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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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8 of 863 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

Kazakhstansince 1997delivered and closedbears on Government foresight capacity

Agency for Strategic Planning, merged into a ministry in 2002

Kazakhstan's President created an Agency for Strategic Planning directly subordinate to him by Decree No. 3377 of 4 March 1997; parliament appropriated KZT 29,040 thousand to it for 2002, including a programme to monitor geopolitical and geo-economic processes and assess their effect on the country's development prospects, and Decree No. 931 of 28 August 2002 then merged the agency into the Ministry of Economy and Budget Planning.

29,040 thousand tenge, republican budget appropriation to administrator 604, agency for strategic planning of the republic of kazakhstan, 2002 (budget law). Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Law No. 273-II of 15 December 2001 on the republican budget for 2002, annex on expenditure by administrator and programme, via the zakon.uchet.kz legal database, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The President set up a strategic planning agency reporting to him and outside the cabinet, then a later administrative reform folded it into a merged economy and budget ministry, which put long-range planning under the body that writes the annual budget.

Preconditions

  • A presidential system in which agencies are created and merged by decree, with no statute to repeal
  • A government reform programme that counted separate agencies as overhead and merged them into larger ministries
  • A receiving ministry able to absorb planning tasks, so the closure left no visible gap in the budget law

Where else it has been used: Poland's strategic studies centre (pol-rcss) was folded into the Chancellery and a line ministry in 2006 on the same consolidation logic; Kazakhstan, unlike Poland, recreated a presidential planning agency in 2020.

Limits: The figure is an appropriation in the budget law, not an outturn, and the agency was merged before the year ended, so it did not spend the full year as a separate body. The text was read on zakon.uchet.kz, a private mirror of the official adilet.zan.kz database, because adilet renders acts only with JavaScript; the mirror shows the law's current edition, which may carry amendments made during 2002. Of the KZT 29,040 thousand, 22,940 thousand was administrative cost, and only 1,200 thousand went to the programme on world geopolitical and geo-economic processes, the line closest to foresight; the rest funded energy-sector planning, public administration recommendations and a demographic information system. The agency was a planning body, closer to development planning than to scenario-based foresight. Its name and form changed between 1997 and 2002: a 1998 decree (No. 3958) reorganised the then Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms by dividing it, and describes it as a central executive body outside the government, so the 2002 body was smaller than the 1997 one, and this record does not measure by how much. Decree No. 931 merged the agency rather than abolishing its tasks, so planning work moved to a line ministry, and in 2020 the President created a new Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms whose regulations list strategic forecasting (zakon.uchet.kz, Decree No. 427 of 5 October 2020, https://zakon.uchet.kz/rus/docs/U2000000427). What ended in 2002 is a dedicated agency with its own budget administrator code, not the planning function, and the function returned 18 years later.

Coordination

2 deliveries linked to University-industry collaboration, Public-private collaboration.

Kazakhstansince 2019delivered and closedbears on University-industry collaboration

Innovation Consortia Matching Grant Program (Fostering Productive Innovation Project)

Kazakhstan's innovation ministry (MDDIAI), through the Innovation Consortia Matching Grant Program of the World Bank financed Fostering Productive Innovation Project, had supported 33 technology consortia of research teams and firms, including 12 competence centres, by September 2024, whose first sales and signed contracts totalled about 17 billion tenge.

33 consortia, technology consortia supported under the innovation consortia matching grant program, September 2024. 17,000,000,000 tenge, first sales and signed contracts of productive sector consortia subprojects, September 2024. World Bank, Kazakhstan: Fostering Productive Innovation Project (P150402), Implementation Support Mission Aide Memoire, September 16 to 24, 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The ministry ran a competitive matching-grant window that paid consortia of research teams and firms to take a technology to first sales, with firms co-financing and a project unit monitoring sales and contracts.

