock, the construct D142 retired business R&D share for. OECD MSTI publishes that share for its members only, and UNESCO UIS no longer serves R&D by type of research (construct audit, 2026-10-02). The behaviour behind it is a funder committing to a horizon: a grant awarded for five years or more is a decision to wait for a result. Untried: no memo has triaged a grant register. National funders publish award lists one by one with their own durations, and commercial grant aggregators fail the inspectability rule. Wireable on a grant-level register with award and end dates, on one definition of a competitive public grant, for half the frame or more.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
R&D expenditureWorld Bank (GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS), 2020
0.09 % of GDP, rank 103 of 118. Gross domestic expenditure on research and development as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: money committed to research is what a country spends, and spending it does not show the country reads the future well (D122).
Researchers in R&DWorld Bank (SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6)
No value for this country. Full-time-equivalent researchers per million people.
A condition, not scored: a standing stock of people who could investigate is what a country has, not a record of what they found (D122). Correlates with income but survives size normalization.
Secure internet serversWorld Bank (IT.NET.SECR.P6), 2024
152 per million people, rank 93 of 125. Servers using encryption in internet transactions, per million people.
A condition, not scored: a diffusion stock of digital adoption that money buys, not an act of anticipation (D122). Spans four orders of magnitude, so its rank is read on the published value and its correlations on the logged one.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 18.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.60
Hold. Research output is at the floor and no independent planning or audit body gives foresight a durable home; nobody on the panel offered evidence of one.
- 20.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.60
Research output is at the floor and only the statistical system is middling. The panel agrees and I find no distributed early-warning practice that would lift it.
- 18.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.60
Research output is at the floor and no foresight body is documented; statistical performance is the only capability signal. Panelist B's 20 rests on no practice I can name, so I hold.
Agency
How able are individuals and organizations to turn an intention into action?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
- Raw value
- 0.147per 1,000 aged 15-64
- Year
- 2018. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BUS.NDNS.ZS)
- History
Time to start a business
direct capability measureretired, see notes- Raw value
- no datadays
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (IC.REG.DURS.MA.DY)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-17 (D167). Doing Business stopped in 2019 and the World Bank archived the code. Its successor, B-READY, publishes the time and cost to register a firm as a score, and business entry efficiency carries that construct. See D23.
- Raw value
- 90.987score 0-100
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BRE.BE.P3)
- History
- one year
- Raw value
- 3count
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.REG.PROC.MA.NO)
- History
Adults doing digital tasks
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of adults
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- ITU / UNESCO UIS (SDG 4.4.1, ICT skills by type)
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked whether adults can perform standard digital tasks, which reads a skill level, the kind of stock D122 moved out of the scores with internet users. It now counts the act: a person who did the task. It is not the internet users condition beside it, which counts access. Candidate: ITU ICT skills by type (SDG 4.4.1) through the UNESCO UIS API, probed 2026-10-02. Sent a message with an attached file reaches 33 of the 53 countries then in the frame, 25 at 2018 or later, with no United States, India or China and most of Africa and Central America missing; two other task items reach 31 and 16. The items are self-reported and the task list has changed between rounds. Wireable on one task observed for half the frame or more at 2018 or later.
- Raw value
- 7.5mean 1-10
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (A173)
- History
- one year
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Individuals using the internetWorld Bank (IT.NET.USER.ZS), 2024
55.8 % of population, rank 96 of 125. Share of the population that used the internet in the last three months.
A condition, not scored: access to the basic tool of modern agency is what people have to act with, not a record of them acting (D122). Saturates near 95%, which compresses the top of the range.
Financial account ownershipWorld Bank (FX.OWN.TOTL.ZS), 2024
54.5 % aged 15+, rank 91 of 122. Adults with an account at a bank or mobile money provider.
A condition, not scored: holding an account is the precondition for almost any economic action, not the action (D122). Global Findex, published every three years.
Credit to the private sectorWorld Bank (FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS), 2023
12.2 % of GDP, rank 113 of 124. Domestic credit provided to the private sector by financial corporations.
