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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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4 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Trinidad and Tobagosince 1994still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

PowerGen and the independent power producer model

In December 1994 T&TEC sold its generating assets to PowerGen, a company it kept 51 percent of beside private investors, and since then independent power producers have generated Trinidad's electricity for sale to T&TEC; the regulator put their contracted capacity at 1,754 MW for 2023 to 2027, against a maximum demand of 1,356 MW in 2021.

1,754 MW, contracted generating capacity at the four ipp power stations, 2023. 1,356 MW, t&tec system maximum demand, 2021. Regulated Industries Commission, Final Determination for the Electricity Transmission and Distribution Sector of Trinidad and Tobago 2023 to 2028, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

T&TEC divested its generation into a company it controlled with private shareholders, paid for the assets in equity, and then bought all output under take-or-pay contracts while supplying the fuel itself, so private partners ran plants with guaranteed revenue and no fuel risk.

Preconditions

  • A state gas company able to supply cheap natural gas to the utility
  • A single-buyer utility whose contracts private investors trust to be paid
  • Existing generating plant the state could sell into a joint company

Limits: Both numbers are inside a long PDF: the contracted capacity is a note under Table 7.7 and is a projection for 2023 to 2027, and the maximum demand is in Table 6.1. Contracted capacity measures what T&TEC pays for, not what the plants delivered, and respondents to the regulator objected that the take-or-pay contracts make customers pay for excess capacity. Not all of that capacity is joint: the 720 MW Union Estate plant (TGU) began as a joint venture with AES, but the state bought AES out in July 2013 and has owned it outright since, so the public-private part is PowerGen, 51 percent T&TEC, and the wholly private Trinity Power. The state also supplies the gas the plants burn, so the private side carries plant risk only. The power purchase agreements are not public, so prices and performance terms cannot be checked.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Trinidad and Tobagosince 1988operating below its peakbears on Adult learning participation

Youth Training and Employment Partnership Programme (YTEPP), and its shrinking enrolment

Trinidad and Tobago's YTEPP Limited, the state company that trains people aged 15 to 35 who are out of work or school, enrolled 1,601 persons in October 2024 to June 2025, 61 percent of its target, against 2,301 trainees in the Youth Training Programme over the same October to June window of 2019-20, according to the Ministry of Finance's Social Sector Investment Programme reviews.

1,601 persons, persons enrolled in ytepp youth training and employment programmes, October 2024 to June 2025. 2,301 trainees, trainees enrolled in the ytepp youth training programme, same months five years earlier (ssip 2021), October 2019 to June 2020. Ministry of Finance, Trinidad and Tobago, Social Sector Investment Programme 2026, chapter 3B Review of Social Programmes, Ministry of Tertiary Education and Skills Training, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The state funds a training company that runs short vocational and life-skills courses in centres across both islands for young people outside work and school, and reports enrolment against a yearly target in the budget's social sector review.

Preconditions

  • A recurrent transfer from the budget, which in a hydrocarbon economy moves with energy revenue
  • Training centres spread across districts, including Tobago
  • A national vocational qualification (CVQ/NEC) that short courses can certify against

Where else it has been used: Caribbean youth training agencies founded in the 1980s (HEART in Jamaica, YTEPP in Trinidad and Tobago) share the design. YTEPP depends on a yearly budget transfer that fell after 2016, while Jamaica's levy-financed HEART reported growing enrolment (jam-heart-nsta).

Limits: Both counts are the ministry's own programme reporting, collected in budget documents. The earlier figure is in a different edition, Social Sector Investment Programme 2021 (https://www.finance.gov.tt/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Social-Sector-Investment-Programme-2021-1.pdf), and the two may not count the same thing: 2021 counts trainees in the Youth Training Programme, 2026 counts persons in 'youth training and employment programmes', and 2026 separately reports 1,323 youths in CVQ/TVET, NEC or YTEPP-certified programmes. 2019-20 is not a demonstrated peak; it is the earliest comparable count found, and its window already includes the first COVID-19 closures from March 2020, so the true fall is probably larger. The money moved the same way: the SSIP 2017 table gives an estimate of TT$111 million for YTEPP in 2016, SSIP 2019 gives TT$64.4 million actual spending in 2017, and SSIP 2026 lists TT$41.4 million, but transfers between ministries make those columns hard to align, so they are context, not the metric. The programme serves ages 15 to 35, so part of it is young people just out of school rather than adults returning to learning. Enrolment is not completion. The 1988 start is YTEPP's founding year as commonly reported; it was not read at the cited source.

