Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism8 of 863 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

Ukrainesince 1992operating below its peakbears on Government foresight capacity

Natsionalnyi instytut stratehichnykh doslidzhen, and its falling staff ceiling

Presidents of Ukraine kept the National Institute for Strategic Studies, created by decree in 1992 to carry out analytical and forecasting research for the President and the National Security and Defence Council, through every change of president, but cut its staff ceiling from 350 posts, set by Decree 662/2010 when it took over the tasks of two liquidated security institutes, to 260 posts by Decree 120/2015 and to 234 posts by Decree 737/2019, which is in force.

234 posts, staff ceiling of the national institute for strategic studies set by presidential decree, 2019-10 (Decree 737/2019, in force on 2026-10-17). 350 posts, staff ceiling under decree 662/2010, in force from june 2010 to march 2015, 2010-06 to 2015-03. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Legislation of Ukraine portal, Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 737/2019 of 7 October 2019 and the Statute of the Institute it approves, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The President kept a strategic studies institute directly subordinate to the office and resized it by decree, enlarging it in 2010 by absorbing two liquidated security institutes and then cutting its staff ceiling twice, in 2015 and 2019, without closing it.

Preconditions

Direct subordination to the President, which lets each president resize the institute by decree without a parliamentary vote
A recurring statutory output, the draft annual presidential message to parliament, which gives every new president a reason to keep the institute
A legal basis in presidential decrees rather than a law, which makes continuity depend on each president's choice

Limits: Both figures are staff ceilings set by decree, not headcounts, budgets or output: they show how many posts the President allowed, not how many were filled or what the institute produced. The 350 ceiling of 2010 included the tasks of the Institute for National Security Problems and the National Institute for International Security Problems, which Decree 662/2010 liquidated and folded in, so part of the later cut undoes a merger rather than removing a capacity the institute always had. The 350 and 260 values were read from dated editions of Decree 662/2010 on the same portal (https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/662/2010/ed20100720/print and https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/662/2010/ed20150306/print); a short-lived edition of July 2010 carried 315 posts before Decree 760/2010 restored 350. Forecasting is one task among several: the 2019 statute names analytical and forecasting research on the development and national security of Ukraine, drafting the President's annual messages to parliament and expert review of draft laws, so the institute is a presidential think tank with a forecasting mandate rather than a dedicated foresight unit. The ceiling has not changed in law since 2019, through the full-scale war; this record does not show staffing after 2022.

Coordination

2 deliveries linked to Public-private collaboration, University-industry collaboration.

Ukrainesince 2023still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Brave1 defence technology cluster

Ukraine's government set up the Brave1 cluster in 2023 under the Ministry of Digital Transformation. By September 2026 it had awarded more than 1,000 non-repayable grants worth UAH 6.2 billion to private defence-technology developers, whose products it tests with the armed forces and moves toward serial production.

6.2 UAH billion, defence technology development funded by brave1 since 2023, 2026-09. 1,000 grants (published as more than 1,000), grants awarded to ukrainian defence developers since 2023, 2026-09. Brave1 defence innovation cluster (state institution under the Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine): news release, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Digital Transformation, with the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, set up a state cluster. It registers private developers, funds them through tiered grants, arranges battlefield testing and military feedback, and steers money toward priority areas the military defines.

Preconditions

An acute, shared national objective that private firms and the state both accept
A large pool of small engineering and software firms able to iterate quickly
A military willing to test immature products and return field data to developers

Limits: The source is the cluster reporting on itself in a news release, with a minister's quote. Neither the 6.2 billion nor the grant count is broken down by year or audited. The figures measure money and grants going out, not what was delivered: they do not show how many funded products reached serial production or the front. The impact claims on the page, a 1.7-point gain in technology readiness and 79 percent of firms saying they had no alternative, come from a survey of defence-tech manufacturers in a study by the BRDO Office for Effective Regulation and are self-reported. Grants are one-way subsidies, so the record evidences public funding of private developers plus joint testing, which is a thin reading of joint delivery. The standard grant programme accounts for UAH 2.3 billion of the total; most of the rest, UAH 3.7 billion, went to 34 competition projects for missiles, air defence and autonomy, so the money is concentrated in a few large awards. Wartime urgency and secrecy limit what can be verified.

