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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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3 of 863 deliveries

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Myanmarsince 2020dismantledbears on Institutional responsiveness

COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan household transfers, and their halt after the 2021 coup

Under its COVID-19 Economic Relief Plan, Myanmar's government distributed food to about 5.4 million households in April 2020 and cash transfers that had reached about 6 million vulnerable households by November 2020, and the World Bank reported in July 2021 that these transfers had come to a sudden halt after the military takeover of 1 February 2021.

6 million households, vulnerable households reached by covid-19 cash transfers by november 2020, before the transfers halted (about), 2020-11. World Bank, Myanmar Economic Monitor, July 2021: Progress Threatened; Resilience Tested, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The civilian government widened its maternal and child cash transfer and social pensions and set up emergency food and cash distributions through ward and village administrators, using community identification of the neediest households because no national poverty registry existed.

Preconditions

  • A functioning civilian administration down to ward and village tract level
  • Donor and budget finance that could be reallocated within weeks
  • Political continuity, which is the precondition the 2021 takeover removed

Limits: The 6 million and the halt are in one sentence on printed page 38 of the July 2021 Monitor ('reached about 6 million vulnerable households by November 2020 have come to a sudden halt'). The source does not say who stopped the transfers, by what decision, or whether every government transfer stopped: the line on printed page 43 that 'all government cash transfer programs and remittances stopped' is an assumption of the Bank's poverty simulation (method in Annex 1, page 51), not an observation, so the record does not claim that the maternal and child cash transfer or the social pensions ended. The food distribution to about 5.4 million households in April 2020 and repeated cash payments of 40,000 kyat to 5.4 million households in July and August 2020, rising to 5.6 million in September and 6.1 million in November, are the government's figures as relayed by the December 2020 Monitor (Coping with COVID-19, https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/906171608086222905/pdf/Myanmar-Economic-Monitor-Coping-with-COVID-19.pdf, printed pages 52 and 66), which notes its own survey found lower numbers. The figures are approximate and dated by month only, so the speed of the 2020 response is shown only by month. The COVID-19 transfers were emergency rounds of modest size (the December 2020 Monitor calls the support far from meeting needs), so part of what stopped was temporary by design; the reversal is that they stopped suddenly during a deeper crisis rather than being replaced. The halt followed a coup, not a policy judgement on the programme, and the source does not separate loss of finance, loss of donor support and loss of administrative capacity. A World Bank country monitor is an international source reporting on the government's programme, not the government's own accounts.

Myanmarsince 2017delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Flood and Landslide Emergency Recovery Project, and its slow delivery

Myanmar's Ministry of Construction and rural roads department had used US$37.2 million of a US$200 million IDA credit approved in July 2016 for recovery from the 2015 floods and landslides, rehabilitating 60 km of rural roads, 10 percent of the target, and starting no national road works in Chin State, when disbursements stopped after the military takeover of February 2021, and the project closed on its original December 2021 date with an Unsatisfactory outcome rating.

37.15 million US dollars, actual disbursement at closing, 2021-12-31. 200 million US dollars, original ida financing at approval, 2016-07-14. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Myanmar Flood and Landslide Emergency Recovery Project (P158194), 29 June 2023, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

After the 2015 floods the government took an emergency recovery credit for roads, bridges and community works, but slow procurement, safeguards breaches and then the 2021 coup left most of the money unspent.

Preconditions

  • Agencies able to design and procure civil works quickly after a disaster
  • Safeguards compliance on politically sensitive roads
  • A government the lender could keep financing

Where else it has been used: Same stop date as mmr-nep; the contrast with Nepal's earthquake housing (npl-ehrp), delivered through cash grants rather than procured works, is the useful one.

Limits: The disbursement figures are on the ICR datasheet (pages 1 to 2) and the 60 km rural road figure, 10 percent of target, is in the component review (page 12); all were read from the plain-text version. The shortfall was mostly in place before the coup: by September 2020, four years after approval, US$27.4 million had been disbursed (ISR table, page 3), the national roads in Chin State never started because donor and government-financed linked works broke safeguards, design work for the large roads was unfinished, and in July 2020 the government requested a 23-month extension that was never processed. The World Bank's pause of all disbursements in February 2021 under its policy on de facto governments then fixed the outturn, so part of the Unsatisfactory rating reflects the lender's stop rather than the ministries' work. The ICR had no contact with the authorities after the takeover and no borrower report, so later works financed by other sources are not counted. US$12.4 million of goods under component 3 were procured and distributed with UNOPS support, so that part was not delivered by national procurement. Recovery of one flood event says little about warning or evacuation capacity, which this project did not measure. The 2015 floods themselves, and any relief delivered in 2015, fall outside it. Nothing delivered was lost, so this is a slow delivery and not a reversal.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Myanmarsince 2016dismantledbears on Large project delivery

National Electrification Project grid extension, and its halt

Myanmar's Ministry of Electricity and Energy and its distribution utilities built 6,400 km of distribution lines and connected 361,703 households to the main grid under the National Electrification Project from 2016, against revised targets of 17,800 km and 645,000 households, before financing stopped after the military takeover of 1 February 2021 and the project closed on 30 September 2021 with the grid extension component at 52.3 percent of its approved cost.

6,400 km, distribution lines constructed or rehabilitated at closing, against a revised target of 17,800 km (36 percent), 2021-09-30. 52.3 % of appraisal cost, grid extension component cost at closing as a share of the us$375 million approved, 2021-09-30. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Myanmar National Electrification Project (P152936), 2023, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

Myanmar's electricity ministry ran the first phase of a national electrification plan through its distribution utilities, with IDA paying for poles, conductors and transformers and the utilities and communities paying for installation, and the build stopped part way when the 2021 takeover cut off the lender's money.

Preconditions

  • A concessional lender financing materials for a national grid roll-out
  • Distribution utilities able to install and connect at scale
  • A government the lender would keep dealing with, which ended on 1 February 2021

Limits: This is a shortfall against a target and an underspend, not a cost overrun: the grid extension component spent US$196.14 million of the US$375 million approved (Annex 3), and the report gives US$203.14 million for the same component in paragraph 18, so the two tables in one document disagree. The halt came from the World Bank pausing all disbursements under its policy on de facto governments after the military takeover, so the stop was a lender's decision triggered by a change of regime, not a ministry abandoning the build. The report was written as a desk review from supervision and progress reports filed before 1 February 2021, with no contact with the authorities and no borrower report, and it does not assess anything after that date. The 36 percent of distribution lines is against a target already cut from 20,700 to 17,800 km in the 2017 restructuring, and part of the shortfall predates the takeover: the report names low ministry capacity and delayed audits. The project is a national programme of many small medium and low voltage works rather than one structure, it also had an off-grid component that reached 92 percent of its target, and the report rated the whole project Moderately Satisfactory. Plain-text file of a PDF.