Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism7 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

2 deliveries linked to Public-private collaboration.

Mozambiquesince 2004dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Beira railways concession, and its termination

Mozambique's government concessioned the Sena and Machipanda railways for 25 years in 2004 to a joint company in which the state rail enterprise CFM held 49 percent; the Sena line reopened to Moatize more than two years late, carried 266,000 tonnes against a target of one million, and the government terminated the concession on 7 December 2011.

266,000 metric tons, freight carried on the sena line by the end of the project, 2011. 1,000,000 metric tons per annum, target freight on the sena line by the end of the project, 2009. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Beira Railway Project (P082618), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government of Mozambique, through CFM, handed rehabilitation and operation of two state railways to a private concessionaire in a 51 to 49 joint company, financed largely by an IDA credit, and took the lines back when rehabilitation ran late and traffic did not materialise.

Preconditions

A state rail enterprise able to supervise a concessionaire, which a 49 percent shareholding in the same company undercut
A traffic forecast tied to coal mines whose own concessions were being negotiated in parallel by another ministry
A dispute mechanism or independent arbiter, which the concession lacked

Limits: The source is the World Bank's own completion report on a project it financed, so the lender is grading a failure it shares, and the independent review of that report found its cost tables mutually inconsistent: the text claims a cost overrun of more than US$50 million while the annex shows actual cost below appraisal, which is why no cost figure is used here. The ICR also dates the termination both to September and to December 2011. The 266,000 tonnes is coal moved in the months after the line opened in August 2011, against a target set for 2009, so it measures lateness as much as capacity. The concession covered two lines in the centre of the country, not the national network. The termination ended the partnership but not the asset: CFM kept operating the rehabilitated Sena line, and later coal traffic on it is not in this record. Blame is contested: the report faults the concession design, the state's 49 percent stake and ineffectual Bank supervision as well as the private operator.

Mozambiquesince 2000dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Maputo water lease to Aguas de Mocambique, and the public buyout of the operator in 2010

Mozambique's water asset fund FIPAG leased Maputo's water service from 2000 to the private operator Aguas de Mocambique, whose lead shareholder SAUR pulled out in December 2001 and offered its stake to Aguas de Portugal for one euro; under the lease Maputo connections rose from 77,793 at the end of 2000 to 109,932 in March 2009, and in 2010 FIPAG bought out the Portuguese shareholder, leaving the operator primarily publicly owned.

109,932 connections, maputo water connections served by the lease operator at project completion, 2009-03-31. 77,793 connections, maputo water connections at the start of the lease (baseline), 2000-12-31. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Mozambique Second National Water Development Project, Report No. ICR0000700, September 2009, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The state kept the water assets in a public fund and leased operation of the capital's system to a private consortium paid from tariffs, with a regulator able to order tariff reviews; when the lead foreign operator left and its successor underperformed, the asset fund bought the operating company itself and kept the lease structure with a public owner.

Preconditions

Bids priced on reliable information about network condition, which the security situation prevented here
A lead operator whose corporate strategy commits it to the country for the contract term
A regulator with power to order tariff reviews, which existed (CRA) but could not save the original consortium

Limits: The connection counts are in a PDF (page 7, the results table; the SAUR withdrawal on page 18, paragraph 22), reported by the lender that designed and financed the lease. The end of private participation rests on a second World Bank document, the completion report for the Greater Maputo Water Supply Expansion Project (Report No. ICR00005527, February 2022, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/306811653587372748/pdf/Mozambique-Greater-Maputo-Water-Supply-Expansion-Project.pdf, page 22, paragraph 37), which says the operator's performance fell well below expectations, relations with FIPAG deteriorated, FIPAG bought out the Portuguese partner's roughly 85 percent stake in 2010, and the renamed company, Aguas da Regiao de Maputo, has run the lease since then as a primarily public company, with the lease extended to 2019 and private partners for the regional utilities only scheduled for 2022. The two reports do not agree on the lease length (15 years in 2009, 14 years in 2022). The record shows growth in connections under the lease and the end of private ownership, not a fall in service: connections were not shown to decline after the buyout, so what eroded is the partnership, not access. The 2009 report rates the private operator's performance poorly through much of the period: the 2000 floods, SAUR's underbidding, and two years of renegotiation delayed the programme by about four years, and supply in 2009 averaged 14 hours a day against a target of continuous supply. Lease revenue to FIPAG stayed far below expectation (2022 report, paragraph 52).

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Mozambiquesince 1975operating below its peakbears on Adult learning participation

Alfabetização e Educação de Adultos (public adult literacy and adult primary education), and its decline

Mozambique's education ministry counted 243,655 learners in its public adult literacy and adult primary education classes in the April 2025 school survey (169,341 in literacy and 74,314 in primary education for young people and adults), against 302,207 in 2024 and 529,314 in the March 2014 survey.