Preconditions

  • Loan financing from a development bank with a project management unit able to run calls
  • Research teams with near-market technologies and firms willing to co-finance
  • A follow-on budget to keep calls running once the loan closes, which was not yet in place

Where else it has been used: The consortia window scaled up the earlier Technology Commercialization Project; its continuation depends on a second loan rather than the state budget.

Limits: The figure is the World Bank's mission account of a programme it financed, not a ministry statistic, and the number is in a PDF (paragraph 6 of the aide memoire). The sentence 'supported 33 technology consortia, including 12 competence centers, and 9 IICs' does not make clear whether the nine inclusive innovation consortia are inside or beside the 33. The aide memoire does not define a consortium's membership; the 2020 restructuring paper describes the window as a tool 'for fostering industry-science linkages' with an average 40 percent private co-financing in the first six grants, and the annex shows competence centres hosted by universities (Astana IT University, the ENU-Lab centre), but not every consortium is shown to include a university. The 17 billion tenge is first sales and contracts as reported by beneficiaries, rounded ('around'), and is not audited. The programme ran on loan money: the 2020 restructuring cut the consortia component from US$35 million to US$25.1 million, and in 2024 the ministry asked to cancel a further US$5.4 million of unused consortia grants because no new round could be run before closing (extended to June 30, 2025), so the status is concluded and a follow-on (FPIP-2) was only in preparation. The 2019 start is the year the first consortia grant agreements were signed according to the 2020 restructuring paper.

Kazakhstansince 2015still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

National and local PPP and concession contracts

By the end of 2025 Kazakhstan's central and local governments had signed 1,257 PPP and concession contracts worth 3.6 trillion tenge, of which 697 were in implementation, 1,240 were local projects mostly in social services, health, education, energy and utilities, and 17 national projects accounted for more than 1.8 trillion tenge.

1,257 contracts, ppp and concession contracts signed, cumulative, 2025. 697 projects, ppp and concession projects in implementation, 2025. Kazakhstan Public-Private Partnership Center (national operator for PPP), briefing on PPP results for 2025, 'From the number of contracts to the quality of projects', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The state set up a national PPP operator and let regional akimats sign PPP contracts for local social infrastructure, with the operator appraising projects, ranking regions each year and standardising contract documents.

Preconditions

  • A PPP law that lets local governments commit future budget payments to private partners
  • A national operator to appraise projects and publish the portfolio
  • Budget room for long availability-payment obligations, which is what later pushed policy towards fewer, larger projects

Limits: The figures come from the state-owned PPP Center reporting on the portfolio it promotes, at a briefing of the government's Central Communications Service; the page carries no date beyond 'results for 2025' and no table, and the Center's own homepage gives a different, later count (1,438 contracts and 3.8 trillion tenge as of 1 September 2026) that we could not reconcile with the briefing's 1,257. The gap between 1,257 signed and 697 in implementation is not explained: it mixes completed, not yet started and terminated contracts, so the share of contracts that failed is unknown. Most contracts are small local projects in social sectors, and the Center's PPP White Book describes availability payments from the budget as a standard repayment route, so many contracts may be deferred public procurement rather than shared risk; the briefing gives no split by payment mechanism. The briefing itself says the number of new contracts is falling while average project size rose from about 6 billion tenge before 2022 to 18 billion in 2022 to 2025, a policy shift away from the small local contracts that built the count. The start year is that of the Law on Public-Private Partnership of 31 October 2015, as cited in the Center's PPP White Book; the cumulative count also includes concessions signed under earlier law.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Kazakhstansince 2021still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Skills Enbek online vocational training platform

Kazakhstan's Ministry of Labour and Social Protection runs the Skills Enbek online training platform, on which 107,900 citizens, about 52,400 of them unemployed, earned course certificates in 2024, and 410,900 people had completed training since the platform opened.

107,900 people, citizens who received a course completion certificate on skills enbek in the year, 2024. 52,400 people, of whom unemployed, 2024. Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, press release of 10 January 2025, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The labour ministry built a free online course marketplace inside its national employment portal, routes registered unemployed people and programme participants to it, and links each certificate to vacancy suggestions on the state job exchange.

