Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism7 of 863 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

Latviasince 2024delivered and closedbears on Government foresight capacity

Latvija 2050 long-term scenario framework for the State Chancellery

Latvia's State Chancellery commissioned the University of Latvia under contract 2024/065 of 5 November 2024 to build the analytical framework for the Latvija 2050 strategy; the study, delivered in 2026, set out three macroeconomic development scenarios to 2050 and drew on a Kantar survey in December 2024 and expert focus groups in four regions in September and October 2025.

3 scenarios, macroeconomic development scenarios to 2050 in the latvija 2050 framework study, 2026-03. 4 focus groups, regional expert focus groups held for the study, 2025-09-15 to 2025-10-03. Valsts kanceleja (State Chancellery of Latvia), policy planning documents portal: Ietvars Latvijas ilgtermina planosanai Latvija 2050, study by the University of Latvia LV PEAK under contract 2024/065, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The State Chancellery, which absorbed the cross-sectoral planning centre, contracted a university think tank to build values, scenarios and quantified targets for the next long-term strategy, and tested them in a national survey, regional focus groups and conferences in the Saeima before drafting the strategy itself.

Preconditions

An earlier long-term strategy (Latvija 2030) whose challenges could be reviewed rather than written from zero
A centre-of-government body with the planning mandate and a budget to commission research
A domestic university group able to model macroeconomic scenarios over 25 years

Limits: The counts are read from a 291-page PDF (the three scenarios are listed on PDF page 6 and modelled in section 4, the four focus groups are on PDF page 36). The authors are university researchers working to a State Chancellery contract, not civil servants, so the State Chancellery bought the foresight rather than producing it; the document is hosted on the government's planning portal but does not state that the government endorses it. Three scenarios and four focus groups measure the shape of one exercise, not influence: as of a State Chancellery release of 4 September 2026 on LV portals (https://lvportals.lv/dienaskartiba/394043-latvija-2050-no-nakotnes-scenarijiem-lidz-kopigai-ricibai-2026) the Latvija 2050 strategy was still a draft, not adopted by the Saeima, so whether the scenarios shape policy is unknown. The record shows one delivery tied to one strategy cycle, not a standing foresight unit with yearly output. Continuity rests on an institutional change: the Cabinet liquidated the Cross-Sectoral Coordination Centre, which had run long-term planning, as a separate institution and moved its functions and 25 posts to the State Chancellery by 1 March 2023 (LV portals, https://lvportals.lv/norises/346547-parresoru-koordinacijas-centru-likvide-ka-atsevisku-iestadi-2022); the posts moved intact, so this is not counted as a loss. The study cost was not found.

Coordination

2 deliveries linked to University-industry collaboration, Public-private collaboration.

Latviasince 2011delivered and closedbears on University-industry collaboration

Kompetences centri, the industry competence centres programme

Latvia's six industry competence centres, funded through the Investment and Development Agency with 53.2 million euros of ERDF money, had run 231 research projects involving 164 companies and 33 scientific partners by 31 December 2014, of which 78 were completed and 44 percent involved cooperation with scientific institutions.

231 research projects, research projects supported in the six competence centres (table 3, total), 2014-12-31. 164 companies, industry partners in the six competence centres (table 3, total), 2014-12-31. Ekonomikas ministrija (Ministry of Economics of Latvia), ex-ante evaluation of SAM 1.2.1.1 'Atbalsts jaunu produktu un tehnoloģiju izstrādei kompetences centru ietvaros', Riga 2015, chapter 2 (evaluation of the 2007 to 2013 programme), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The economics ministry funded industry-led competence centres, companies grouped by sector, which commissioned or ran research projects for their members, partly with universities and institutes, from EU structural funds.

Preconditions

EU structural funds large enough to finance a sector-by-sector research programme
Industry associations able to form a centre company and choose projects
A few large public universities able to supply contract research

Where else it has been used: Latvia borrowed the competence-centre label from Austria (aut-comet), which the evaluation cites, but put firms rather than universities at the centre, so most projects ended up as firm research with optional academic input.

