Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism6 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Zambiasince 2003dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Zambia Railways concession to Railway Systems of Zambia, and its cancellation in 2012

Zambia concessioned its national railway, after a decade in which traffic halved from 1,072 million net ton kilometres in 1993 to 540 million in 1999, to the private operator Railway Systems of Zambia, which took over on 3 December 2003 and raised traffic by about 30 percent in net ton kilometres in 2004 against 2003; the World Bank later reported that the network and service kept deteriorating and that the concession was cancelled in September 2012.

30 %, increase in rail freight traffic (net ton kilometres) in the first year of the concession, 2004 against 2003, 2004. 3.7 million US dollars, concession fees paid to government by the concessionaire since takeover, per the concessionaire's auditors, 2005 (third quarter). World Bank, Implementation Completion Report, Zambia Railways Restructuring Project, Report No. 32520, December 2005, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

After two decades of falling traffic under the state railway, the government retrenched staff with World Bank money and let one private consortium run all freight and passenger services and the track under a vertically integrated concession; the operator lengthened hauls and paid fees for a few years, then a later government judged the network was still deteriorating and took the railway back.

Preconditions

A concession agreement with enforceable investment and maintenance obligations and a monitoring body able to apply them
Bulk mining freight that the railway can win back from road
Political agreement across governments that private operation is the policy, which did not survive here

Limits: The cited completion report was written two years into the concession and supports the start and the early gains only; it says the 30 percent rise came with a fall in tonnage as the operator dropped short hauls, and that the borrower disputed the concessionaire's fee compliance and Parliament set up a review in December 2005. The cancellation rests on a second World Bank document, the Country Partnership Strategy for FY13 to FY16 (Report No. 75089-ZM, February 2013, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/182591468178437607/pdf/750890CORRIGEN0IC00IDA0R20130002703.pdf, PDF page 22, paragraph 49), which says the rail network condition and service continued to deteriorate and the concession was cancelled in September 2012 with a commitment to recapitalise the railway, and elsewhere (page 11) calls it a reversal of the railway concession that stakeholders saw as policy incoherence. Neither document gives traffic for the later concession years, so the record shows a delivered early gain and a cancellation, not a measured decline from a peak. Both documents come from the lender that financed the concession process and argued for privatisation. The figures are in PDFs (the 1993 and 1999 traffic on page 5, the fees on page 10, the 2004 traffic gain on page 19, the 20-year term on page 43). The concession was originally 20 years with possible extensions (Annex 10), so it ran about nine years of a 20-year term, a figure computed here.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Zambiasince 1998still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

TEVET Fund training for MSMEs and the informal sector

Zambia's TEVET Fund, set up under the TEVET Act and financed mainly by the Skills Development Levy, paid 101 training institutions to train micro, small and medium enterprise operators, informal sector workers and out-of-school youth, and enrolled 10,270 trainees in 2025 against a target of 9,350; its employer-based in-service window trained 1,188 employees against a target of 8,602.

10,270 trainees, trainees enrolled under the tevet fund msme and informal sector training window, 2025. 1,188 employees, employees trained under the tevet fund employer-based in-service training window, 2025. Technical Education, Vocational and Entrepreneurship Training Authority (TEVETA), Zambia, TEVET Fund Annual Report 2025, sections 4.2.1 and 4.3.2, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

Parliament created a training fund in the TEVET Act, the revenue authority collects a payroll skills levy for it, and the training authority's board signs competitive contracts with registered public and private institutions to train informal operators and employees in priority sectors.

Preconditions

A revenue authority that collects a payroll levy from formal employers and remits it to the fund
A register of accredited training institutions spread across the provinces that can bid for contracts
Employers willing to take up in-service training, which the 2025 shortfall shows is not assured

Limits: The gap asks for a share of adults in education and training, and this is a count of trainees the fund paid for, reported by the authority that runs the fund, read from a PDF. Against an adult population of more than ten million, about 10,000 trainees a year is a fraction of one percent. The report gives no age breakdown, and it names out-of-school youth among the trainees, so an unknown part are young people in their first training rather than adults returning to learn. The report contradicts itself on the employer window: section 4.2.1 gives 1,188 employees trained, and the summary table of annual activities gives 2,557 employees. The 10,270 figure is an enrolment; 8,895 learners sat the assessment, against a different target of 9,674 in the same report. The report does not state the year the informal sector window opened; 1998 is the year of the TEVET Act that created the fund. The 2022 TEVETA annual report, a separate document, gives 8,297 enrolled in the same window that year. A count of trainees says nothing about course length, completion rates or effect on earnings.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Zambiasince 2021delivered and closedbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Regulatory Sandbox Framework for Capital Markets, first cohort

Zambia's Securities and Exchange Commission admitted four innovations to the first cohort of its capital markets sandbox, with testing starting on 19 November 2021, and announced on 15 July 2024 that live testing had been completed and directed all four to suspend operations inside the sandbox pending evaluation and exit.

