Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism6 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Georgiasince 2007dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

State health cover bought through private insurers, and its dismantling

From 2007 Georgia's health ministry contracted private insurance companies to buy care for the people covered by its state Medical Assistance Program, and medical policies in force at Georgian insurers reached 1,959,338 at the end of 2013. After the government moved purchasing to its own Social Service Agency under the Universal Health Coverage Program, policies in force fell to 535,505 at the end of 2014.

535,505 policies, medical (health) insurance policies in force at insurers, end of year, 2014. 1,959,338 policies, medical (health) insurance policies in force at insurers, end of year, peak, 2013. Insurance State Supervision Service of Georgia, insurance market statistics, number of policies, 12 months 2014, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The health ministry paid private insurers, first through vouchers the poor could take to any insurer and from 2010 through regional tenders, to carry the risk and buy care for state beneficiaries. In 2013 a new government made its Social Service Agency the single purchaser, and the insurers' public book ran off.

Preconditions

Private insurers with provider networks able to absorb a state book
A state agency able to means-test beneficiaries and pay premiums monthly
Political consensus on contracting out, which the 2012 change of government removed

Limits: The regulator counts policies, not people, and the count mixes the state programmes with voluntary corporate and retail cover. The 2014 value is in the 2014 Excel file at the source URL; the 2013 peak is in the 2013 file (https://insurance.gov.ge/en/Statistics/GetFile/543?type=4), and the same regulator's 2013 file without state programmes (https://insurance.gov.ge/en/Statistics/GetFile/431?type=4) gives 491,885 medical policies, so state programmes held about 1,467,453 policies at the end of 2013. That split is computed by subtraction, not published, and no split exists for earlier years. The year-end series in the same files was 1,311,287 in 2009, 1,915,952 in 2012 and 533,471 in 2015. The account of the arrangement and of the takeover comes from a World Bank knowledge brief (https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099802505242216398/pdf/IDU07bfac40d035c20431a0bc1b0755ced4057df.pdf, a PDF), which dates the Social Service Agency's takeover of purchasing to the start of 2013; the policy counts stayed high through 2013 and fell in 2014, and no source here explains the lag. The record documents the end of a public-private delivery model, not a loss of health coverage: the same brief reports that public health spending rose from 19.4 percent of current health expenditure in 2012 to 40.8 percent in 2019. The brief also reports that insurers had integrated with hospitals and contracted selectively, which is a reason the state ended the model.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Georgiasince 2020still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

SESA vocational training and retraining programme for jobseekers

Georgia's State Employment Support Agency has run voucher-funded short vocational courses for registered jobseekers since 2020, averaging more than 2,000 participants a year, and an evaluation of the 2,521 people who completed training in 2022 found that about 5 in 100 previously unemployed participants found a job the following year.

2,521 people, participants who completed training in 2022, analysed with revenue service administrative data, 2022. 4.8 percent, hard employment indicator: share of participants unemployed in 2022 who were employed in 2023, 2023. European Training Foundation, peer learning event Effectiveness of ALMPs, Evaluation of vocational training-retraining measure in Georgia (Ana Diakonidze), June 2026, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The employment agency issues training vouchers to registered jobseekers for courses of up to three months at public VET colleges and accredited training enterprises, and tracks outcomes through tax records.

Preconditions

A network of public VET colleges able to run short courses for adults
A jobseeker register linked to Revenue Service employment and earnings data
An annual state programme budget for active labour market measures

Limits: The figures come from slides in a PDF presentation, not a published evaluation report, so the method cannot be checked in full; slide 5 gives the 2,521 individuals analysed, and it does not state whether that is every 2022 completer or the subset matched to tax records. The annual scale is given only as an average of more than 2,000 participants over the last five years, with no year-by-year series at an open URL; the agency's own site did not resolve. The evaluation's results are poor: a 4.8 percent hard employment rate (about 10 percent among the previously unemployed only), and a return of 75 GEL in taxes per 100 GEL spent. About 2,000 people a year is a very small share of Georgia's adults. The 2020 start is the start under SESA; earlier job-seeker training ran under the Social Service Agency and is not counted.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Georgiasince 2021still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Regulatory Laboratory (regulatory sandbox) of the National Bank of Georgia

The National Bank of Georgia, under a sandbox framework it approved in May 2020, took 19 supervised firms through the final real-environment stage of its Regulatory Laboratory between June 2021 and June 2026, 14 of them banks, microfinance organisations and payment firms testing remote identification in 2021, and listed one further project, the Ranko credit-offer platform, in real-environment testing in October 2026.

