Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism8 of 863 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

Russiasince 2013delivered and closedbears on Government foresight capacity

Prognoz nauchno-tekhnologicheskogo razvitiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2030 goda

Russia's Ministry of Education and Science issued in December 2013 the Science and Technology Development Forecast of the Russian Federation to 2030, which states that it is one of the main documents of the strategic planning system, sets out challenges and windows of opportunity in seven priority areas, was agreed with eight federal ministries, the space agency and the Academy of Sciences, and rests on an expert base of more than 200 organisations and over 2,000 Russian and foreign experts.

2,000 experts, experts in the expert base of the science and technology development forecast to 2030 (stated as over 2,000), 2013-12 (forecast horizon 2030). 200 organisations, organisations in the expert base of the forecast (stated as more than 200), 2013-12. Government of the Russian Federation, government.ru, Prognoz nauchno-tekhnologicheskogo razvitiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii na period do 2030 goda (Ministry of Education and Science, December 2013, No. DM-P8-5), introduction, page 2, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Education and Science assembled a long-term science and technology forecast from a network of university forecasting centres, academy institutes and research centres, had it agreed by the economic and sector ministries, and placed it in the strategic planning system as the common base for long-term strategies and programmes.

Preconditions

A presidential instruction, Decree 596 of 7 May 2012, to build a national technology forecasting system
A university research institute and sector centres able to run large expert consultations for the ministry
Ministries willing to sign off on a shared list of priority areas before writing their own strategies

Limits: The PDF is a scan with no text layer, so both figures were read from the image of page 2, and both are lower bounds the document reports about itself (more than 200 organisations, over 2,000 experts) with no list behind them. The figures measure participation in one forecast, not a standing function: the record shows a delivery, not continuity. The 2014 Federal Law on strategic planning (172-FZ) puts the science and technology forecast on a six-year revision cycle, and this record does not establish whether a successor to the 2030 forecast was approved on that cycle. The cover gives December 2013 and the number DM-P8-5 but no approval text, so the record does not date a formal approval. The document lists the Higher School of Economics, the Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis and Short-term Forecasting, academy institutes and university sector forecasting centres among the organisations whose material it used, so much of the work was contracted out of government. Priority areas and consultation say nothing about whether any ministry used the forecast in a decision.

Coordination

2 deliveries linked to University-industry collaboration, Public-private collaboration.

Russiasince 2010still operatingbears on University-industry collaboration

Government Resolution 218 complex projects for high-tech production

Under Government Resolution 218 of 9 April 2010, Russia's Ministry of Science and Higher Education subsidised 41 joint firm-university complex projects in their R&D stage in 2024, from the 14th and 15th selection rounds. Federal funding was 2.708 billion rubles, and firms put in 4.14 billion rubles of their own (156 percent of the budget funds). The ministry reports 161 technologies developed and handed over to production by January 2025.

41 projects, complex projects receiving state support in the year (14th and 15th selection rounds), 2024. 4.14 billion rubles, extrabudgetary funds raised from participating firms (156% of budget funds), 2024. Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, report on the ministry's results for 2024 (June 2025), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Russian government subsidises the manufacturer rather than the university. A firm wins a competitive subsidy to commission R&D from a Russian university or state research institute, co-funds it at least one for one, and must build the production line and sell the product from its own resources.

Preconditions

Manufacturers with enough capital to match the subsidy and build production
Universities and state institutes with applied R&D capacity that firms are willing to contract
A federal budget line sustained across 15 selection rounds since 2010

Limits: The ministry is reporting on its own programme in its own annual report, and none of it is audited. The figures are counts of subsidised projects and money, not a measure of how much research firms and universities do together. The 156 percent co-funding largely reflects the rule itself, which requires each firm to match the subsidy at least one for one. The report's cumulative total of 133 projects cannot be reconciled, from this document, with 15 selection rounds since 2010, so the programme's scale over time is unclear. Whether output or new projects per year have grown or shrunk is not shown. The '161 technologies transferred' figure is self-defined and does not show sales. The terms of the scheme and the 2010 to 2020 funding total come from the operator's site, which a private contractor runs. That site says that from 2025 the projects run inside a departmental project of the state programme for scientific and technological development. That reorganisation could change the scheme, and this record does not track it. The figures are read from a 3 MB Russian-language PDF. The figures say nothing about the effect of post-2022 sanctions on the firms involved.