243,655 learners, learners in public literacy and adult education (alfabetizacao e educacao de adultos), annual school survey 30 april, 2025. 529,314 learners, learners in adult education (educacao de adultos), annual school survey 15 march, 2014. Ministério da Educação e Cultura, Direcção de Planificação, Estatística e Cooperação, Levantamento Estatístico do Sector 2025 (Statistical Survey of the Sector 2025), summary enrolment table, as archived by the Internet Archive on 7 November 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The education ministry runs literacy and adult primary classes in community centres staffed by paid or volunteer literacy teachers, counts the learners in its annual school census alongside children, and publishes the totals by province.

Preconditions

A national adult education directorate with provincial and district officers
Literacy teachers paid a stipend or volunteering in each community
An annual school census that also reaches non-formal centres

Where else it has been used: The same census shows the programme concentrated in Nampula, Tete and Sofala in 2025; a programme that depends on stipended community teachers is the first to shrink when the education budget is squeezed.

Limits: The cited URL is an Internet Archive copy: mined.gov.mz timed out on 2026-10-02. Both numbers sit in PDFs: the 2025 total is in the summary table on page 14 of 73 and broken down by province on later pages; the 2014 figure is in the same summary table of the 2014 edition (levantamento_estatistico_do_sector_2014.pdf, page 13, archived copy of 19 August 2026). The comparison is computed by the record (a fall of about 54 percent) and crosses a change in the survey: 2014 was taken on 15 March and labelled 'Educacao de Adultos', 2025 on 30 April and split into literacy and primary education for young people and adults after the 2018 education system law, so part of the gap may be definitional. The intermediate editions read on the same day (290,478 in 2016, 251,887 in 2018, 262,641 in 2019, 229,329 in 2020, 302,207 in 2024) show most of the fall happened between 2014 and 2016 and that the level has moved between about 230,000 and 300,000 since, so 'eroded' rests mainly on one early drop; the 2014 and 2016 editions report the same 2,647 centres, which suggests some figures were carried forward. 2014 is the earliest edition read, not a demonstrated all-time peak. Counts are learners attending at survey date, not completers, and about two thirds are women; nothing here shows literacy gained. Private centres (a few hundred learners) are excluded. The 1975 start is the national literacy campaigns after independence, as commonly dated; it was not read at the cited source.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Mozambiquesince 2018still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Sandbox Regulatório do Banco de Moçambique

Banco de Moçambique admitted 11 participants, chosen from 19 applicants, to the sixth edition of its regulatory sandbox in March 2025, and at the same ceremony gave participation certificates to the five fintechs that had completed the fifth edition.

11 participants, participants admitted to the sixth edition of the regulatory sandbox, 2025-03-28. 5 firms, fintechs completing the fifth edition and receiving participation certificates, 2025-03-28. Banco de Moçambique, highlight 'Governor Rogério Zandamela launches the sixth edition of the regulatory sandbox', retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank runs its sandbox in annual editions: it opens a call, selects a cohort, runs roughly nine months of preparation, testing and reporting, and certifies the firms that finish so they can apply for a licence.

Preconditions

A sandbox regulation issued by the central bank with fixed phases and exit rules
A financial inclusion office with staff to supervise each cohort
A licensing route for payment and credit services that a graduate can apply to

Where else it has been used: The cohort model with a public certificate ceremony is the format several southern African central banks adopted later; Mozambique is among the earliest in the region, with a first cohort in 2018.

Limits: The regulator reports on its own sandbox in a news item, not in a statistical series, and the page gives one cohort only: it does not give cumulative admissions or exits across the six editions, nor how many of the 11 went on to complete testing. 'Participants' can include incumbents as well as start-ups (the five graduates named include Vodafone M-Pesa, a large mobile money operator), so the count is not a count of new firms. Completing the sandbox makes a firm eligible to apply for a licence; the page does not say how many were licensed. The 2018 start is the establishment date in the World Bank's Appendix 3 database (May 2018, five firms in the sandbox at the time), not stated on the cited page. The sandbox page (bancomoc.mz, BM Regulatory Sandbox) shows a call for an eighth edition dated September 2026 and a seventh-edition invitation dated 1 October 2025 for testing from February 2026, so the regime was running at retrieval, but neither document carries a participant count. Against a population of about 34 million, 11 admissions is about 0.3 per million people.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Mozambiquesince 1999still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Instituto Nacional de Gestao de Calamidades (INGC)

Mozambique's National Disaster Management Institute, created in 1999 after a new national disaster policy, evacuated around 150,000 people with two days of warning in the 2007 floods, and by 2011 had ten days of warning for an event of similar scale and spent under US$1 million on evacuation, against about US$5 million in 2007.

150,000 people, people evacuated by ingc ahead of the 2007 floods, 2007. 10 days, advance warning ingc had before a 2011 flood event similar in scale to 2007/2008, 2011. World Bank, Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, Recovery from Recurrent Floods 2000-2013: Mozambique, Recovery Framework Case Study, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government replaced a relief department with a standing disaster agency, INGC, gave it a national emergency operations centre and a civil protection unit, and paired forecasting with district and community risk committees that carry warnings to people who then move.