A condition, not scored: financial depth is a stock of money available to actors, not what they do with it (D122). High values can also signal a credit bubble, so more is not always better.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 32.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Small move up. Panelist B is right that bazaar trade is real initiative, but mass emigration is exit from a system that blocks action at home, not agency inside it; floor-level firm density stands.
- 44.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
I hold above the panel because bazaar trade and mass labour migration are real acts of initiative that registration misses. I accept panelist A's point that floor-level firm density shows insecure property under patronage, so I come down a little.
- 40.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Paper entry scores are high but new business density is at the floor, so procedure is not the binding constraint. Labour migration to Russia is real initiative but also shows missing options at home; I move up slightly from my round 1 score for it.
Coordination
How effectively can independent actors organize around shared objectives?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
Government effectiveness
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_GE.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. The WGI aggregate the opinions of experts and firms, and in this set the four WGI series correlate with each other between 0.93 and 0.98 while correlating with log GDP per capita at 0.91. That is one perception of national wealth counted in three dimensions. Cross-agency delivery records are the replacement and they are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Regulatory quality
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_RQ.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. Same measurement as government effectiveness, filed under a different name, correlating with it above 0.93. See D23 and A4.
Logistics performance
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataindex 1-5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (LP.LPI.OVRL.XQ)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. The LPI is a survey of international freight forwarders, so it records how a country looks to global logistics firms. A small country with a small port scores low whatever its state can organise, which is artefact A9. Container throughput and border time are observable and stay. See D23.
Border compliance time to export
direct capability measureretired, see notes- Raw value
- no datahours
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (TRD.ACRS.BRDR.EXPT.BRDR.COMP.HR.DB1619)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-17 (D167). Doing Business stopped in 2019 and the World Bank archived the code. B-READY trade efficiency carries the construct, the time and cost of border compliance, now reported by firms. See D23.
- Raw value
- 52.819score 0-100
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BRE.IT.P3)
- History
- one year
- Raw value
- 104.969percentage points from approved budget
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (GF.XPD.BUDG.ZS)
- History
University-industry collaboration
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Innovation Index
- History
- no data
Note: GII carries it, but the underlying item is a WEF executive opinion survey whose microdata is not inspectable. Excluded on principle 4.
- Raw value
- 0.153index 0-1
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- V-Dem (v2x_cspart)
- History
- one year
Public-private collaboration
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No comparable dataset. PPP investment databases measure infrastructure finance, not collaboration capacity.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Customs clearance time for exportsWorld Bank (IC.CUS.DURS.EX), 2024
4.399 days, lower is better. Average number of days to clear direct exports through customs, as reported by manufacturing firms that export directly, in the World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Days a manufacturer that exports directly says its goods took to clear customs, from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. It is the time the border took on firms' own shipments, current where the Doing Business border time this capability scores is frozen at 2019. It is not scored for two reasons. The number of firms behind each country's figure is published only in the survey microdata, and on a proxy from the published tables 37 of the 53 countries in the frame when it was checked clear 30 exporting firms; Mexico, the Philippines, Israel and nine others may not. And the question changed: surveys fielded from 2024 also ask how long release took across all border agencies, and drop an answer where customs alone took longer, so a country surveyed on both sides of the change can move severalfold with nothing at its border changing. India reads 17.3 days in 2022 and 2.5 in 2025, on more than 9,000 firms each time. No country in the frame has two surveys on the new questionnaire yet. Income is not why it is left out: it barely tracks log GDP per capita.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 26.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Hold. Mahalla and hashar labour are local and increasingly state-directed; independent actors cannot organise beyond the ruling network when civil society reads 8 and courts do not bind the state.
- 32.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Mahalla and hashar labour organise local work outside the record, but independent actors cannot coordinate beyond that under a suppressed civil society. Budget fidelity reads a centralised state, as the others said.
- 27.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Civil society is near the floor and courts do not bind the state, which outweighs near-plan budget execution that reflects a centralised budget. Mahalla and hashar networks are local and state-adjacent.