Preconditions

  • A national digital employment portal with a single user identity
  • Course authors willing to publish free or subsidised content in Kazakh and Russian
  • Internet access good enough for short video courses outside the cities

Limits: The ministry reports on its own platform in a press release, and the page renders only with JavaScript, so a plain fetch returns an empty shell. A certificate counts a completed online course, and the release states courses last from 1 to 72 hours, so one certificate can be one hour of content; the count is certificates issued to people, not hours, skills or job outcomes. About 108,000 completers is under 1 percent of the adult population. The same release folds in mandatory courses for social workers and individual assistants and the Bastau Business entrepreneurship course (35,300 certificates), so part of the total is training the state requires for its own programmes rather than voluntary adult learning. The 2021 start is the platform's launch year as reported elsewhere and is not stated at the cited URL.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Kazakhstansince 2018still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

AFSA FinTech Lab at the Astana International Financial Centre

The Astana Financial Services Authority granted five FinTech Lab sandbox licences in 2022, saw the first participant graduate to a full licence that year, and had 18 licensed firms in its sandbox at the end of 2022.

5 firms, fintech lab licences granted (firms admitted to the sandbox) in 2022, 2022. 18 firms, licensed companies in the fintech lab at end of year, 2022. Astana Financial Services Authority, 2022 Annual Report, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Astana Financial Services Authority grants individual, time-limited FinTech Lab licences with requirements tailored to each firm, and graduates a firm to full authorisation when its test succeeds.

Preconditions

  • A financial centre with its own regulator and rulebook separate from the national one
  • Demand from foreign fintech and crypto firms for a regional base
  • Supervisory staff able to write firm-specific requirements

Limits: The regulator is reporting on itself in an annual report, and the counts stop at 2022. Admissions plus completions in 2022 come to six firms, which is well under one per million people. AFSA regulates only the Astana International Financial Centre, a special jurisdiction under English-style common law, so the sandbox sits outside Kazakhstan's ordinary financial regulation; the indicator sums every regulator in the country, and the National Bank and the Agency for Regulation and Development of Financial Markets are not counted here. Many participants are crypto exchanges drawn by the AIFC regime, and eight licences were withdrawn in the same year five were granted, so the counts measure churn as much as successful testing. The start year is inferred from 'fifth year' rather than stated.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Kazakhstansince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

KZT 42,500 income-loss payment during the 2020 state of emergency

During the March to May 2020 state of emergency, Kazakhstan's government paid people who lost income because of business closures and lockdown KZT 42,500 per person per month, and about 4 million people received the payment.

4,000,000 people (about), people who received the kzt 42,500 monthly income-loss payment, 2020. World Bank, Kazakhstan Economic Update, Summer 2020: Navigating the Crisis, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government declared a state of emergency and attached to it a flat monthly payment for people who had lost income because of closures and lockdown, paid through the state benefit system for the duration of the emergency.

Preconditions

  • Fiscal room for an anti-crisis package the World Bank put at 5.7 percent of GDP
  • Population and tax registers to check applicants against
  • A state benefit payment system already reaching most households

Limits: The figure is a rounded 'about 4 million people' in Box 1 on printed page 7 (PDF page 8) of a World Bank economic update; the Bank did not finance or evaluate the payment and relays the government's own figure. The government release with the exact count (gov.kz, Ministry of Labour and Social Protection) renders only through JavaScript and could not be opened for verification. The update gives the state of emergency's dates (quarantines from 19 March, lifted on 11 May 2020) but no date of first payment and no count of people paid in each month, so the speed claim rests on the payment having been made during an emergency that lasted under two months. The update publishes no targeting, error or rejection figures, so it cannot show how well the payment reached the people it was meant for. The update puts the whole anti-crisis package at 5.7 percent of GDP, of which this payment was one part. The payment was temporary and ended with the emergency.