Limits: The ministry evaluated a programme its own agency ran, and the figures are in a 43-page PDF: the 164 companies, 231 projects and 78 completed are on printed page 10 (PDF page 10) and Table 3 with 33 scientific partners on printed page 10 to 11 (PDF page 11). Most projects were firms' own research: the same evaluation says only 44 percent of projects involved cooperation with private or public scientific institutions, with 24 registered institutions, so the 231 overstates university-firm collaboration, and the 33 scientific partners count partners of the centres, not distinct universities. The programme was suspended from December 2011 to May 2012 and the centres only started full operation in 2013; by the end of 2014 they had drawn 56 percent of their funding and completed 34 percent of projects. Patents (3) and publications (25 against 107 planned) were few. The data are eleven years old. The evaluation states the 2007 to 2013 centre projects were to run until 31 December 2015, so this delivery is concluded; a successor competence centre programme for 2014 to 2020 under the same agency is what this ex-ante evaluation prepares, and this record does not show its scale.

Latviasince 2021still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Ķekava bypass, the first major road PPP in the Baltic states

Latvia's Ministry of Transport and the state roads company signed a design, build, finance and maintain contract for the Ķekava bypass on the A7 on 16 July 2021, the private partner Kekava ABT built the roughly 18 km road from 2021 to 2023 and it opened on 13 October 2023, with the state paying EUR 250.13 million in availability payments over 20 years.

250.13 EUR million, total availability payments over the 20-year maintenance period, 2023-10-13. 27 months, months from contract signature (16 july 2021) to opening (13 october 2023), 2023-10-13. Centrālā finanšu un līgumu aģentūra (CFLA), Atklāj vērienīgāko PPP ceļu projektu Baltijā: Ķekavas apvedceļu (news, October 2023), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The transport ministry and the state roads company procured a bypass as one design, build, finance and maintain contract, the private partner built it in about two years, and the state pays quarterly for 20 years once the road is available.

Preconditions

A PPP law and a supervising agency (CFLA) to run procurement
Eurostat clearance that the project sits off the public balance sheet
Lenders willing to finance a first-of-kind deal in a small market

Where else it has been used: The Czech D4 (cze-d4-ppp) followed the same availability model at larger scale; Lithuania's PPP portfolio (ltu-vpsp) shows the municipal route the Baltic states use more often.

Limits: CFLA supervises PPP projects in Latvia and is part of the delivery it reports, so this is the supervisor's announcement on opening day, not an audit. The 27 months are our arithmetic from the two dates on the page; the page gives no planned opening date, so it does not show whether the road opened on schedule, and it gives no construction cost separate from the availability payments. The same page says the state roads company had to obtain several Eurostat opinions to keep the project off the government balance sheet, and that CFLA is working to remove that step: the procedure was slow before construction began. One project is not a programme; the page calls it the first large road PPP in the Baltic states, which also means Latvia has no record of repeating it. Representatives of the Nordic Investment Bank and the European Investment Bank took part in the opening; the page does not describe the financing.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Latviasince 2017delivered and closedbears on Adult learning participation

Mācības pieaugušajiem, the ESF training programme for employed adults 2017 to 2023

Latvia's State Education Development Agency (VIAA) trained almost 77,000 employed adults aged 25 and over through its ESF-funded 'Mācības pieaugušajiem' project between 2017 and 2023, in ten rounds and 2,309 programmes offered by 124 education institutions, with 90 to 100 percent of fees covered.

77,000 persons, employed persons aged 25 and over who improved their competence in the project ('teju 77 000', almost 77,000), 2017 to 2023. 2,309 programmes, education programmes offered in the project, 2017 to 2023. Valsts izglītības attīstības aģentūra (State Education Development Agency of Latvia), project page 'ESF projekts Nodarbināto personu profesionālās kompetences pilnveide', published 4 December 2024, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The national education agency bought places on formal and non-formal programmes from colleges, universities and vocational schools and offered them to employed adults in competitive rounds, with EU money paying almost the whole fee.