Trust
How much cooperation is possible beyond immediate personal networks?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
Rule of law
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_RL.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. A WGI perception composite correlating with control of corruption above 0.95 and with log GDP per capita at 0.83. Court throughput and case clearance rates are the observable replacement and are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Control of corruption
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataz-score -2.5 to 2.5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (GOV_WGI_CC.EST)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. A WGI perception composite. It measures reputation for corruption, which is not the same thing as corruption, and it tracks income closely. Prosecution and audit records are the observable replacement and are a declared gap. See D23 and A4.
Time to enforce a contract
direct capability measureretired, see notes- Raw value
- no datadays
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (ENF.CONT.DURS.DY)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-17 (D167). Doing Business stopped in 2019 and the World Bank archived the code. B-READY dispute resolution efficiency carries the construct, the time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute and enforce the decision. See D23.
- Raw value
- 62.28score 0-100
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.BRE.DR.P3)
- History
- one year
- Raw value
- 9.057% of firms
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.FRM.BRIB.ZS)
- History
- Raw value
- 0.247scale 0-4 (never to always)
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- V-Dem (v2jucomp_osp)
- History
- one year
Intentional homicide rate
downstream outcomeretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataper 100,000 people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (VC.IHR.PSRC.P5)
- History
- no data
Note: Added 2026-08-26 by D23 as the observable replacement for two retired WGI perception composites, and retired 2026-08-27 by D44 when the diagnostic built in D42 measured what it was doing. It raised this dimension's correlation with log GDP per capita by 0.288, from 0.096 to 0.385, the largest single wealth contribution anywhere in the model. It was added to fix wealth contamination and it was the wealth contamination. The dataset is sound and the objection is to what it measures here: homicide is driven heavily by organised crime, a society can be physically safe while trusting very little, and across this country set the variation it carries is mostly income. Behavioural trust measures remain a gap.
- Raw value
- 20.6% agreeing
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (A165)
- History
- one year
Trust in public institutions
perception proxyno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% expressing confidence
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD Trust Survey / WVS
- History
- no data
Note: The OECD survey covers members only. Mixing it with WVS items for India and South Africa would break comparability. The Joint EVS/WVS confidence battery (E069) reaches 37 countries from one release, and confidence in the courts (E069_17) is published beside Trust as a check under this id rather than scored: every item of the battery tested (courts, civil service, police, parliament and government) reads higher in the closed and electoral autocracies of the frame than in its democracies, which is deference as much as confidence (A13). The gap stays open for a measure that does not reward a court that cannot rule against the state. See D132.
- Raw value
- 10.3% expressing trust
- Year
- 2022. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Joint EVS/WVS (G007_34_B)
- History
- one year
Court case clearance rate
downstream outcomeno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of incoming cases
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- CEPEJ / OECD / national court statistics
- History
- no data
Note: Whether a court finishes what it starts, counted from case records rather than asked in a survey. D23 named it as the observable replacement for the two retired WGI composites and it has stayed unfilled since. CEPEJ publishes it for Council of Europe members and OECD for its own members, so no single publisher reaches this country set, and a harmonised series needs the project second source adapter. See D57.
Behavioral check, not scored
Each number below is published beside the score and stays out of it. It is not in the frame, the average, the indicator count or the confidence.
Confidence in the courtsJoint EVS/WVS (E069_17), 2022
38.3 % a great deal, higher is better. Share of survey respondents saying they have a great deal of confidence in the justice system and courts, of the four answers a great deal, quite a lot, not very much and none at all, in the Joint EVS/WVS 2017 to 2022 survey round.
Confidence in the courts is the public half of what this capability asks: whether people expect the rules to be enforced when a stranger breaks them. It is not scored because the survey answer reads two things the number cannot tell apart. Where courts are independent, confidence is a judgment of how they perform. Where they answer to the state, it is also deference, and saying otherwise to an interviewer has a cost. In this frame the pattern runs the wrong way. India, the Philippines and Indonesia, all electoral autocracies in the V-Dem 2025 classification, lead on the share saying a great deal, and Vietnam and China, the two closed autocracies surveyed, lead once quite a lot is counted too. The ten electoral autocracies average 21.8 percent saying a great deal and the two closed autocracies 28.1, against 13.6 for liberal and 8.4 for electoral democracies. Scored, it would rank highest the states whose courts are least able to rule against them. Income is not why it is left out: the share correlates about -0.18 with log GDP per capita. The value is the share saying a great deal; the share saying quite a lot is in the source note.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 22.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Small move up for low firm bribery, but the B-READY dispute score is rules on paper and courts almost never bind the state. Kin trust, as B concedes, is outside this dimension.