Kazakhstansince 2024delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Response and housing recovery after the spring 2024 floods

Kazakhstan's government reported that during the spring 2024 floods, which it called the largest in 80 years, more than 120,000 people were rescued and placed in temporary accommodation centres, and that by December 2024 it had bought 5,767 homes, fully repaired 9,156 and built 2,680 new houses for owners of the 19,359 flooded homes inspected, while 36,455 families received one-off assistance.

120,000 people (more than), people rescued and placed in temporary accommodation during the flood period, 2024-04. 2,680 houses, new individual houses built for flood victims (64 billion tenge), 2024-12-25. Office of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan (primeminister.kz), review '2024 zhylgy su tasqyny: azamattarga aleumettik komek, uyler men infraqurylymdar salu zhane qalpyna keltiru', 25 December 2024 (in Kazakh), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Emergency Situations coordinated a national and regional headquarters that evacuated whole settlements by land and air, and the government then used its reserve to buy housing on the market, repair, and build new houses within the same year.

Preconditions

  • A civil protection system able to mobilise army, police and National Guard under one command
  • A government reserve fund large enough to pay for housing within months
  • A functioning housing market from which homes could be bought quickly in the affected regions

Limits: The government reports on its own response in a press review, with no independent verification, and the page exists only in Kazakh (the English and Russian addresses redirect to the home page); figures were translated by me. 'Rescued and placed in temporary accommodation' counts evacuations, not people saved from death, and the page gives no count of deaths or of people who stayed. The housing figures answer only for homes that were the owner's sole dwelling (19,359 inspected), so second homes and renters are outside them, and the three remedies (purchase, repair, new build) add to 17,603 against 19,359 inspected by my sum, so about 1,750 cases are not accounted for on the page. The page itself says the scale could not have been forecast, which bears on preparation: the response was large but the warning system did not anticipate the event, and the President afterwards created a Committee for the Prevention of Emergencies inside the ministry. Spending figures are nominal tenge. Status 'concluded' rests on a December 2024 account; later complaints about the quality of new houses, if any, were not checked.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Kazakhstansince 2009delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

South-West Roads: Western Europe-Western China corridor (CAREC 1b and 6b)

Kazakhstan's Committee for Roads upgraded 1,281 km of the Western Europe-Western China corridor and connecting roads under a US$2.5 billion programme between 2009 and 2024, for an actual cost of US$2,468.6 million against US$2,500 million appraised, but over 15 years against a planned four and a half.

15 years, implementation duration, actual (planned at appraisal: 4.5 years), 2024. 2,468.6 US$ million, actual total project cost (appraised: us$2,500 million), 2024. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00317, South-West Roads Project (P099270), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Kazakhstan's Committee for Roads borrowed from the World Bank to rebuild its stretch of the Western Europe-Western China corridor to dual carriageway, procured it in large international civil works packages, and used the savings from low bids to extend the scope across three oblasts.

Preconditions

  • Sovereign borrowing capacity backed by oil revenue
  • A road agency able to run international competitive bidding under lender rules
  • A corridor with transit demand that neighbours and lenders also wanted built

Limits: The cost line looks on budget only because the scope was moved to fit the money: bid prices came in low and the tenge depreciated, and the savings bought 219 km of extra road, so the total says nothing about cost per km against plan. The schedule figure is the honest one, and it is poor: the closing date was extended four times, the first three to absorb added scope and the last for COVID-19 and the termination of several civil works contracts, and a 42 km Otar-Uzynagash section was still unfinished at closing after two contractors were terminated for non-performance. The source is the lender's own completion report; the World Bank financed 85 percent of the cost, so this is a borrowed-money build supervised by the lender, though executed and repaid by Kazakhstan. Traffic came in about a third below forecast. It is one corridor programme, not a portfolio, so it cannot stand for Kazakhstan's average project performance.