Preconditions

European Social Fund money large enough to cover 90 to 100 percent of fees
Education institutions willing to adapt programmes for working adults, including distance formats
A national agency able to run open application rounds and pay providers

Where else it has been used: Portugal's Novas Oportunidades (prt-novas-oportunidades) and Croatia's vouchers (hrv-vauceri) are other EU-funded adult training pushes; Latvia's ended with its funding period and was replaced by a different instrument, individual learning accounts.

Limits: The agency reports on its own project, and the headline is a rounded 'almost 77,000' credited to 'project data' with no table behind it; whether it counts people or enrolments is not stated, and an adult who took part in two rounds may be counted twice. The figure covers seven years, roughly 11,000 a year against fewer than a million employed people, and only employed adults aged 25 and over, so the unemployed and young adults are outside it. 'Improved their competence' is the agency's wording; the page does not say how many completed a programme or gained a qualification, beyond 1,909 people compensated for a qualification exam. The project was financed by the European Social Fund and ended in 2023; the agency has since moved to individual learning accounts funded by the EU recovery plan, which this record does not cover.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Latviasince 2022still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

National warning siren network and its twice-yearly test

Latvia's State Fire and Rescue Service tested the national early warning siren network on 23 May 2025 and reported that 160 of the 162 sirens tested worked without faults, out of 164 installed, against 119 of 155 in the test of 20 May 2024.

160 of 162 tested (164 installed), sirens that worked without faults in the national test, 2025-05-23. 119 of 155 tested (164 installed), sirens that worked without faults in the national test a year earlier, 2024-05-20. Valsts ugunsdzēsības un glābšanas dienests (State Fire and Rescue Service of Latvia), news item 'Pārbaudot 162 trauksmes sirēnas, bez traucējumiem nostrādāja 160 sirēnas', 23 May 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The fire and rescue service sounds every national warning siren twice a year, publishes how many worked by region, and repairs or relocates the failures before the next test.

Preconditions

A remotely triggered siren network owned by a national service
A published test result after every test, which makes failures visible
Maintenance funding, which rose after 2022 with the security situation

Where else it has been used: Norway's civil defence publishes the same kind of test result for a network seven times larger (nor-tyfonvarsling).

Limits: The fire service reports on its own system. A test is not a shock: the record shows that sirens sounded on a set day, not that people were warned or acted in a real event, and the item does not say what share of the population lives within hearing range of 164 sirens. Sirens not tested because they were being moved, repaired or renewed (two in May 2025, nine in May 2024) are outside the denominator. The 2024 figure is from the service's item of 20 May 2024 (https://www.vugd.gov.lv/lv/jaunums/parbaudot-155-trauksmes-sirenas-bez-traucejumiem-nostradaja-119-sirenas); other items in the series give 152 of 158 (May 2023), 138 of 159 (November 2023) and 151 of 158 (November 2024), and in June 2022 the remote activation software failed and the sirens had to be started by hand, so performance has swung between tests rather than improved steadily. No test result after May 2025 was found in the service's sitemap. The started year is the first test in the series read (June 2022), not the founding of the network; Latvia also sends cell broadcast and app alerts, which this figure does not cover.

Latviasince 2020delivered and closedbears on Institutional responsiveness

Dīkstāves pabalsts, the 2020 downtime benefit

Latvia introduced a downtime benefit in March 2020 under its COVID-19 emergency law, paying idled employees and self-employed people up to 75 percent of their previous average pay, capped at 700 euros a month, and by 14 August 2020 the State Revenue Service had paid it to 52,867 employees and 2,381 self-employed people, 53.78 million euros in all.

52,867 employees, employees paid the downtime benefit, 2020-08-14. 53,784,481 EUR, downtime benefit paid by the state revenue service, employees and self-employed, 2020-08-14. Valsts kontrole (State Audit Office of Latvia), financial audit 'Finanšu ministrijai piešķirtā finansējuma izlietojums dīkstāves pabalsta izmaksai', 26 November 2020, summary as hosted in the European Court of Auditors' COVID-19 audit repository, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The Saeima wrote the benefit into the COVID-19 emergency law, the Cabinet set the eligibility rules by regulation and amended them as the crisis widened, and the State Revenue Service paid the benefit from its own tax records, funded from the budget contingency line.