- 30.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Out-group trust is near the floor and courts do not bind the state. I accept that the B-READY dispute score describes rules on paper, so I move down toward the panel.
- 26.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Generalised and out-group trust are low and courts almost never bind the state. Low bribery in a firm survey in a closed setting is a thin offset; I move down slightly toward panelist A.
Learning
How effectively does the country acquire, distribute, and update knowledge?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
- Raw value
- 0.504index 0-1
- Year
- 2020. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (HD.HCI.OVRL)
- History
- Raw value
- 16.021% of firms
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.FRM.TRNG.ZS)
- History
Adult learning participation
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no data% of adults
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Eurostat / OECD PIAAC
- History
- no data
Note: The best available measure of continuous learning capacity, and it exists only for European and OECD members.
- Raw value
- 0.55ratio to world average
- Year
- 2021. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- OpenAlex (citation_normalized_percentile.is_in_top_10_percent)
- History
- one year
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Tertiary enrolmentWorld Bank (SE.TER.ENRR), 2024
35.6 % gross, rank 81 of 124. Gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education.
A condition, not scored: enrolment counts people in formal education and records nothing learned (D122).
Public education expenditureWorld Bank (SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS), 2023
5.4 % of GDP, rank 22 of 125. Government expenditure on education as a share of GDP.
A condition, not scored: public spending on education is a pure input, and learning is what the dimension asks about (D122).
Vocational share of secondaryWorld Bank (SE.SEC.ENRL.VO.ZS), 2013
1.4 % of secondary, rank 112 of 125. Vocational pupils as a share of total secondary enrolment.
A condition, not scored: the share of secondary pupils on a vocational track describes how a school system is built, not what anyone learns in it, and higher is not unambiguously better (D141). It marks a route into skilled work that does not run through university. Learning reads research citation impact, firm training and the human capital index instead.
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Adult learning centres of the Agency of Labour and Employment
Tajikistan's Agency of Labour and Employment trained 55,361 people in 2024 in its network of adult learning centres, built up since the 2008 government decree that created the Adult Education Centre of Tajikistan, and 20,100 of them were sent and paid for by the agency.
55,361 people, people trained in the adult learning centres of the agency of labour and employment, 2024. 20,100 people, people sent to short-term vocational training by the agency, with a stipend, 2024. European Training Foundation, Tajikistan: active labour market measures for youth (working paper, 2025), section 4 and Table 2, citing the Agency of Labour and Employment's 2024 annual report and the Agency on Statistics under the President, retrieved 2026-10-17.
How it worked: The labour ministry turned a handful of former vocational schools into a national chain of short-course adult learning centres under its employment agency, which sends registered jobseekers on stipends and also sells courses and skills validation to anyone aged 15 and over.
Limits: Both figures are read from a PDF working paper that the ETF commissioned from a national author; the 55,361 total comes from the agency's own 2024 annual report, and the 2024 column of Table 2 is marked as preliminary. The total mixes very different things: 34,660 of the 55,361 paid for their own course, 12,033 of those bought validation of skills they already had rather than training, and the centres also run life-skills, language and basic literacy courses, so the count is not a count of vocational learners. It is a count of people, not a share of adults, and it covers one public network only. The agency-funded referrals barely moved over a decade (18,397 in 2015 against 20,100 in 2024) while registrations rose by more than half. In 2025 the government moved the Adult Education Centre out of the agency and renamed it, so the series may break.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 23.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.55
Hold near the indicator. Low human capital, little firm training and weak citation impact agree, and universities sit under tight political control.
- 26.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Low human capital, little firm training and weak citation impact agree. Skill transfer through returning migrants is real but I cannot size it, so I keep only a small lift.
- 22.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.60
Low human capital, little firm training and weak citation impact agree. Migration-based skill transfer is real but unquantified.
