Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism4 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Lebanonsince 2004dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Private management of the state mobile networks, and its end

Lebanon's government kept ownership of its two mobile networks, Alfa and Touch, and paid private operators to run them under management contracts from 2004, and mobile subscriptions grew from 884,445 in 2004 to 4,237,962 in 2019, the last full year of private management; the government did not renew the contracts in September 2020 and took management back itself.

4,237,962 subscriptions, mobile cellular subscriptions, last full year under private management, 2019. 884,445 subscriptions, mobile cellular subscriptions, first year of private management, 2004. World Bank, World Development Indicators, mobile cellular subscriptions (IT.CEL.SETS), from ITU data, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The state kept the licences, the assets and the prices, and hired private telecom groups for fixed fees to run the two networks, then let the contracts lapse into provisional extensions and finally took management back into the ministry when it could not agree a new tender.

Preconditions

State ownership of the networks, so management could be tendered without selling assets
A ministry able to set prices and subscription permits, which left the operators little room to compete
Government stability long enough to re-tender contracts on schedule, which Lebanon lacked after 2019

Limits: The subscription series shows national mobile scale, not the quality of the management contracts or what the state paid for them, and growth from 2004 also reflects the spread of mobile phones everywhere in those years. Both numbers are at the World Bank URL, but the contract history is not: the end of the contracts in September and October 2020 comes from Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2021, Lebanon (republished at ecoi.net/de/dokument/2060922.html), and the 2004 start of private management from secondary sources. The loss is the arrangement, not the service: subscriptions stood at 4,251,774 in 2022, about the 2019 level, so the record does not show that service fell after the state took over. The series peaked at 4,657,651 in 2015, under private management, and the 2020 and 2021 values are identical, which suggests a carried-forward estimate. Freedom House also records that the contracts were provisional after the tender expired in 2019, so the collaboration was weakening before it ended.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Lebanonsince 2021still operatingbears on Institutional responsiveness

Emergency Social Safety Net (AMAN), and its slow start

Lebanon's emergency cash transfer for the economic collapse that began in 2019 was approved by the World Bank in January 2021, rewritten by Parliament in March 2021 and declared effective only in July 2021, so that in October 2021 the number of households receiving basic cash transfers still stood at its 15,153 baseline against a target of 147,000; the programme later reached 158,770 households by March 2025.

15,153 households, households receiving basic cash transfers, unchanged from the june 2020 baseline, 2021-10-31. 158,770 households, households that had received cash assistance under the programme (aman), 2025-03. World Bank, Implementation Status and Results Report, Lebanon Emergency Crisis and COVID-19 Response Social Safety Net Project (P173367), sequence 2, 17 November 2021, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government borrowed for a new cash transfer rather than extending an existing one, and the loan had to pass Parliament, which amended it, so the programme waited for a revised law, a new government and fiduciary conditions before it could pay.

Preconditions

A cash-transfer instrument that requires parliamentary ratification of each external loan
No functioning domestic financing for safety nets during a banking and currency collapse
A donor-funded legacy programme whose end, in June 2024, showed how little was domestically owned

Where else it has been used: The contrast with Jordan (jor-naf-covid-cash), which paid 150,000 new households within two months by reusing a standing platform and domestic funds, is the point of the record.

Limits: The 15,153 is the PDO indicator table on pages 2 and 3 of the status report, identical at baseline (30 June 2020), March 2021 and October 2021; the approval, ratification and effectiveness dates are on page 1, which says Parliament's changes cut budget allocations for fiduciary activities and that the Bank judged some of them would impede implementation, and that the government still had to meet disbursement conditions so that payments could begin before the end of 2021. The 158,770 is in paragraph 4 of the World Bank restructuring paper of 13 May 2025 (https://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099051325103513216/pdf/P173367-bed938d8-7d2a-4120-80a5-3da01c595ba8.pdf), which says about 94,000 households were enrolled in 2022 and 2023 and 65,000 were migrated in October 2024 from the National Poverty Targeting Program after it closed in June 2024 for lack of donor funding. The baseline households were beneficiaries of that older programme, not of this one. The record documents slowness, not failure: once paying, the programme reached roughly its target. The publisher is the lender, and part of the delay was the World Bank's own conditions and the process of agreeing them with Parliament across a change of government in September 2021; the record does not apportion blame. The start year is the year of approval, not the start of the crisis in late 2019.