19 firms (cumulative), firms listed as having completed real-environment testing, counted from the completed projects page, 2026-06-19. 1 projects, projects listed as currently in real-environment testing, 2026-10-16. National Bank of Georgia, Regulatory Laboratory: Completed Projects, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank wrote a three-stage sandbox framework (idea, concept, then live testing on a limited number of users) open to firms it already supervises, and publishes each firm's project and the date its live test ended.

Preconditions

An integrated supervisor whose remit covers banks, microfinance, payment and capital market firms, so one framework reaches the whole financial sector
A specific rule blocking demand at a given moment, here in-person identification during the COVID-19 pandemic
A public page kept current row by row with completion dates

Where else it has been used: The central bank reframed the sandbox in 2025 under Order No. 125/04 and moved from open intake to thematic calls, but the published list shows the remote identification wave of 2021 remains most of its throughput.

Limits: Both counts are ours, made by reading the rows of two central bank pages; neither page states a total. The Completed Projects page lists 20 rows, but Microfinance Organization Micro Business Capital appears twice with the same project and date, so the count is 19 firms. The page lists completions only: it does not say how many firms applied, how many entered the first two stages (idea and concept testing) and were stopped there, or whether any test failed, so firms that exited without success, half of what the indicator asks for, cannot be counted and the list may show only successes. The flow is lumpy: 15 of the 20 rows are remote identification tests closed between June and November 2021, a COVID-era wave in which most banks tested the same face-recognition onboarding service, so the 2021 peak counts near-identical tests rather than distinct innovations. After 2021 the list shows one completion in March 2025, three online currency conversion services in August and September 2025 and a virtual-asset-secured loan in June 2026. The central bank opened later thematic calls (escrow services, tokenized deposits, equity crowdfunding, an AI sandbox, tokenized bonds), and none of these appears among completed or live tests. The page does not say whether any completion led to a rule change. Only the central bank, which supervises banking, non-bank, payment and capital market firms, is covered; no other Georgian regulator was found running a trial regime.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Georgiasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Temporary unemployment benefit and one-off support for the self-employed, 2020

Georgia, which had no unemployment benefit, announced a temporary GEL 200 monthly benefit for laid-off formal workers and a one-off payment for self-employed and informal workers on 24 April 2020, a month after declaring a state of emergency, and by September 2021 had paid 231,487 unemployed people and 307,236 self-employed people.

231,487 people, unemployed people paid the temporary unemployment benefit, 2021-09. 307,236 people, self-employed people whose activity was affected and who received support, 2021-09. World Bank, Implementation Status and Results Report, Georgia Emergency COVID-19 Response Project (P173911), sequence 3, 10 September 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government used the Revenue Service's payroll tax records to identify laid-off formal workers and pay them a flat monthly benefit through the State Employment Support Agency, and opened an online portal for a one-off payment to self-employed and informal workers with no declared income.

Preconditions

Monthly payroll tax declarations linking workers to employers and bank accounts
An employment agency able to verify eligibility against social assistance lists
External emergency finance (World Bank and AIIB) committed within weeks

Limits: Both counts are in one sentence on page 1 of the status report, with no table behind them and no date of first payment; the timing comes from the project appraisal document (http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/949581588712278110/pdf/Georgia-Emergency-COVID-19-Response-Project.pdf: state of emergency on 21 March 2020 in paragraph 9, printed page 12; the Prime Minister's 24 April announcement in paragraph 26, printed page 18; the GEL 200 benefit for up to six months and the GEL 300 one-off benefit in paragraphs 45 and 46). The speed shown is therefore 34 days from emergency to announced rule, not to money paid. The World Bank and AIIB co-financed the programme, the report notes that its indicator values cover only the IBRD share of some outputs, and the counts are cumulative people paid at least once, not people covered for six months. The benefit was temporary by design and Georgia still has no permanent unemployment insurance, so the rule change did not outlast the shock. The self-employed figure is described as people 'whose activity was affected', a looser category than the one-off benefit's eligibility rule.