Preconditions

A flood catastrophe in 2000 that made preparedness a political priority
Hydrological and meteorological forecasting with enough lead time to act on
Donor funding and an annual contingency budget line for evacuation

Limits: Every figure here is a round number in a GFDRR case study, a conference version that says it aims to learn from country experience rather than evaluate it and carries a disclaimer on accuracy; the evacuation counts and costs are INGC's own, with no underlying series published. 'Similar in scale' is the case study's judgement, not a measured comparison of hazards. The same document's comparison of the 2000 and 2013 floods (700 and 117 deaths) does not show a falling death rate once divided by the population affected (4.5 million and 478,892, our computation), and its own text gives 30 direct deaths for 2013, so mortality is not used as the metric. The record says nothing about the cyclone seasons after 2014. Much of the system was built with donor money.

Mozambiquesince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

PASD-PE COVID-19 cash transfers

Mozambique's National Social Protection Institute (INAS) extended its post-emergency cash transfer programme (PASD-PE) to new urban and peri-urban households after the COVID-19 shock, covering 280,000 new households in 2020 and 572,415 families cumulatively by November 2023.

572,415 families, families covered by the pasd-pe covid-19 response with world bank financing, cumulative, 2023-11-01. 280,000 households, new households covered in the first phase of the covid-19 response, 2020. World Bank, Social Protection and Economic Resilience Project (P173640) Implementation Status and Results Report, sequence 6, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

INAS used a programme already written for shocks, PASD-PE, which had run after the 2016 drought and the 2019 cyclones, and pointed it at urban and peri-urban households hit by the pandemic, paying them by mobile money with donor finance.

Preconditions

A standing emergency transfer programme with rules that allow horizontal expansion
Donor finance ready to move inside an existing World Bank project
Mobile payment channels able to reach households INAS had not registered before

Limits: Both numbers sit in World Bank PDFs: 572,415 on page 3 of the December 2024 results report, and 280,000 in paragraph 11 and Table 1 of the project appraisal document (November 2021, page 9). The results report is the financier reporting on its own project from INAS data, and its value is dated 1 November 2023 although the report was archived in December 2024. The count includes families paid only two or three of the six planned monthly transfers, so it measures registration and first payment, not delivery of the full benefit. It counts only the families the World Bank financed; the appraisal document (page 65) names a separate top-up to more than 550,000 existing beneficiaries and a second phase planned at 700,000 households, and no source found states how many of the second phase were paid. The appraisal document does not date the first payments, so the record shows scale and not the speed of the change. The money was largely external, so the case evidences INAS changing who its programme reaches, not Mozambique financing the change.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Mozambiquesince 2004dismantledbears on Large project delivery

Beira Railway concession and Sena line rehabilitation, and its termination

Mozambique's government and its ports and railways enterprise CFM rehabilitated the 600 km Sena railway from Dondo to Moatize through a 25-year concession signed on 30 August 2004, with total financing rising from US$152.47 million at appraisal to US$188.70 million, works finishing more than two years late, and the concession terminated on 7 December 2011.

188.7 million US dollars, total project financing by source, actual or latest estimate, 2011-12-31. 152.47 million US dollars, total project financing by source, appraisal estimate, 2004. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Mozambique Beira Railway Project (IDA-39910), Report No. ICR2154, 27 June 2012, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The Mozambican government handed the rehabilitation and operation of the Beira railway system to a concession in which its own railway enterprise held 49 percent, paid for the Sena line works with an IDA credit whose proceeds went to the concessionaire, and took the line back when the works ran late and over cost.

Preconditions

A concessional lender willing to finance a private concessionaire through the state
A concessionaire with rail operating experience, which this one lacked
A conceding authority able to enforce the contract, which its 49 percent stake undercut

Limits: The 23.8 percent rise is computed here from the two totals in Annex 1, table c; the report's own cost table by component shows actual spending below appraisal (73 percent) because the Machipanda line works the concessionaire was to fund never happened, so the two tables tell different stories and the overrun sits in extra shareholder loans and an EIB loan rather than in IDA money. The report also states cost overruns of US$50 million, a 35 percent increase, at the June 2008 mid-term review, and 'more than US$50 million' overall, without a baseline for either. The delay is stated only as 'over two years' against a four-year plan, and the report gives the termination date as 7 December 2011 in one place and September 2011 in another. The concessionaire, CCFB, was 51 percent held by the private concessionaire and 49 percent by CFM, so the delivery was a public-private vehicle and the report blames weak concessionaire capacity as much as the state. This is the World Bank's report on its own credit and rates its own performance Unsatisfactory. The Sena line was completed except for a 44 km section to the Malawi border and kept running under CFM after termination, so the line was not abandoned; what ended was the concession and its programme, with the Machipanda line left to deteriorate. Plain-text file of a PDF.