Russiasince 2019still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Faster Payments System (SBP), run by the Bank of Russia with the banks

The Bank of Russia's Faster Payments System, which commercial banks connect to so that customers can pay any account by phone number or QR code, processed more than 3 billion operations worth 14.4 trillion rubles in 2022 with 213 banks connected, and 18.3 billion operations worth 103 trillion rubles in 2025.

18.3 billion operations, operations made through the faster payments system in the year, 2025. 3 billion operations (more than), operations made through the faster payments system in the year, with 213 banks connected, 2022. Bank of Russia, Faster Payments System key indicators, Q4 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank built a national instant-payment switch addressed by phone number, capped what banks may charge individuals, and had commercial banks connect it to their own apps, so that a transfer or QR payment works across all connected banks.

Preconditions

A central bank with its own retail payment operator (NSPK) able to build and run the switch
Regulatory power over every bank's fees and app offerings
Mobile banking already in near-universal use, so the system only had to be added to existing apps

Where else it has been used: The same move as Brazil's Pix and Bolivia's interoperable QR (bol-qr-bcb); in Russia, sanctions removed the foreign card schemes that compete with it elsewhere.

Limits: The 2025 figures (18.3 billion operations, 103 trillion rubles, 1.4 and 1.5 times 2024) are in the text of the Bank of Russia's quarterly indicator page; the 2022 figures, the 213 connected banks and the comparison with 2019 to 2021, which dates the start, are on the Q4 2022 page (https://www.cbr.ru/analytics/nps/sbp/4_2022/). The pages are HTML text over charts, with no downloadable series. The central bank owns the system, sets its tariffs and reports on it, so this is the operator grading itself. The collaboration is asymmetric: the Bank of Russia and its payment-card subsidiary NSPK built and run the infrastructure, and banks connect and offer it in their apps; the indicator pages do not say how far connection was voluntary, and the record does not claim it was. Growth after 2022 coincided with the exit of Visa and Mastercard and with sanctions on Russian banks, which pushed users towards domestic rails, so the count reflects a shock as much as the design. The values are nominal rubles in a period of high inflation. Russia's infrastructure PPP and concession programme is not covered by this record.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Russiasince 2019delivered and closedbears on Adult learning participation

Federal project Sodeystvie zanyatosti (Employment Promotion) vocational training of adults

Under the federal project Sodeystvie zanyatosti of the national project Demography, which paid for vocational training and further professional education of selected groups of adults, more than 80,000 citizens had started training and 21,125 had completed it by the end of the third quarter of 2024.

21,125 people, citizens who completed training under the federal project, January to September 2024. 80,000 people (stated as 'over 80 thousand'), citizens who had started training under the federal project, January to September 2024. Government of the Russian Federation, news release 'Tatyana Golikova discussed with all regions the implementation of the national project Demography', 12 November 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The labour ministry paid regional employment centres and accredited providers to train target groups of adults in short courses tied to regional demand, under a national project with quarterly reporting to the deputy prime minister.

Preconditions

A national project budget line with targets reported quarterly to the centre of government
Regional employment centres able to enrol and refer trainees
A pool of accredited training providers, including universities and colleges

Limits: The source is a government press release reporting a meeting, not a statistical table, and the counts cover only nine months of 2024, the project's final year, so they are a partial year and understate annual scale. An earlier release (government.ru/news/50674, 22 January 2024) says more than 190,000 people had completed short courses under the Demography retraining programme, without stating a period, so the two figures cannot be compared as an erosion. The training is for eligible groups (jobseekers, people aged 50 and over, women on parental leave and others defined by government resolution), not all adults. The national project Demography ended in 2024 and the release says its lines move into new national projects from 2025, so the status is concluded; the successor was not verified. The 2019 start is the first year of the national project Demography; the federal project took its current training form in 2021.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Russiasince 2018still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Bank of Russia regulatory sandbox (regulativnaya pesochnitsa)

The Bank of Russia decided in 2025 to create the legal conditions for introducing 4 digital financial services piloted in its regulatory sandbox, out of 10 pilot applications it considered that year in identification, artificial intelligence, insurance, distributed ledgers and other areas.