Experimentation
How easily can new approaches be attempted, tested, abandoned, and improved?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
- Raw value
- 1per million people
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.PAT.RESD)
- History
- Raw value
- 780per million people
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.TMK.RSCT)
- History
- Raw value
- 1per million people
- Year
- 2013. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IP.IDS.RSCT)
- History
- Raw value
- 20194per million people
- Year
- 2026. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- GitHub Innovation Graph (data/repositories.csv)
- History
- no data
Venture deals
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataper million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD / national VC associations
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The id keeps its first name so evidence records, links and published files still resolve. The row asked for venture capital deployed as a share of GDP, a level of financial depth of the kind private credit is (D122). A count of first rounds counts attempts started with outside risk money, which is what this capability asks about, and a large round counts once. Candidates, none wireable: the OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Financing scoreboard carried venture capital for 6 of the 16 countries the frame held on 2026-08-26, as amounts in national currency, latest year 2022, with Brazil, India, South Africa and Singapore absent (D21); national venture capital associations publish counts on their own definitions; commercial deal databases cover the world and are not inspectable (D10). Wireable on an inspectable deal count with one definition of a first round for half the frame or more. Read A1 before treating this dimension as measured.
Early-stage entrepreneurial activity
direct capability measuremissing- Raw value
- no data% aged 18-64
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, TEA rate)
- History
- no data
Note: From the GEM Adult Population Survey, entered by hand because GEM has no open API. TEA counts every new business, so necessity self-employment scores the same as a funded startup, which is why Chile and Argentina sit above the United States here. Read it as how many people are trying, not as how much value the attempts create. GEM does not run every economy every year: Singapore last took part in 2014 and the recency term marks that value down hard.
Tolerance of entrepreneurial failure
perception proxymissing- Raw value
- no data% not deterred
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (APS key indicators, fear of failure rate)
- History
- no data
Note: Stored as 100 minus the published GEM fear of failure rate, so the direction matches the rest of the registry. GEM measures that rate among adults who already see good opportunities, not among all adults, so the denominator differs from the label. Attitudinal: bankruptcy law and time to discharge would be the observable substitute and are still worth wiring beside it.
Firms through regulatory sandboxes
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no datafirms per million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- national regulators
- History
- no data
Note: Redefined 2026-10-02 (D152). The row asked for the number and breadth of live sandboxes, which is a policy stock: a regime can exist with nobody in it. It now counts what passes through: firms a regulator let test under relaxed rules, and firms that came out, authorised, withdrawn or failed. Regulators publish cohort lists and exit reports one by one. The evidence corpus holds 22 records against this row, most of them counts of firms admitted or exited, each on the definition and window of its own regulator, and no register assembles them on one definition (O1 triage sweep, 2026-10-01). A realistic candidate for Envisioning to build from those lists. Wireable on a register that counts admissions and completions on one definition for half the frame or more.
University spinouts
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no dataper million people
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- national TTO associations
- History
- no data
Note: Reported nationally with incompatible definitions of what counts as a spinout.
Business share of R&D
capability inputretired, see notes- Raw value
- no data% of R&D
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD MSTI / RICYT
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-10-02. The only working source, OECD MSTI joined with RICYT for Latin America, covers 34 of the 53 countries then in the frame, but the row reads the make-up of a spending stock: who performs the R&D a country pays for. R&D spending itself is a condition since D122, and the share is high both where business research is large (Israel) and where total research is tiny and one firm dominates it (Thailand). State enterprises count as business, so China and Vietnam read their ownership model. UIS stopped publishing the series in 2023. Firms trying new things are read through patents, trademarks, designs and entrepreneurship instead. See D142.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 4.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.60
Hold. Informal route-switching by traders is survival, not a channel where new approaches are tested and abandoned; one patent and one design reflect no institutional channel.
- 8.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Registry counts of one are partly an artefact, and traders do try new routes and goods. Still, I see no wider culture of trying and abandoning approaches under tight control.
- 4.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.60
One patent, one design and very few trademarks or repositories. The count of one is partly a registry artefact, but nothing shows an institutional channel for trying and abandoning.
Adaptability
How effectively can the system respond when circumstances change?
