Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism5 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to University-industry collaboration.

Sloveniasince 2016delivered and closedbears on University-industry collaboration

Cohesion Policy operational programme 2014-2020, research and innovation priority

Slovenia's cohesion policy operational programme reported that 241 enterprises it supported had cooperated with research institutions by 2020, against a target of 135 that was later raised to 210, and the count held at 241 through the end of 2023.

241 enterprises, enterprises cooperating with research institutions, investment priority 1a (common indicator co26, cumulative implemented value), 2023. 210 enterprises, final target for the same indicator, raised from 135, 2023. European Commission, Cohesion Open Data Platform, ESIF 2014-2020 Achievement Details timeseries (programme 2014SI16MAOP001, indicator CO26), retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

Slovenian ministries ran cohesion-funded research and innovation calls that paid firms for projects carried out with universities and public institutes, and reported each participating firm against a common European indicator.

Preconditions

Cohesion funding large relative to the national research budget, with a common indicator reported every year
Public universities and institutes able to contract research with firms
Firms able to co-finance research and carry the administrative load of a structural funds project

Limits: The values are what the Slovenian managing authority reported to the Commission in its annual implementation reports, so they are the programme's own account, republished by the Commission without audit. The target moved upward: it was 135 until 2019 and 210 from 2020, after the programme had already passed the first figure, so beating the final target says little on its own. The count stopped growing in 2020 and stayed at 241 to 2023, so the collaboration counted here was mostly delivered in 2016 to 2019. CO26 counts enterprises, not projects, money or results, and any firm that took part in a supported project with a research institution counts once. A research institution includes public institutes as well as universities, and the dataset does not split them or give a figure per call. The money was mostly European Regional Development Fund co-financing administered through Slovenian ministries. The year 2016 is the first year with a reported value, not the first call. The single-year URL carries the 2023 values; the earlier years are in the same dataset without the year filter.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Sloveniasince 1991still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Upper secondary education for adults (srednješolsko izobraževanje odraslih)

Slovenia's publicly accredited upper secondary programmes for adults, run by schools and adult education centres, enrolled 17,858 adults in the 2024/25 school year, up from a low of 13,851 in 2020/21 but below the 20,580 enrolled in 2015/16.

17,858 adult students, adults in upper secondary education, all types of education, both sexes, all ages, 2024/25 school year. 20,580 adult students, same count, first year of the current series, 2015/16 school year. Statistični urad Republike Slovenije (SURS), SiStat table 0953322S 'Adults in upper secondary education by type of education, age and sex, Slovenia, annually', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The state accredits upper secondary programmes adapted for adults, delivered part-time by secondary schools and folk high schools (ljudske univerze), so adults can earn the same vocational or general qualification as young people.

Preconditions

A national qualification framework that lets adult programmes award the same certificates as youth schooling
A network of folk high schools and school adult units in every region
Public co-funding or employer payment of fees, which adults otherwise bear

Where else it has been used: Poland's licea dla dorosłych (pol-licea-dla-doroslych) and Estonia's adult gymnasiums (est-adult-gymnasiums) are the same instrument; the Slovenian series shows the usual dip in the pandemic and a partial recovery.

Limits: The URL is the table's API endpoint; the national total is returned by a POST query selecting the totals for sex, age and type of education, or can be read in SiStat. The count is enrolment in formal upper secondary programmes leading to a state-recognised qualification, from short vocational to the matura course, so it leaves out the non-formal adult education that makes up most adult learning in Slovenia, and it reaches about 1.5 percent of the working-age population. Enrolment is not completion: SURS publishes adult graduates in a separate table that was not used here. The series restarts in 2015/16 under a new methodology; the old series (table 0953356S) gives 13,327 in 2014/15 and 15,963 in 2011/12, which cannot be joined to the new one without a break. The 2020/21 low coincides with the pandemic. Adult upper secondary education predates 1991; the start year is that of the independent state's school system and is not in the table.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Sloveniasince 2023still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Recovery after the August 2023 floods

Slovenia's Ministry of Natural Resources and Spatial Planning reported in July 2025 that after the floods of 4 August 2023 it had completed all intervention and emergency works on 850 km of watercourses by June 2024, paid 35.7 million euros in advance payments for home repairs to more than 7,350 individuals, transferred 218 million euros in advances to municipalities and completed more than 430 watercourse repair sites, within a five-year recovery programme funded at 2.3 billion euros.

7,350 people (more than), individuals paid advance payments for urgent repair of damaged homes, 2025-07-25. 850 km, length of watercourses on which all intervention and emergency works were completed by june 2024, 2024-06. Ministrstvo za naravne vire in prostor (Ministry of Natural Resources and Spatial Planning) and Direkcija RS za vode, news release 'Dve leti po poplavah: krepimo odpornost na podnebne spremembe', 25 July 2025, gov.si, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government passed an intervention law, paid flood-hit households and municipalities in advance instead of after damage assessment, mobilised more than a thousand machines on rivers at once, and then adopted a five-year recovery programme with dedicated funding through a new reconstruction office.

Preconditions

A water directorate and concession contractors able to scale works more than tenfold in a year
Fiscal room and a law allowing advance payments before final damage assessment
EU Solidarity Fund support to cover part of the eligible public costs

Limits: The ministry reports on its own response at a press conference marking two years since the floods, and calls its results 'an excellent result', so the framing is the government's. The figures are stated as 'more than' and are not broken down by date, apart from the June 2024 completion of emergency works. Advance payments to 7,350 people are not completed repairs: the same page says more than 5,000 applications from individuals and firms for building repair were still being processed and that 'more than half' of beneficiaries had received all the funds they needed, so the household recovery was incomplete two years on. The 2.3 billion euro programme is money allocated, not spent; the ministry says watercourse works rose more than tenfold after the floods, with 240 million realised in 2024 and 332 million forecast for 2025. A separate release of the cohesion ministry (12 June 2025) says Slovenia had used 88 percent (376.6 million euros) of the 428 million euro EU Solidarity Fund grant, so part of the recovery was EU money. The record shows recovery after the shock, not the warning or evacuation before it; the August 2023 floods killed several people and damaged a large share of municipalities, which this record does not measure.

Sloveniasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Začasno čakanje na delo, the 2020 to 2021 furlough reimbursement

Slovenia's National Assembly passed a law on 20 March 2020 under which the state reimbursed employers part of the wage compensation for workers temporarily sent to wait for work, and by 20 May 2021, across all the COVID-19 laws that extended it, the Employment Service had paid 533.1 million euros to 31,605 employers for 214,128 employees.

214,128 employees, employees for whom employers were reimbursed for temporary waiting for work, counted once, 2021-05-20. 533.1 EUR million, reimbursements paid by the employment service to employers, 2021-05-20. Ministrstvo za delo, družino, socialne zadeve in enake možnosti (Ministry of Labour), 'Ukrep čakanja na delo podaljšan še za en mesec', 27 May 2021, citing Zavod RS za zaposlovanje, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The National Assembly created a state share of wage compensation for idled workers by an emergency law, the Employment Service paid it to employers on application against a written commitment to keep the jobs, and the government kept extending it as the epidemic continued.

Preconditions

A labour law concept of temporary waiting for work, with a set wage compensation, that the state could co-fund
An Employment Service able to take and pay tens of thousands of employer applications
A legislature willing to pass and amend emergency laws in weeks

Where else it has been used: Close to Croatia's job preservation grants (hrv-orm-covid) and the Czech Antivirus programme (cze-antivirus); Slovenia ran the measure through a sequence of omnibus COVID-19 laws, each of which could reset its terms.

Limits: The ministry that ran the measure reports on it, in a press notice that also argues for extending it, and the record rests on no audit or final report covering the whole scheme. The figures stop on 20 May 2021, and the government extended the measure to 30 June 2021, so the totals are not final. The 20 March 2020 date is from the ministry's notice of that day (https://www.gov.si/novice/2020-03-20-kljucni-cilj-sprejetega-zakona-je-ohranitev-delovnih-mest-in-zadrzanje-cim-vec-ljudi/), which describes the first law: the state paid 40 percent of the wage compensation and the employer 60 percent, for at most three months, and later laws changed those terms several times. The notice gives no date for the first payment, so the record shows the speed of the rule change and the scale of the payments, not the speed of delivery. The ministry says the measure limited the rise in unemployment but publishes no estimate of jobs kept, and the count of 214,128 is people covered at any time, not a monthly peak. The record cannot show whether any money went to employers who kept workers busy while claiming for them.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Sloveniasince 2008delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Šoštanj thermal power plant unit 6 (TEŠ 6), and its cost overrun

Slovenia's state-owned power holding HSE and its subsidiary TEŠ raised the estimated cost of the 600 MW Šoštanj unit 6 from 1,302,747 thousand euros in the August 2011 investment programme, the ceiling written into the 2012 law guaranteeing its 440 million euro EIB loan, to 1,428,457 thousand euros in the February 2014 programme, breaching the condition on which the state guarantee was given, according to the Court of Audit.

1,428,457 thousand euros, estimated investment value of unit 6, revised investment programme no. 6 (nip 6), 2014-02. 1,302,747 thousand euros, estimated investment value in revised investment programme no. 4 (nip 4), the ceiling set as a condition of the state guarantee, 2011-08. Računsko sodišče Republike Slovenije (Court of Audit of the Republic of Slovenia), post-audit report 'Popravljalni ukrepi pri reviziji obvladovanja denarnih tokov skupine HSE zaradi investicije v blok 6', no. 321-1/2014/70, 7 January 2016, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

A state-owned utility group committed to a single large lignite unit, financed it with a state-guaranteed EIB loan conditioned on a cost ceiling, and then revised the investment programme upward several times while construction ran, leaving the state as guarantor to accept the breach.

Preconditions

A state holding with a captive coal mine and a political mandate to keep the lignite region working
A state guarantee law that set a cost ceiling but no mechanism to stop the project when it was crossed
Shareholder oversight bodies that did not ask for cash-flow reports until after the overrun

Limits: Both figures are in a PDF, on PDF page 9 of the post-audit report, which restates finding 2.1.2 of the main audit report of 19 August 2015 (no. 321-1/2014/49). The main report itself is published with the investment values redacted as business secrets (marked (P)) in its OCR copy, so the post-audit report is the readable source. The comparison is between two revisions of the investment programme, not between the first approved estimate and the final outturn: the record does not show the earlier, much lower estimates of the original 2006 to 2008 investment documents, which this protocol did not read at an official source, and so understates the full growth. NIP 6 is an estimate made while the unit was being built, not a final account. The court's main finding concerns HSE's management of the group's cash flows, and it also found the assumed coal cost (2.25 euros per GJ) and electricity prices unachievable, so the unit's financial case failed on more than construction cost. The unit was built under contract by an Alstom consortium; the delivering institutions are the state-owned HSE and TEŠ, and the state as guarantor and owner (through AUKN, SOD and SDH), whose oversight the court also faulted. The started year is the main construction contract with Alstom, as commonly reported; it was not read at the cited source. Status is concluded because the unit was built and operates; the record says nothing about its economics after 2016 or Slovenia's coal exit plans.