4 applications, sandbox applications for which the bank decided to create legal conditions for introduction (the step its sandbox page says follows a successfully completed pilot), 2025. 10 applications, applications to pilot services considered in the regulatory sandbox, 2025. Bank of Russia, Annual Report for 2025 (Godovoy otchet za 2025 god), section 2.5.1 'Development of innovation on the financial market', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank runs an isolated environment in which any organisation can pilot a financial service that existing law would not allow, and when a pilot succeeds it approves a roadmap of legal changes so the service can be introduced.

Preconditions

A central bank with rule-making power over most of the financial market
An expert review process for applications
A legislative route to turn a successful pilot into law, which the experimental legal regimes law of 2020 added

Limits: The central bank reports on its own sandbox, in a 351-page PDF of 57 MB, on PDF page 213 (printed page 211). The unit is applications, not firms: the report does not say how many firms stand behind the 10 applications or the 4 decisions, and one firm can file several. The 4 are read as completions because the Bank's sandbox page (https://www.cbr.ru/fintech/regulatory_sandbox/) says it approves a roadmap for legal conditions when piloting is completed successfully; the annual report itself does not say the pilots ended in 2025, and the 10 considered are not admissions, since an application can be reviewed without a pilot running. The sandbox launched in April 2018 (the Bank's sandbox page) and the Bank said in August 2023 that 86 services had been submitted since launch, so 10 in 2025 is a modest flow, about 0.07 per million people, and 4 completions about 0.03. Experimental legal regimes under the 2020 federal law on digital innovation, which the Ministry of Economic Development registers for every sector, are a second channel the column should sum; the ministry's register did not open from here (connection refused) and its last archived copy is from 2022, so they are not counted. Participants are mostly large incumbent banks and infrastructure operators, so this is not a startup programme.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Russiasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

One-off COVID-19 payments to families with children, 2020

Russia's government adopted rules on 11 May 2020, the day the President announced it, for a one-off payment of 10,000 rubles per child aged 3 to 16, applied for through the state services portal, and on the first day of payment, 1 June 2020, the Pension Fund paid it for 15.3 million children, more than 150 billion rubles.

15,300,000 children, children for whom the 10,000-ruble payment was made on the first payment day, 2020-06-01. 21 days, days from the decree (no. 652) to the first payment, 2020-06-01. Government of the Russian Federation (government.ru), briefing by the Minister of Labour and Social Protection, the Minister of Digital Development and the head of the Federal Tax Service on payments to families with children, 2 June 2020, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government made the payment universal by age, took applications only through the state services portal and the Pension Fund, and checked them automatically against the digitised civil registry and tax data, with a legal limit of five days to decide and three to pay.

Preconditions

A national e-government portal already used by tens of millions of people
A digitised civil registry of births linked to parents
Accumulated reserves, which the President cited when announcing the payment

Limits: The 15.3 million children are the Minister of Labour Anton Kotyakov's spoken figure at a briefing on 2 June 2020, the day after payment began, given as the count 'as of this moment' and described as paid in one day; the 'more than 150 billion' rubles he added is that count times 10,000 rubles, not a separate payment total. It is not a statistical release. He said about 22 million citizens were expected to use the payment. The decree date (No. 652 of 11 May 2020), the President's announcement on the same day, the 5-day review and 3-day payment limits and the 1 June start are in the government's notice of 11 May 2020 (http://government.ru/news/39668/), and the 21 days is our count from 11 May to 1 June. The government and its ministers are reporting on their own measure. The payment was universal for the age group, not targeted at income loss, so speed was bought by not checking need: eligibility needed only the child's age and the parent's application, which the portal could match to civil registry records that, the head of the Federal Tax Service said at the same briefing, had been back-filled with more than 25 million records. A universal per-child cash payment is a broad response; it says nothing about how fast the state adjusted targeted programmes such as unemployment benefits.