No trend is shown because too few indicators have values at both ends. The rows below still show the available history.
- Raw value
- 6.931% of labour force
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS)
- History
Long-term unemployment share
downstream outcomemissing- Raw value
- no data% of unemployed
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- ILOSTAT (DF_UNE_TUNE_SEX_AGE_DUR_NB)
- History
- no data
Note: Derived from ILOSTAT unemployment by duration: 12 months or more over the unemployed whose duration is stated, both sexes, age 15 and over, a labour force survey preferred where ILOSTAT holds more than one. Read it beside the unemployment rate, because a high share means two different things: slow reallocation, where people who lose work stay out of it (South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria), or a small residual pool in a tight market, where the few left unemployed are the hardest to place (Switzerland, Japan). Some national questionnaires cannot record a long search, so the adapter runs a plausibility gate on every country: it drops a year under 3%, every year of a survey whose median is under 3%, a one- or two-year spike of more than 15 points that the series returns from, and a latest year that jumps more than 15 points with no later year to confirm it, then emits the latest year that survives. Every dropped value is logged in the source memo. See D120.
- Raw value
- 0.292index 0-1, lower = more diversified
- Year
- 2025. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- UNCTAD (US.ConcentDiversIndices)
- History
- one year
- Raw value
- 2.18% of products not exported competitively at the start
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- Harvard Growth Lab (hs92_country_product_year_4.csv (doi:10.7910/DVN/T4CHWJ))
- History
- one year
Disaster preparedness and recovery
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- INFORM / UNDRR
- History
- no data
Note: No source observes a country preparing for or recovering from a real shock. INFORM publishes its lack of coping capacity apart from hazard and exposure, but that dimension averages government self-assessments and governance perception indices with stocks such as roads, phones and physicians, which is the perception layer D23 retired plus conditions money buys (D122). Sendai and WHO reporting are governments grading themselves. A warning-reach survey item is a check candidate. See the disaster preparedness memo.
Institutional responsiveness
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no dataindex 0-100
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: No dataset exists. Measurable in principle from legislative and regulatory timestamps, which no one has assembled comparably.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Labour force participationWorld Bank (SL.TLF.ACTI.ZS), 2025
40.4 % aged 15+, rank 124 of 125. Share of the working-age population in the labour force.
A condition, not scored: how much of the population is in the labor force at all is what a country has to reallocate, a level set by norms, schooling and age, not a record of it reallocating (D141). Participation norms confound it, especially for India. Adaptability reads reallocation through long-term unemployment and export diversification instead.
Fixed broadband subscriptionsWorld Bank (IT.NET.BBND.P2), 2023
0.98 per 100 people, rank 103 of 125. Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people.
A condition, not scored: installed infrastructure is what a country has to change with, not a record of it changing (D122). Penalizes mobile-first countries such as India and South Africa.
Electricity transmission lossesWorld Bank (EG.ELC.LOSS.ZS), 2024
16.2 % of output, rank 92 of 117. Power lost in transmission and distribution, including unbilled use.
A condition, not scored: the state of the grid, and whether its operator can bill what it delivers, is infrastructure a country has to change with, not a record of it changing (D141). Read it beside broadband, the other installed network beside Adaptability.
Informal employmentILOSTAT (DF_SDG_0831_SEX_ECO_RT), 2016
63.6 % of employment, rank 58 of 102. Informal employment as a share of total employment, SDG indicator 8.3.1.
A condition, not scored: how much work carries no contract, registration or social protection describes the labor market a country reallocates through, not it reallocating (D150). Read it beside the unemployment rate: where most work is informal, a person who loses a job takes any work within weeks, so a low rate is not a fluid market. Its direction for Adaptability cannot be defended, since informal work is both the slack that absorbs a shock and the precarity that keeps a worker from moving up, so the rank orders values and is not a verdict. Comparability is weak: the European values come from an income survey (EU-SILC) with a proxy definition, and the rest from labor force or household surveys processed by the ILO. ILOSTAT has no value for the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, Israel, Malaysia, China, the Philippines or Cuba, and some values are old (Haiti and Nicaragua 2012).