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Institutional responsiveness.

Trinidad and Tobagosince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

COVID-19 Salary Relief Grant and income support

After restricting non-essential activity in March 2020, the Government of Trinidad and Tobago paid a Salary Relief Grant of TT$1,500 a month for three months through the National Insurance Board, spending TT$226.3 million on it in fiscal 2020 against a TT$490 million allocation, and the Ministry of Social Development and Family Services paid income support to 46,533 people outside the national insurance scheme.

46,533 persons, persons receiving covid-19 income support (ministry of social development and family services), 2020-09. 226.3 million TT$, salary relief grants paid in fiscal 2020 (october 2019 to september 2020), of a tt$490 million allocation, 2020-09. Ministry of Finance, Trinidad and Tobago, Review of the Economy 2020, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government split its pandemic income support by registry: the National Insurance Board paid a flat grant to registered workers who were terminated, suspended or lost income, and the social development ministry paid income support and food cards to people outside the insurance scheme.

Preconditions

  • A national insurance register with employer and contribution records
  • A social assistance ministry with an existing public assistance and food card system
  • Fiscal room from energy revenues and the Heritage and Stabilisation Fund

Limits: The figures are in a PDF: the 46,533 is footnote 54 on printed page 85 (Labour Force and Employment), the TT$226.3 million is on printed page 98 (Transfers to Households) and the TT$490 million allocation is in Box 4 that follows. The ministry is reporting on its own government's programme in a pre-budget document, with no audit. The source gives no date of first payment and no count of Salary Relief Grant recipients, so speed is shown only by the fiscal year: money was paid within the six months to September 2020. Less than half of the Salary Relief Grant allocation was spent in fiscal 2020, which may mean fewer eligible claims, slow processing or payments falling into fiscal 2021; the source does not say which. Eligibility for the grant depended on national insurance registration, so informal workers relied on the smaller income support channel. Persons and grants may overlap across programmes.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Trinidad and Tobagosince 2011still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Sir Solomon Hochoy Highway Extension to Point Fortin, and its abandoned contract

NIDCO signed a four-year TT$5,214 million design-build contract with Construtora OAS in July 2011 within a Cabinet-approved budget of TT$7,502.6 million; OAS abandoned the site in December 2015 and was terminated on 6 July 2016 with about 49 percent of the works done and TT$5,088.26 million spent, and NIDCO put the revised total budget to finish the highway at TT$10,224.93 million, 37 percent over the approved budget.

10,224.93 TT$ million, revised total project budget to complete the highway, estimated at the contractor's termination, 2016-07. 7,502.6 TT$ million, approved total project budget, cabinet minute no. 333, 2011-02. National Infrastructure Development Company (NIDCO), The Saga of the Sir Solomon Hochoy Highway Extension to Point Fortin Project, 31 October 2023, published by the Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago for the Joint Select Committee on Land and Physical Infrastructure, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

NIDCO let a single lump-sum design-build contract for the whole highway to one foreign contractor before it held all the land, then, when the contractor filed for judicial reorganisation in 2015, signed an addendum that cut the scope instead of terminating, and after the contractor walked off it re-tendered the remainder in 12 packages to local firms.

Preconditions

  • A special-purpose state company able to award and finance a contract larger than the ministry's own capacity, under Cabinet approval
  • A land acquisition process that could not release the right-of-way before construction began
  • Performance and advance-payment standby letters of credit large enough to fund part of the restart (US$139.6 million recovered)

Limits: This is the implementing agency's own account, written in 2023 for a parliamentary inquiry into the same project, and it places the blame on the contractor and on the 2015 addendum that kept an insolvent contractor on site; the committee's findings are not in it. All figures are read from Tables 4 and 5 of a PDF. The 37 percent is NIDCO's estimate at termination of what completion would cost, not a measured outturn: the report gives no final cost and no completion date for the whole highway, only that most of the 12 re-tendered packages (TT$1,913.03 million in Table 6) had opened to traffic by 2023. Part of the revised budget restores scope that Addendum 2 had removed, so not all of it is overrun on the original design. The 49 percent progress is NIDCO's weighting of design and construction, and the US$126.4 million LCIA partial award to OAS, set aside by the High Court in December 2022 and under appeal, could still add to the cost. The status is eroded because the original delivery collapsed halfway and the budget it was approved under was broken, not because a finished road was lost.