Lebanonsince 2021delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

COVID-19 vaccination campaign

Lebanon's health authorities reported to WHO that 2,740,227 people, 40 per 100 population, had received at least one COVID-19 vaccine dose by 22 December 2022, from a first dose given on 14 February 2021, with 2,414,223 (35 per 100) completing the primary series.

2,740,227 people, people vaccinated with at least one covid-19 vaccine dose, 2022-12-22. 35 per 100 population, people who completed the primary series (last dose), 2022-12-22. World Health Organization, COVID-19 dashboard vaccination data (vaccination-data.csv), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Lebanon's health ministry ran a national COVID-19 campaign through its primary care network and mass vaccination sites and reported progress to WHO.

Preconditions

A routine immunisation programme and cold chain
A supply of doses large enough for a national campaign, however obtained
Registers good enough to count who received a second dose

Limits: The figures are Lebanon's own reports to WHO (DATA_SOURCE 'REPORTING'), with no independent coverage survey behind them. Completion of the primary series reached 35 per 100 and boosters 660,249 people (10 per 100), so the record shows a partial delivery. The campaign ran through Lebanon's 2019 to 2022 financial collapse and the August 2020 port explosion, and first-dose reach stopped at 40 per 100, which is the more informative reading: a partial delivery by a state in crisis. Donor financing of the doses, if any, is not shown in the CSV. The VACCINES_USED field is empty, so the record cannot show which products were used or where the doses came from, and it evidences distribution only. The per-100 rates divide by WHO's population estimate. Vaccination is a response to one shock, not proof of general preparedness, and it is filed under the precedent of bol-covid-vaccination and ven-covid-vaccination as a judgement call because no hazard-specific delivery with an official figure was found for this country in this batch. The source is a CSV with no prose; the numbers are read from one row. The cited URL is the blob the WHO dashboard serves, the same one bol-covid-vaccination cites.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Lebanonsince 2012operating below its peakbears on Large project delivery

Greater Beirut Water Supply Project (Awali to Beirut conveyor), and its unfinished delivery

Lebanon's Council for Development and Reconstruction and the Beirut Mount Lebanon Water Establishment built most of a system to bring 250,000 cubic metres a day from the Awali to 1.2 million people in Greater Beirut, but when the World Bank loan closed on 30 April 2025, 106 months after the original June 2016 closing date, no additional water had been delivered, the 24/7 supply reached in a 20,000-customer pilot zone in 2018 had not been maintained, and component costs had risen from US$370 million at approval to US$561.7 million.

0 customers, customers in the achrafieh pilot zone receiving 24/7 water supply at closing, 2025-04-30. 20,000 customers, customers in the achrafieh pilot zone receiving 24/7 water supply when the target was reached, 2018. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Lebanon Greater Beirut Water Supply Project (P103063, Loan 7967-LE), report ICR00441, 16 December 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The reconstruction council and the regional water utility split a gravity conveyance, treatment and distribution system between them, financed the start with a World Bank loan, and depended on utility surpluses and a second loan for the rest; when the utility's revenue and the state's finances collapsed, the scheme stopped short of delivering water.

Preconditions

A utility with cash surpluses able to co-finance distribution, which disappeared with the 2019 crisis
Parliamentary ratification of loans in time, which failed for the 2018 additional financing
Contract terms that allocate contractor insolvency risk, which the report says were missing

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated the outcome Highly Unsatisfactory and its own performance Moderately Unsatisfactory. The 106 months are in para. 17; the zero water delivered, the 75, 84 and 89 percent completion of tunnels, pipelines and treatment plant and the 20,000-customer pilot are in Table 2 and paras. 29 to 31 (ICR pages 8 to 9). The US$561.7 million is the project budget at closing printed in Table 3 of the report against US$370 million at appraisal, and matches the sum of the three components in Annex 3 (US$434.0, 112.7 and 15.0 million; page 31) against 294.0, 61.0 and 15.0 at approval. Lebanon's 2019 financial collapse, COVID-19, the 2020 port explosion and a contractor's insolvency all fall inside the delay, so it is not a clean measure of institutional capacity in normal times, and a US$90 million additional financing approved in 2018 lapsed because Lebanon did not make it effective. The erosion is the pilot zone's 24/7 supply, reached in 2018 and lost; that is a small part of the project, and the main failure is non-completion, not loss. A follow-on Second Greater Beirut Water Supply Project was approved on 14 January 2025 to finish the works, so the delivery may still complete. The related Bisri dam, financed under a separate project, was partly cancelled before construction (footnote in para. 8) and is not counted here.