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
Emergency Flood Assistance Project after the 1998 and 1999 floods
After floods in 1998 caused damage estimated at US$40 million, about 2 percent of GDP, Tajikistan's Republican Project Coordination Unit for Liquidation of Consequences of Natural Disasters had repaired about 210 km of roads and fully completed seven bridges and structures by the credit's closing on 31 December 2001, with about 80 km of road repairs and three bridges unfinished, and the World Bank rated the outcome unsatisfactory.
210 km, road repairs completed at closing (about 80 km more unfinished), 2001-12-31. 40 million US dollars, damage from the 1998 floods as estimated, 1998. World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Tajikistan Emergency Flood Assistance Project (IDA-31230, IDA-31231), Report No. 24209, 2002, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: A government emergency coordination unit repaired flood-damaged bridges, roads and embankments with an emergency IDA credit through local contractors, without the supervision capacity to hold them to quality.
Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Unsatisfactory and sustainability Unlikely, mainly over poor works quality and financial management; it refused a further extension and closed the credit as planned. The record is filed as evidence of weak recovery capacity, not of success. The report says the roads actually damaged totalled about 105 km of the 210 km repaired, that works quality was poor because local firms lacked experience and supervision, and that only three of eight planned power substations were completed. The project came a year after the end of a five-year civil war, with a supplemental credit after further floods in 1999, so capacity was at a low point. The text is OCR of a scanned 2002 report, and the data sheet and narrative disagree on the original closing date (January 2000 against June 2001).
Bank bailout of 2016, and the liquidation of both banks
The Government of Tajikistan injected TJS 3.3 billion of public money into Agroinvestbank and Tojiksodirotbank in 2016, after both had been in difficulty since 2015, and in May 2021 the National Bank of Tajikistan revoked both licences and the Economic Court of Dushanbe ordered their compulsory liquidation.
3.3 TJS billion, public funds injected into the two banks, 2016. World Bank, Tajikistan Country Economic Update, Summer 2021, retrieved 2026-10-16.
How it worked: The government recapitalised two failing banks from the budget, and when their governance problems persisted the central bank closed both five years later.
Limits: The number sits in a World Bank report PDF (pages 19 and 20), not in a statistical series, and the report does not break the TJS 3.3 billion down by bank. The World Bank's 2017 update (page 22, https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/963071514451761441/pdf/122285-WP-Tajikistan-PUBLIC.pdf) counts the 2016 financial sector bailout at 6.1 percent of GDP, a wider figure that may include more than these two banks. The 2021 report says structural and corporate governance problems were not resolved but gives no recovery figure, so the record does not show how much of the injection was lost. A bailout is a response to a shock, and its failure says the response did not fix the cause; it does not measure how fast Tajik institutions change rules or programmes in general. The 2021 liquidation was itself a decision that followed international recommendations, which the report treats as the correct outcome.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 36.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Small move up: households did absorb the 2022 rouble shocks. But the adjustment ran through emigration and remittances, a channel that depends on Russia, not on domestic institutions.
- 50.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.35
Households reallocate fast through migration and remittances and carried the 2022 rouble shock. Panelist A is right that this is emigration rather than institutional response, so I come down slightly but stay above the panel.
- 40.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.40
Remittances and migration are a household channel that absorbed the 2022 rouble shock, but this is emigration standing in for an institutional response. Export base is narrow and new products are few.
Building
How capable is the country of turning plans and knowledge into functioning systems?
-8.3 over 10 years, from 29.0 in 2016 to 20.7 on 3 indicators seen in both years.
Trends use fewer indicators than the current score and use today's frame. A longer span reaches further back.
- Raw value
- 13.236% of GDP
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (NV.IND.MANF.ZS)
- History
- Raw value
- 15.208% of manufactured exports
- Year
- 2023. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS)
- History
Logistics infrastructure quality
perception proxyretired, see notes- Raw value
- no dataindex 1-5
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- World Bank (LP.LPI.INFR.XQ)
- History
- no data
Note: Retired 2026-08-26. An LPI sub-index, so the same freight-forwarder survey as logistics performance and the same problem. Electricity connection speed stays as the observable infrastructure measure in this dimension. See D23.
