Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.
Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.
Madagascar's vocational training fund, the FMFP, financed by a payroll levy on formal employers and governed with ministry, employer and worker representatives, trained 30,043 people in 2022 after 42,044 in 2021 and 19,898 in 2020, through 741 company training requests and sector projects in 21 regions.
The state created a training fund paid for by a levy on the payroll of formal employers, and a board of ministries, employers and unions spends it on company training plans, sector projects and equity projects for informal workers chosen through calls for proposals.
Preconditions
A social security agency that can collect a payroll levy from formal employers
Employer and union bodies willing to sit on the board and set priorities by sector
Private and public training providers in the regions able to deliver the courses the fund pays for
Limits: The fund reports on itself, in a PDF annual report with no stated method, and the figures do not reconcile: the key-figures page gives 30,043 people trained in 2022, while the sector breakdown in the same report totals 28,791. The 2024 annual report prints a beneficiary breakdown of 42,044 with the same male and female counts as 2021, which looks like a copied table, so the 2023 and 2024 counts cannot be read from it. A person trained in two projects may be counted twice. Against an adult population of well over ten million, about 30,000 trainees a year is a fraction of one percent. The fund mainly serves employees of levy-paying formal firms, a small part of a mostly informal workforce, although its equity projects reach informal workers. Its expansion in 2021 and 2022 relied on additional money from the European Union and the French development agency, AFD. A count of people trained says nothing about training length, quality, or effect on skills or earnings.
Madagascar's Fonds d'Intervention pour le Developpement turned its safety net project into a shock-response channel from December 2016, delivering crisis-response unconditional cash transfers to 622,961 people and crisis cash-for-work to 155,649 people after droughts in the South and the 2022 cyclones, by the project's close in October 2024.
FID, a government agency with field staff and a beneficiary registry from the regular safety net, repeatedly restructured the project to redirect funds to drought and cyclone victims, paying unconditional transfers and cash-for-work through the channels it already ran.
Preconditions
An implementing agency with a targeting method and payment channels already operating before the shock
A financier willing to restructure a project within weeks rather than design a new one
Enough security in affected districts to move cash, here secured by an agreement with the police
Limits: The figures are cumulative over 2016 to 2024 and come from the World Bank's own evaluation of a project it financed, which draws on the implementing agency's reporting; they count people reached, not whether households recovered, and say nothing about speed of delivery after each shock. Almost all the money was IDA credit and grants (US$305.9 million actual), so the record shows the state's agency delivering donor-financed transfers, not domestic fiscal capacity to respond. Targets were set and raised repeatedly in emergency conditions, and IEG notes that some reach targets were not scaled up as financing grew (its remark about targets set quickly and with limited clarity concerns the emergency nutrition targets), so exceeding them is weak evidence. The response was reactive, reallocating funds after each shock rather than drawing on a pre-arranged trigger, which is recovery more than preparedness. Security problems in the South forced FID to sign an agreement with the police to deliver cash. The project closed in October 2024, so the status is concluded.
๐ฒ๐ฌMadagascarsince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness
Madagascar's social protection agency FID designed the Tosika Fameno emergency cash transfer after the March 2020 urban lockdown, registered almost 200,000 households in about 12 days, made the first payment four weeks after the lockdown began, and reached more than 368,000 urban households in ten cities with 100,000 ariary payments.
The President asked the national social protection fund FID to extend its rural cash transfer machinery to the locked-down cities; FID and WFP built a rapid registration process, paid by mobile money and post, and partners aligned their transfers on the same amount and targeting.
Preconditions
A national social fund already running cash transfers and a payment chain
Donor finance that could be redirected within weeks
Mobile money and postal networks able to pay urban households
Where else it has been used: Madagascar later turned the urban response into a longer urban safety net under the World Bank project; similar lockdown transfers in Malawi (mwi-cuci) took ten months to pay, which shows how much the existing agency mattered.
Limits: The figures are in an eight-page UNICEF case study PDF (PDF page 4: first payment four weeks after the start of the urban lockdown, registration of almost 200,000 households in about 12 days, more than 368,000 households; PDF page 6: registration completed two weeks after the declaration of the state of health emergency, first payments within one month; the 368,000 by the end of 2020 also on PDF page 2). UNICEF co-led the cash working group and directly supported 8,500 of the households, so it is grading a response it helped build, and the case study gives no exact dates for the lockdown or the first payment. The 368,000 mixes government payments financed by the World Bank with humanitarian top-ups by UNICEF, WFP, the EU and NGOs using the same parameters; the World Bank's Social Safety Net Project ICR (2025, P149323, paragraph 43 and annex note 2) counts 215,093 households paid under its own financing, a smaller number on a different scope. The benefit was 100,000 ariary (about US$26), small against lost urban income, and coverage was limited to ten cities. The speed came from an agency that already ran rural safety nets, not from a standing urban programme.
Madagascar's road authority and transport agencies delivered road, port, airport and Northern Railway works under the Transport Infrastructure Investment Project from 2004, cutting travel time on the RN44 from 24 to 6 hours, with the closing date extended four years from 30 June 2008 to 30 June 2012 and IDA-financed costs of US$169.39 million against US$150.00 million at appraisal plus US$15.60 million of additional financing added in 2007.
Madagascar's road authority and port and rail agencies ran a multi-modal investment programme on a lender credit, re-scoping it repeatedly as priorities and the political situation changed, and finished four years late.
Preconditions
A road authority and transport agencies able to procure civil works
Lender flexibility to restructure and add financing
Political continuity through implementation, which Madagascar did not have
Limits: The costs are in Annex 1 of the World Bank's own completion report, which rated the outcome Moderately Satisfactory. They are IDA disbursements only (the borrower's own contribution is shown as US$1.11 million against 17.42 appraised), and the 112.9 percent of appraisal is almost entirely the US$15.60 million additional financing of 2007 for the Northern Railway component, which was not in the appraisal; against the revised estimate including that financing, the outturn is 102.3 percent, so the record shows no meaningful cost overrun and should not be read as one. Port and airport components spent a fraction of their estimates and the RN5a upgrade was dropped at the January 2006 restructuring, so scope shrank in some places while it grew in others. The RN44 travel-time result is the report's own indicator comment. The closing date moved through five restructurings, and the 2009 political crisis froze disbursements during implementation. The project is a portfolio of works, not one build, so no single project's baseline and outturn are shown. Plain-text file, no PDF page numbers.