Georgiasince 2018still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Multi-hazard early warning system and hydrometeorological network

Georgia's Ministry of Environmental Protection and Agriculture, as executing entity of a UNDP-implemented programme financed by the Green Climate Fund and the Government of Georgia, installed 150 of 154 planned hydro- and agro-meteorological monitoring stations between 2018 and 2025, produced hazard and risk maps for all 11 river basins and completed flood-protection works at 12 of 13 sites, with the government disbursing USD 37.5 million of its own grant co-finance.

150 stations (of 154 planned), hydro- and agro-meteorological monitoring stations installed, 2025. 37,475,923.41 USD, government of georgia grant co-finance disbursed, cumulative, 2025. Green Climate Fund, FP068 annual performance report 2025 (submitted by UNDP, 30 July 2026), retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The environment ministry paired a Green Climate Fund grant with a larger government grant to rebuild the national observation network, map hazards basin by basin and build flood defences, routing procurement and management through UNDP while the National Environmental Agency and the Emergency Management Service take over the systems.

Preconditions

A national hydrometeorological agency able to staff, maintain and integrate new stations
Government willingness to put more of its own budget into the programme than the external grant
Mobile operators and an emergency service able to carry warnings to the last mile

Limits: The numbers sit in a PDF (station count on page 7, co-finance table on page 22) written by UNDP, the accredited entity, so the programme reports on itself. Installed stations are not yet a working warning chain: the report says all 150 are still being tested for integration into the ICT system, forecasting platforms for floods, mudflows, avalanches and landslides run in testing mode, and the last-mile channel (a cell broadcast system replacing 200 planned sirens) is not yet built. The programme has requested a 12-month no-cost extension; its approved period ends in April 2027. The interim evaluation dated January 2025 recorded delays in the first output that pushed back the other two, and local mistrust of the equipment. UNDP implements the programme, so the delivery is Georgian in ownership and money but not in day-to-day management. Nothing here shows warnings issued or losses avoided.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Georgiasince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

East-West Highway Corridor Improvement Project (Rikoti Pass sections)

Georgia's Roads Department completed most civil works on the Zemo Osiauri to Chumateleti and Chumateleti to Khevi sections of the East-West Highway across the Rikoti Pass by the project's closing on 30 June 2025, four and a half years after the original loan closing date of 31 December 2020, and the government's own financing rose to US$91.03 million against US$44 million planned for the enlarged project (US$24 million at approval plus US$20 million under the 2017 additional financing).

91.03 million US dollars, borrower co-financing actually disbursed, 2025-06-30. 44 million US dollars, borrower co-financing planned, parent project (us$24 million) plus 2017 additional financing (us$20 million), my sum of table 2, 2017-12. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Georgia East-West Highway Corridor Improvement Project (P149952, Loans 8547-GE and 8788-GE), 2026, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Roads Department carried the national east-west highway over its hardest mountain pass in contracts financed by the World Bank and the EIB, and when contracts failed or were re-tendered the government covered the gap from its own budget instead of cutting scope.

Preconditions

A sequence of earlier highway projects that built the Roads Department's contract management
Lenders willing to co-finance tunnels and bridges in seismic mountain terrain
Budget room to nearly quadruple counterpart funding

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory and efficiency Modest. The financing figures are in the data sheet and Table 2 (ICR page 4); the closing-date changes in the restructuring table (paras. 10 to 11) and para. 23. Much of the extra time and government money followed a 2017 decision to add the 11.6 km Chumateleti to Khevi link, co-financed by an EIB loan of EUR 67.47 million, so the plan the outturn is set against grew mid-project; Table 2's component 1 estimates (parent plus additional financing, US$273.48 million including EIB) against actuals (US$359.72 million) give a 32 percent overrun by my own sum, which the report does not state. The report attributes the 18-month extension of 2023 to re-tendering, COVID-19 and mountain construction, and the parallel Fourth East-West Highway project's ICR (2020) records that a Zemo Osiauri to Chumateleti lot was terminated in December 2018 and re-bid under this project. Most civil works were complete at closing, with residual works finished afterwards on government money; the date of full opening was not read at an official source.