Preconditions

A tax administration that already held each worker's recent pay and social contributions
A contingency budget line the Cabinet could draw on without a new budget law
Cabinet regulations that could change eligibility within weeks

Where else it has been used: The audit office's recommendation, that a widening of eligibility must not drop groups already eligible, was taken into the later downtime support, which no longer required a minimum level of social contributions and could be paid from several employers.

Limits: The figures are in a two-page PDF summary of the audit, on page 1, hosted by the European Court of Auditors rather than on the audit office's own site. The audit covers the first wave only, with data to 14 August 2020; the downtime support Latvia paid in the second wave from late 2020 is not in this number. The audit office found the money paid was 53 percent of the 101.8 million euros the Cabinet had set aside, and that the benefit ran for almost four months against the two months planned. It found no material irregularity in how the State Revenue Service granted the benefit, but it found that successive amendments to the Cabinet regulations widened eligibility for some groups while excluding others, and that self-employed people paying the microenterprise tax and employees with one crisis-hit employer were treated more favourably than comparable groups. The summary gives the month of introduction but no date for the first payment, so the record shows scale and not speed. The number counts people paid at any time over the period, not a monthly peak, and says nothing about how many jobs the benefit kept.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Latviasince 2016still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Rail Baltica in Latvia, and its cost and schedule overrun

The Latvian State Audit Office found in June 2024 that the estimated construction cost of Rail Baltica's main line in Latvia had risen sevenfold since 2017 to about 8.7 billion euros, that design work due by the end of 2021 was only 54 percent complete and now planned to finish by the end of 2027, and that the Riga Central Station works contracted in 2019 at 430 million euros had risen to 565 million euros.

8.7 billion euros (about), estimated construction cost of the rail baltica main line, latvian section, 2024-06. 54 %, share of main line design work completed, against an original deadline of end 2021, 2024-06. Valsts kontrole (State Audit Office of the Republic of Latvia), news release 'Rail Baltica tvērums Latvijā mainījies bez vienotas pieejas un lēmumi ir grūti izsekojami', 12 June 2024, with the attached infographic of the national situation review, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The transport ministry approved scope changes and cost increases for stations, the Riga node and the main line itself, often without bringing a full cost picture to the Cabinet, while design guidelines kept changing and EU co-financing deadlines kept slipping.

Preconditions

A first cost estimate made before any design guidelines existed
A ministry able to approve scope changes without a single Cabinet-level change process
Financing that depends on successive EU funding calls rather than a committed national budget

Where else it has been used: The joint Baltic review found the same pattern in Estonia and Lithuania, so the overrun is a property of the joint project's governance as well as of Latvian administration.

Limits: The source is a situation review (situācijas izpēte), which the audit office itself describes as a short compilation of facts with no conclusions or recommendations, not a full audit. The 8.7 billion is stated as 'aptuveni' (about) and as a sevenfold rise since 2017, so the 2017 baseline (roughly 1.2 billion) is implied, not printed; it is not used as a metric here. Much of the rise is scope and specification change (the design guidelines were revised more than 100 times after 2018, and the station node went from two tracks to four), so the multiple measures how far the 2017 estimate was from a buildable project as much as delivery performance. The project is not finished: the release says only 4.5 percent of the needed main line financing was available, and the joint Baltic review it summarises puts the whole three-country project at 23.8 billion euros in 2023 against 5.8 billion in 2017, with the first phase now due in 2030. Rail Baltica is a joint Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian project funded about 85 percent by the EU; this record covers only the Latvian section and the Latvian ministry's management. Status is operating because the project is under construction; a decision to phase or cut the Latvian scope after June 2024 was not checked at an official source. The started year is the 2016 Cabinet approval of the project scope named in the release. The 565 million euro station figure is computed here: the release says the 2019 contract cost of 430 million euros rose by a further 135 million in 2024, and does not print 565.