4 innovations, innovations admitted to the first sandbox cohort and completing live testing, 2024-07-15. Securities and Exchange Commission of Zambia, Press Release 'Regulatory Sandbox Framework for Capital Markets' (15 July 2024), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The securities regulator admitted a single cohort of capital markets innovations, let them take real investors under parameters and caps, then froze onboarding at the end of testing so it could evaluate each before deciding on commercial deployment.

Preconditions

A sandbox guideline issued under the Securities Act
Firms, including the national exchange, willing to test under caps
A licensing decision process after testing, which here had not been published

Limits: The regulator reports on itself in a one-page press release (PDF). The four are named innovations from four firms (Kukula Capital, Lupiya Circle, Lusaka Securities Exchange and Premier Credit Zambia), one of them the national stock exchange. The release says the framework was issued on 18 December 2022 but that testing began on 'Wednesday, 19th November 2021', which cannot both be right, and neither date matches its weekday (19 November 2021 was a Friday, 18 December 2022 a Sunday); the start year 2021 is the earliest date the release gives and is not confirmed by any other source read. Completion of testing is not a successful exit: the release says each innovator will or will not be permitted to deploy commercially after review, and no outcome statement was found on the SEC site; its list of sandbox participants page is empty. If the 2021 date is right, testing ran over two and a half years for one cohort of four, and no second cohort was found. The Bank of Zambia runs a separate sandbox and reports that 'one financial innovation exited the Sandbox after a successful test' in 2024 (Annual Report 2024, printed page 69, PDF page 86, https://www.boz.zm/sites/default/files/2026-01/Bank_of_Zambia_2024_Annual_Report.pdf); summed, the two regulators show about five firms through a sandbox over three years for 21 million people.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Zambiasince 2024delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Drought Emergency Cash Transfer through the Social Cash Transfer

After the President declared the 2024 El Niño drought a national disaster, Zambia's Ministry of Community Development and Social Services enumerated households in all 116 districts within four to eight weeks. From May 2024 to April 2025 it paid a drought emergency cash transfer to 1,631,007 households in 84 districts through the Social Cash Transfer, and paid a nationally funded price-shock transfer to 632,664 households in the other 32 districts.

1,631,007 households, households supported by the drought emergency cash transfer (d-ect) in 84 drought-affected districts, May 2024 to April 2025. 632,664 households, households paid the government-funded indirect price shock emergency cash transfer in the remaining 32 districts, May 2024 to April 2025. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Zambia Scaling-up Shock Responsive Social Protection Project (P179095), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Once the drought was declared, the Cabinet chose the existing Social Cash Transfer instead of a parallel humanitarian pipeline to deliver emergency aid. The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services then used enumerators already on retainer in every district and a simplified proxy-means test to enrol drought-hit households in weeks and pay them through the same digital rails.

Preconditions

A national cash transfer already running in all 116 districts, with a beneficiary information system and digital payments
Enumerators kept on retainer and a targeting questionnaire that could be adapted in weeks
Donor crisis financing available at short notice to fund the expansion while the treasury was in debt restructuring

Limits: The source is the World Bank's own completion report on a project it financed, written with the implementing ministry, and the household counts are programme administrative data, not an independent survey. The 1.63 million drought transfers were financed by IDA grants and a donor trust fund. Only the 632,664 price-shock transfers were paid from national funds, so the record shows government delivery capacity more than government financing. Payment timeliness fell to 17 percent in the first half of 2025, at the height of the drought, and averaged 29 percent over the project against a 90 percent target. Households counted as supported were not necessarily paid on time. The consumption and coping effects the report cites come from evaluations it says should be interpreted cautiously. The report's own footnote 51 puts enumeration at about eight weeks, against four weeks in the main text. The report dates the disaster declaration to 28 February 2024 in one place and 29 February in another. The record shows a response after a shock was declared. It does not show forecasting or contingent financing in place before the drought, and the report says the government began strengthening disaster risk financing, with contingent financing instruments, only from 2024, after the drought. The transfer ended in April 2025 and the caseload returned to its pre-drought level, so nothing here shows recovery outcomes.

Zambiasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

COVID-19 Emergency Cash Transfer through the Social Cash Transfer

Zambia's Ministry of Community Development and Social Services answered the COVID-19 pandemic by extending the Social Cash Transfer, paying 400 kwacha a month to about 204,000 households in 25 urban and peri-urban districts from September 2020 to August 2021, and for the first time adding households from outside the programme's caseload.

204,000 households, households paid the covid-19 emergency cash transfer (c-ect), about, September 2020 to August 2021. 194 days, days from the first confirmed coronavirus case to the first c-ect transfer, 2020. UNICEF Zambia, Zambia's Emergency Cash Transfer Programmes D-ECT and C-ECT: Process Evaluation (June 2022), retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Community Development and Social Services used the Social Cash Transfer's caseload, district staff and payment contracts as the channel for a pandemic transfer, topping up existing beneficiaries and registering new categories of households, such as female-headed households with children, alongside them.

Preconditions

A national cash transfer with an enrolled caseload and district social welfare staff
Donor money that could be routed through a UN agency while direct budget support was suspended
Payment service providers able to reach urban and peri-urban districts

Limits: Both numbers sit in a PDF: the household count on printed page 28 (PDF page 30) and the 194 days in the executive summary (PDF page 13). The evaluation was commissioned and funded by UNICEF Zambia, which also channelled the money, so the programme is partly reporting on itself. The 204,000 is a rounded figure with 116,000 of the households already enrolled in the Social Cash Transfer; the final caseload the evaluation reports for the UNICEF-managed share is 141,579 households in 19 districts, of which 41,581 were newly registered, so most of the response was a top-up to an existing list. The money came from the UN COVID-19 appeal, US$21.6 million from the EU, KfW, Ireland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom, not from the treasury, and the evaluation says donors had suspended direct funding to the ministry after the Auditor General reported mismanagement of Social Cash Transfer funds. The evaluation rates the speed below the global average for COVID-19 social protection responses: the first transfer came 194 days after the first case and 166 days after the first localised lockdown. It also finds the programme's information system inadequate for emergency processing and records registration delays. The 204,000 is against an estimated more than 1 million households made vulnerable by the pandemic in 43 districts.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Zambiasince 2016operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Solar powered milling plants contract, and its erosion

Zambia's government contracted Shandong Dejian Group for a fixed-price US$200 million national programme of solar powered milling plants, financed in 2016 and due 24 months after the March 2016 deposit. The Auditor General found it still incomplete at 31 March 2022, 38 months after the scheduled completion date, and found 555 of the completed plants non-functional at audit in January 2024.

555 plants, solar powered milling plants found non-functional at audit, January 2024. 1,583 units, units contracted (1,553 solar powered milling plants plus 30 solar powered rice mills), 2016. Office of the Auditor General of Zambia, Special Audit Report of the Auditor General on Public Debt for the period 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2022, section 7.6.4, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Finance borrowed from China Development Bank to buy a turnkey national programme of off-grid milling plants from one Chinese contractor, and appointed the Zambia Co-operative Federation to run them through local co-operatives. No public body was funded to maintain the equipment, so delivery slipped for years and a third of the completed plants stopped working.

Preconditions

A maintenance and spare-parts budget for battery-based equipment spread across rural districts
An implementing agent with the technical staff to accept, commission and service the plants
Contract management able to enforce the fixed-price completion clause against the supplier

Limits: The Auditor General never publishes the peak number of working plants. The secondMetric is the contracted count, not the peak installed or working count. The 555 non-functional plants are counted among the 1,553 milling plants, about 36 percent; that share is our inference. The audit inspected selected sites, so the 555 figure may rest partly on progress reports rather than visits to every plant. The report is internally inconsistent: the loan paragraph describes 1,000 plants for US$200 million, while the finding counts 1,583 contracted units. It also dates the deposit (March 2016) before the China Development Bank loan (July 2016). The section gives no final cost and no completion date, so neither a cost overrun nor a final schedule overrun can be computed. 38 months is the delay at 31 March 2022 against the revised January 2019 date; against the original 6 March 2018 date it is about 49 months. The plants are distributed small units rather than a single structure, which makes the record a weaker fit for major public infrastructure. The Zambia Co-operative Federation, the implementing agent, is a federation and not a ministry. The audit also found K15.5 million in lease fees that were never paid into the Treasury. Nothing here shows how many households used the mills, or whether the non-functional plants were later repaired.