- Raw value
- 65.217score 0-100
- Year
- 2019. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (IC.ELC.TIME.DFRN)
- History
- Raw value
- 0.009index
- Year
- 2024. The rail runs from 1960 to 2026.
- Normalized
- Source
- World Bank (EF.EFM.UNIV.XD)
- History
Large project delivery
direct capability measureno dataset exists, 1 record- Raw value
- no data% overrun
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- none
- History
- no data
Note: The single best measure of execution capability and there is no comparable international dataset. Assembling one is a defensible Envisioning project. Building mixes industrial output with state delivery capacity, and this indicator carries the delivery side: the other six indicators cannot see a national programme that was delivered. Documented deliveries are recorded in data/evidence and never scored, see D20.
Firm scale-up rate
direct capability measureno dataset exists- Raw value
- no data% of firms
- Year
- no data
- Normalized
- no data
- Source
- OECD DynEmp
- History
- no data
Note: OECD business dynamics work covers members irregularly. Nothing comparable for India, Brazil or South Africa.
Conditions, not scored
What the country has to work with on this capability. The values are shown as the source published them and are not part of the score, the confidence or the trend. The rank counts the countries with a value, best first.
Output per workerWorld Bank (SL.GDP.PCAP.EM.KD), 2025
22,156 constant 2021 PPP $, rank 88 of 123. GDP per person employed, constant purchasing power parity.
A condition, not scored: output per worker is income per worker, the wealth the benchmark tests capability against, so it is published beside Building as context (D122).
Evidence for missing indicators
Each record describes a case the indicators above cannot see. It does not affect the score or confidence because one case is not comparable across countries. A gap can become an indicator when a comparable series covers at least two countries.
The Government of Tajikistan resumed construction of the Soviet-era Rogun hydropower plant in 2007 from the state budget, signed the main dam contract in 2016 and commissioned two temporary units (400 MW) in 2018 and 2019. It invested about US$3.3 billion in 2007 to 2022, and in November 2024 the World Bank put the cost to complete the plant at US$6.29 billion, with construction completion moved to 2033 and full reservoir impoundment not before 2039, 63 years after construction first began in 1976.
6.29 billion USD, estimated cost to complete the rogun hpp programme, November 2024. 3.3 billion USD (about), government of tajikistan investment in rogun hpp, 2007 to 2022, 2007-2022. World Bank, Project Appraisal Document PAD00208, Sustainable Financing for Rogun Hydropower Project (P181029), 19 November 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.
How it worked: The Tajik government restarted a stalled Soviet megaproject from its own budget and a Eurobond, brought two temporary turbines online early to earn revenue during construction, then used World Bank-backed safety and environmental studies to draw in a donor financing package for the rest.
Limits: No cost overrun can be computed: the appraisal document gives no original budget or baseline completion date to set the US$6.29 billion against, so the gap's unit (percent overrun) is not met. The US$6.29 billion is a forward estimate of remaining cost with contingencies, not an outturn, and adding it to the US$3.3 billion already spent is our arithmetic, not the Bank's. The schedule slip is our reading of milestone dates: construction began in 1976, the Soviet works stopped in 1992, and completion is now 2033 with impoundment in 2039. The Bank itself expects 'some further delays' to the March 2024 milestones. It attributes slow progress to financing shortfalls. The source is the lender's appraisal for its own grant, written to justify financing. The project is now financed by ten development partners, so delivery after 2024 is shared rather than purely Tajik. Spending close to 39 percent of GDP and a US$500 million Eurobond left the country at high risk of debt distress. 'Operating' means two temporary units run, not that the 3,780 MW plant is built.
Panel estimate, round 2, how this layer works
- 24.0 institutionalist@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.45
Small move up for Rogun as a project the state carries, but it has run for decades on external finance and economic fitness is at the floor.
- 26.0 bottom_up@claude-opus-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Rogun shows the state can carry a large project slowly with outside money. Economic fitness near zero and narrow manufacturing keep the score low.
- 26.0 wealth_sceptic@claude-sonnet-5-5, self-confidence 0.50
Economic fitness is at the floor and manufacturing is narrow. Rogun shows slow, externally financed delivery of one project, not a general capacity.