Ukrainesince 2000dismantledbears on University-industry collaboration

Technological parks under the 1999 special regime, and their collapse

Ukraine's technological parks, set up from 2000 under the 1999 law on a special regime of innovation activity to join research institutes and universities with industrial enterprises in state-registered projects, had 120 projects approved from 2000 to 2014 and raised the annual output of their innovative products from UAH 0.18 billion in 2001 to UAH 2.6 billion in 2007; after the state cut their benefits from 2005, project approvals were blocked from 2005 to 2010, no project was accepted after the 2010 Tax Code, and the parks' performance came to nothing by 2010 to 2014.

2,600,000,000 hryvnias, annual output of innovative products from technopark projects under the special regime, at the peak, 2007. 120 projects, technological park projects approved, cumulative, 2000-2014. Mazur, A.A. and Pustovoit, S.V., Paton Electric Welding Institute of the NAS of Ukraine, Social and economic efficiency of academic technoparks in Ukraine, Science and Innovation 12(3), 2016, pp. 59-69, table and text from Ministry of Education and Science departmental reporting, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

Parliament gave named technological parks, built mostly on academy research institutes, tax and customs relief on state-registered projects that took their research into production with industrial partners, and the relief was reinvested in the projects. The government withdrew the relief from 2005 and stopped approving projects, and output fell with it.

Preconditions

Research institutes with technologies close to production and enterprises able to manufacture them
A tax and customs relief that the finance ministry was willing to forgo, which it stopped being after 2005
Stable rules over the five-year life of a project, which the repeated legal changes removed

Where else it has been used: Belarus and Kazakhstan run science and technology parks with tax relief for residents. The Ukrainian case shows that a regime tied to a tax privilege can be ended in one budget law when the privilege is accused of abuse.

Limits: The figures are in a PDF and come from authors at the Paton Electric Welding Institute, whose own technopark is the largest in the table, so the account is written by a beneficiary arguing for the regime's return. The authors say the table rests on the Ministry of Education and Science's departmental reporting, which the ministry does not publish at an open URL. More than 98 percent of the parks' sales came from three parks built on National Academy of Sciences institutes, so the evidence is mostly about academy institutes working with enterprises, and much less about universities. Sales of innovative products measure the commercial output of registered projects, often made by enterprises tied to the institutes, and do not count joint research projects or the firms involved one by one. The peak and the 2001 value are read from the text; the annual series is drawn in a chart without printed values, so the 2010 to 2014 level is stated only in words ('came to nothing'). The law was not repealed: the source describes cut benefits and blocked project approvals, and some incentives were later restored, so the collapse is of the delivery, not of the legal form. The source ends in 2014 and does not show whether projects were registered after its publication.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Ukrainesince 1991still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

State Employment Service vocational training

Ukraine's State Employment Service put 93,000 people through vocational training in 2025, 55,000 of them registered unemployed and 38,000 in its own vocational education centres, after 33,000 in 2023, the second full year of the war.

93,000 people, people who completed training through the state employment service in the year, 2025. 33,000 people, unemployed people in vocational training through the service in 2023, 2023. Government of Ukraine portal (kmu.gov.ua), State Employment Service results for 2025, 6 January 2026, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The State Employment Service funds training for registered unemployed people through its own vocational education centres and contracted providers, and since 2023 also issues training vouchers that let adults choose a course and provider themselves.

Preconditions

A national register of jobseekers that ties benefit receipt to contact with a counsellor
A network of state-owned training centres that kept operating under wartime conditions
Unemployment insurance and donor funding that held up through the war

Limits: Both figures are the service reporting on itself in government news items, rounded to the thousand, and not a statistical table; the 2023 figure comes from a separate item (https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/derzhavna-sluzhba-zainiatosti-osnovni-zdobutky-2023-roku) and counts unemployed trainees only, while the 2025 figure counts all trainees, so the two are not strictly comparable. 93,000 people is about one percent of the working-age population the service can reach, far below the indicator's construct of all adult participation. The same service reported 93,000 trainees for 2020, before the full-scale invasion, so 2025 is a recovery to the pre-war level and not an expansion. The 88 percent employment rate after training is self-reported and has no comparison group. The service trains inside territory under government control, so the count does not cover occupied regions or the millions of Ukrainians abroad.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Ukrainesince 2025still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Sandbox for AI and blockchain products, Ministry of Digital Transformation and Ukrainian Startup Fund

Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation and the Ukrainian Startup Fund opened a sandbox for AI and blockchain products in 2025 and, in its first year, received more than 80 applications and admitted 15 companies to a first cohort that completed testing.