Russiasince 2014still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Roshydromet modernization: accuracy of hazard warnings to emergency agencies

Russia's federal hydrometeorological service Roshydromet raised the accuracy of its warnings on hazardous hydrometeorological events delivered to regional emergency agencies from 81 to 83 percent to 91 percent, and of its warnings on natural hazards from 88 to 95.8 percent, between 2014 and the end of 2022 under its second national modernization project.

91 %, accuracy of warnings on hazardous hydromet events delivered to regional emergency agencies (wmo standards), 2022-12-31. 95.8 %, accuracy of warnings on natural hazards, perfect warnings as share of warnings issued (baseline 88 percent in 2014), 2022-12-31. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Russia Second National Hydromet Modernization Project (P127676), 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The national weather service modernised its observation network, computing and forecasting models over two successive World Bank projects, and measured itself on the verified accuracy of hazard warnings passed to emergency agencies.

Preconditions

A national hydromet service with a single federal budget and network
Successive projects over a decade, the first (RHM-1) building the baseline
A verification method agreed with WMO so accuracy is measured the same way each year

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report without site visits or formal interviews, because it suspended disbursements on 19 March 2022 (para. 1), so the indicator values are Roshydromet's own figures as reported to the Bank. The figures are in para. 49 and the results annex (ICR pages 18 and 37). Warning accuracy is a forecast-verification statistic, not a measure of whether warnings reached people or prompted action, and the record ties it to no single disaster; it is a preparedness capacity figure of the same kind as the South African radar availability record. The report says the improved reliability let Roshydromet sign, for the first time, binding agreements with the Ministry of Emergencies on hazard warnings. The final cost was US$174.89 million, 25 percent above appraisal, with the government financing what the Bank suspension left. Status 'operating' assumes the system still runs; nothing after 2022 was read.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Russiasince 2014delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Central Ring Road around Moscow (TsKAD), audited by the Accounts Chamber

Russia's Accounts Chamber found in June 2020 that the state company Avtodor's Central Ring Road project, whose first stage was originally to be built in 2014 to 2018 and was now scheduled for 2014 to 2021, had risen in cost by 2.6 billion roubles in 2019 to 315.9 billion roubles, and that launch complexes 1 and 5 were only 49 and 61 percent complete on 1 January 2020.

315.9 billion roubles, project cost after the 2019 increase, 2019. 49 %, technical readiness of launch complex no. 1, 2020-01-01. Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation (Schetnaya palata), check report summary 'Stroitelstvo TsKAD dorozhaet, no ne zakanchivaetsya', 16 June 2020, archived copy, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The federal road company procured a ring road around Moscow as long-term investment concessions, financed by the National Wealth Fund, budget subsidies and investors, and as works lagged the government extended deadlines and the Accounts Chamber audited the project year by year.

Preconditions

A sovereign wealth fund able to buy the state road company's bonds
Concession contracts with enforceable milestones, which the audits found weakly policed
An audit office that publishes a check of the same project each year

Limits: The live ach.gov.ru did not answer a script today, so the cited copy is the Internet Archive's of 15 September 2020. The page is the audit office's summary of its check, not the full report, and it does not state the original cost, so the record shows cost growth in one year, not the full cost overrun against an approved baseline; the schedule baseline is in the page's footnote, which gives the construction period of the first stage as 2014 to 2021, originally 2014 to 2018; the Chamber's 5 August 2015 release on the same project (archived at https://web.archive.org/web/20210717054203/https://ach.gov.ru/news/sredstva-fonda-nacionalnogo-blagosostoyaniya-napravlennye-na-stroitelstvo-ckad-ne-ispolzuyutsya-v-po-22619) says construction of complexes 1 and 5 had not started a year after their agreements were signed and that National Wealth Fund money sat unused in a bank. The road is a concession-based project of a state company with private investors (33.8 billion roubles of 186.5 billion invested by end 2019), so delivery is partly private. The 2014 start is the year of the first concession agreements cited by the 2015 release. Status 'concluded' assumes the ring opened in the years after the audit; no official source for the final opening date or final cost was read, which is the record's main weakness.