15 companies, companies admitted to the first cohort that completed testing, 2026-06-04. 80 applications, applications received in the first year (more than), 2026-06-04. Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine, AI portal, news item 'One year of the AI and blockchain Sandbox' (4 June 2026), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The digital ministry, with a state startup fund, invites AI and blockchain firms to submit products for an expert audit across law, technology and business, and feeds what it learns into drafting AI legislation aligned with the EU AI Act.

Preconditions

A ministry with a standing AI policy unit and a lawmaking agenda to feed
A state startup fund able to recruit and pay outside experts under NDA
A pipeline of domestic AI and blockchain firms seeking EU market access

Limits: The ministry reports on its own programme in a news item, not a statistics page, and 80 is a floor ('more than 80'). The sandbox grants no statutory derogation that this check found: what participants receive is a free legal, technical and business audit by outside experts with recommendations, and the ministry's statement that firms test 'without fines or legal risks' is not backed by a legal instrument read today, so this is closer to an advisory sandbox than to a regime that relaxes rules, and it sits at the weak edge of the D152 construct. 'Completed testing' means completed the audit cycle; the ministry's page of 21 October 2025 names Artellence as the first company to finish it. Higher figures in the press (over 100 applications, 25 companies under review) were not found at an official publisher and are not used. The National Bank of Ukraine runs a statutory regulatory platform under the payment services and financial services laws, open only to firms it already licenses, but its page (promo.bank.gov.ua/sandbox) publishes no participant count, so the figure covers one programme and not every regulator.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Ukrainesince 2023still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

eRecovery (єВідновлення) housing compensation programme

Ukraine's government, through the Ministry for Development and the Diia digital platform, paid war-damage housing compensation to 231,681 families totalling UAH 119.1 billion by 10 July 2026. Of these, more than 153,000 families received repair payments, and more than 74,000 received certificates to buy replacement housing for homes that were destroyed.

231,681 families, families that received erecovery compensation, cumulative, 2026-07-10. 119.1 UAH billion, total erecovery compensation paid, cumulative, 2026-07-10. Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine (Ministry for Recovery): eRecovery programme results, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Rada created a statutory right to compensation for war-damaged housing. The ministry and the Ministry of Digital Transformation then ran claims, damage inspection and payment through the Diia app and the state register of damaged property, paying repair grants to bank accounts and issuing purchase certificates for destroyed homes.

Preconditions

A national digital identity and services app that most households already used
Property and damage registers that could be linked to verify claims
External concessional finance willing to fund payouts through government systems during a war

Limits: These are the ministry's own running totals, published as press releases and not as a statistical series, and nothing independent audits them. The page shows recovery for households whose claims were accepted, not the share of all damaged housing compensated. For destroyed homes, more than 161,000 applications produced certificates for about 74,000 families, and only about 33,000 had bought a home, so most of the destroyed-housing caseload is unresolved. The page ties the repair payments to the World Bank HOPE project and the own-plot rebuilding payments to the Council of Europe Development Bank HOME project, and does not say who funds the certificates for destroyed homes, so how much of the delivery rests on external money is not shown here. The record evidences recovery after a war shock and says nothing about preparedness before one. Amounts are nominal hryvnias. The figure is the ministry's results update of 10 July 2026.

Ukrainesince 2022delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

eSupport one-off 6,500 hryvnia payment to workers in combat regions, March 2022

After Russia's full-scale invasion on 24 February 2022, Ukraine's Cabinet allocated UAH 21,450 million for a one-off eSupport payment by Resolution 199 of 4 March 2022, opened applications in the Diia app on 8 March to insured employees and sole proprietors in regions with active fighting, paid the first 6,500 hryvnia transfers on 21 March, and by 27 March had paid 2.7 million people UAH 17.9 billion against 4 million applications.

2.7 million people, people paid the 6,500 hryvnia esupport payment, cumulative, 2022-03-27. 25 days, days from the invasion to the first esupport payments (24 february to 21 march 2022), 2022-03-21. Government of Ukraine portal (kmu.gov.ua), Ministry of Digital Transformation release 'Mintsyfry: maiemo 4 mln zaiavok na yePidtrymku', 27 March 2022 (Internet Archive copy of 31 March 2022), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Cabinet reused the existing eSupport payment rail, let insured workers in combat regions apply in the Diia app, checked them against social insurance records and paid a flat sum to their bank cards within four weeks of the invasion.

Preconditions

A national digital identity app with millions of users and verified bank cards
A social insurance register that could confirm employment and location quickly
A reserve fund the Cabinet could reallocate by resolution

Where else it has been used: The same rail paid later wartime transfers, and it is the Ukrainian version of what Togo (Novissi) and Brazil (Auxilio Emergencial) did in 2020: pay by phone first and check later.

Limits: The 2.7 million and the UAH 17.9 billion are the Ministry of Digital Transformation's own running count on the Government portal, not an audited outturn; the final number of recipients is not on this page. The live page at kmu.gov.ua answered a captcha to a script on the day of retrieval, so the record cites the Internet Archive copy of 31 March 2022, which carries the same text. The release says the service opened on 8 March and was open to employees for whom the single social contribution was paid and to sole proprietors of all groups in 14 listed regions and Kyiv, so eligibility was by region, not by a test that the person's work had stopped. The 25 days is our count: the start date of payments comes from a second Government portal release of 22 March 2022 ('Pochalysia pershi vyplaty 6500 hrn yePidtrymky', kmu.gov.ua), which says payments began the day before and had reached almost 500,000 people, and the allocation and its date come from Cabinet Resolution 199 of 4 March 2022 on kmu.gov.ua. Speed was bought with eligibility checks that were later found loose: press reports from August 2022 cite tens of thousands of payments to ineligible people, a figure this record does not carry because no official page with it was opened. A one-off flat transfer to workers in listed regions is a fast payment, not a durable programme change, and it relied on a payment rail (the Diia app and the existing eSupport scheme) that already existed before the shock.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Ukrainesince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Road Sector Development Project on the M-03 and M-12, and its cut scope

Ukraine's road agency Ukravtodor rehabilitated or upgraded 156.3 km of the M-03 Kyiv to Kharkiv and M-12 corridors under a US$560 million loan approved in November 2015, after slow progress led the government in 2017 to cancel US$222.2 million of the loan, dropping three M-03 bypasses and two long-term maintenance contracts, so the loan closed at US$337.8 million in September 2022, nine months after its original date.

337.8 million US dollars, loan amount after cancellation, fully disbursed, 2022-09-30. 560 million US dollars, original loan amount at approval, 2015-11-03. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Ukraine Road Sector Development Project (P149322), November 2023, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The national road agency delivered the widening of a corridor it had already been rebuilding with the same lender, and when bypasses stalled on land acquisition the government cancelled them rather than extend the loan.

Preconditions

An experienced implementation unit from earlier corridor loans
Land acquisition and resettlement procedures that can be completed before works are tendered
A lender willing to cancel and reallocate rather than hold undisbursed funds

Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, in a completion report on its own loan, and the loan amount is not the full cost of the works; no figure for the cost of the delivered roads against an appraisal estimate per km was used. The cancellation and its reasons (land acquisition not started at Poltava, community objections at Kopyly, a realignment at Chutove) are in paras. 23 and 26 to 27 (printed pages 10 to 12); the 156.3 km is in para. 41 (page 16); amounts and dates are on the datasheet (page 2). In 2019 disbursement was about 11 percent with over 60 percent of the period elapsed, and some lots were moved in from a parallel World Bank road project, so the delivered kilometres mix two programmes. Russia's invasion in February 2022 stopped the civil works under force majeure seven months before closing, so the final delay is not all the agency's. The record shows a scope cut, not a cost overrun, and says nothing about the separate Great Construction programme.