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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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5 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Iraqsince 2013still operatingbears on Public-private collaboration

Basrah Gas Company

Iraq's Ministry of Oil put the southern gas infrastructure of its South Gas Company into a 25-year joint venture with Shell and Mitsubishi, with the state holding 51 percent, and from May 2013 the venture gathered and processed associated gas that the Rumaila, West Qurna 1 and Zubair oil fields had flared, reaching a raw gas processing capacity of 1 billion standard cubic feet per day by 2019.

1 billion standard cubic feet per day, bgc raw gas processing capacity, 2019-10. 70 million tons CO2e, greenhouse gas emissions prevented by bgc since inception, 2013 to 2018, 2018. International Finance Corporation, Summary of Investment Information, Basrah Gas Co (project 39146), retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Oil transferred South Gas Company's existing southern gas assets into a joint venture in which the state kept majority ownership and an international operator brought capital and operating capability, and the venture sold dry gas into the national grid and LPG to the domestic market under a fixed 25-year term.

Preconditions

  • Existing state gas plants and pipelines that a venture could take over and rehabilitate
  • Oil fields under service contracts whose associated gas had no other buyer
  • A domestic power sector short of fuel, which gave the captured gas a national buyer

Limits: Both numbers are sponsor information that IFC republished: the disclosure states that IFC has not necessarily verified the project information independently. The capacity figure is installed processing capacity in 2019, not gas actually captured, and the disclosure gives no flared volume, so it cannot show what share of the associated gas the venture captured or how much is still flared. The second number comes from the IFC Environmental and Social Review Summary for the same project (https://disclosuresservice.ifc.org/api/ProjectAccess/ESRSProject?projectId=39146), not from the investment summary, and an avoided-emissions figure rests on a counterfactual the company chose. Both URLs return JSON from IFC's disclosure service; the human-readable page at disclosures.ifc.org renders the same text with JavaScript. The case is one concession in one province, so it shows that the state can run one large joint venture, not how often it does so. The disclosure dates from 2019 and the record cannot show whether the planned expansion to 1.4 billion cubic feet per day by 2024 was delivered. The processing plants at North Rumaila and Khor Al Zubair date from the early 1980s, so part of the capacity is rehabilitated state infrastructure, not new private build.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Iraqsince 2014still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Government vocational and development training centres

Iraq's government training centres ran 18,177 vocational and development courses for 331,547 trainees in 2019, up from 199,804 trainees in 2015 but below the 372,321 of 2017, according to the Central Statistical Organization's survey of parallel education and training.

331,547 trainees, trainees in training centres of the government sector, 2019. 372,321 trainees, trainees in training centres of the government sector, highest year in the series, 2017. Central Statistical Organization of Iraq, Directorate of Social and Educational Statistics, Statistics of parallel education and vocational and development training in Iraq, academic year 2019/2020, table 6, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

Each ministry runs its own training centres that teach vocational and staff development courses, and the national statistics office surveys every centre each year and publishes the counts of courses and trainees.

Preconditions

  • A large public sector whose ministries keep their own training budgets and centres
  • A statistics office able to survey training units in every ministry and governorate
  • Courses short enough to fit around employment

Limits: The figure is read from a PDF report whose Arabic text layer is partly garbled; the table numbers are legible and match the 2018/2019 edition for the overlapping years. The report does not describe the trainees: it does not separate public employees on in-service courses from jobseekers or other adults, and 14,841 of the 18,177 courses are development courses rather than vocational ones. It counts trainees per course and does not say whether a person on two courses counts twice. The count is a head count, not a share of adults, and it leaves out literacy centres, which this survey does not cover. 2019 is the latest year read; newer editions of the report were not found at an open URL. The 2014 start is the first year of the statistics office's published series in the 2018/2019 edition; the centres themselves are older and the report gives no founding date.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery, Institutional responsiveness.

Iraqsince 2015still operatingbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Emergency Operation for Development, reconstruction of areas affected by terroristic operations

From September 2015 Iraqi ministries, governorates and the Reconstruction Fund for Areas Affected by Terroristic Operations used two World Bank loans totalling US$750 million (IBRD-85200, US$350 million, and IBRD-87930, US$400 million), of which US$610 million was disbursed by 30 November 2024, to rebuild water, power, roads, bridges and railway in five governorates, reaching 5 million direct beneficiaries by March 2024, with the first loan's closing date pushed six years past the original June 2020.

5,000,000 people, direct project beneficiaries, 2024-03. 72 months, extension of the first loan's closing date beyond the original (30 june 2020 to 30 june 2026), computed, 2025-01. World Bank, Implementation Status and Results Report, Emergency Operation for Development (P155732), sequence 19, archived 12 January 2025, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The federal government channelled World Bank loans through line ministries, governorates and a dedicated reconstruction fund, rebuilding basic services in retaken cities sub-project by sub-project rather than through one master plan.

Preconditions

  • Military recovery of the territory before any rebuilding could start
  • Sovereign borrowing capacity and an international lender willing to extend the closing date repeatedly
  • A reconstruction fund and planning ministry able to register and approve hundreds of sub-projects

Limits: The figures come from a World Bank supervision report on its own loan, compiled from implementing agencies' reporting; procurement and M&E are rated Moderately Unsatisfactory in the same report, and the beneficiary count is a 'direct beneficiaries' definition that counts everyone in a served area, so it can overlap across water, power and road indicators. The project is still open, so nothing here is a completion figure, and the 72-month extension is our computation from the table, not a published delay figure. The shock is war, not a natural hazard, and the record evidences recovery, not preparation. The money is World Bank lending the government must repay, implemented by Iraqi agencies under Bank supervision, and the US$68 million repurposed to railway works in 2024 shows the scope moved with time. It covers five governorates, not the country, and the report gives no measure of whether rebuilt services were kept running after handover.

Iraqsince 2020operating below its peakbears on Institutional responsiveness

The December 2020 dinar devaluation, and its partial reversal

The Central Bank of Iraq answered the 2020 collapse in oil revenue by devaluing the dinar in mid-December 2020, moving the official rate from an average of 1,192 dinars per US dollar in 2020 to 1,450 in 2021 and 2022, and Iraq then took back more than half of that move, to 1,300 in 2024 and 2025.

1,300 dinars per US dollar, period average, official exchange rate after the partial reversal, 2025. 1,450 dinars per US dollar, period average, official exchange rate at the devalued peak, 2021. World Bank, from IMF International Financial Statistics, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank raised the dinar price of the dollar it sold from its reserves, which raised the dinar value of the state's dollar oil revenue and let the government meet a salary and pension bill fixed in dinars.

Preconditions

  • A state budget earning in dollars and spending in local currency, so a devaluation moves revenue faster than spending
  • A central bank that controls the official rate through its own dollar sales
  • Political tolerance for a fall in household purchasing power, which in Iraq lasted about two years

Where else it has been used: Oil exporters with a peg have used the same move after price collapses. Iraq's partial reversal in 2023 shows the limit of the tool where public salaries and imports dominate household budgets.

Limits: An exchange rate is a price, and a devaluation is one rule change by a central bank, not a public programme rebuilt around new conditions. The series carries the rates and not the reason: the IMF press release on the 2020 Article IV consultation (11 February 2021) records the devaluation as a mid-December 2020 measure, taken after a sharp decline in oil revenue left fiscal and external current account deficits of 20 and 16 percent of GDP, and it gives Iraq's oil export price as 59.7 US dollars a barrel in 2019 and 38.2 in 2020. The move came about nine months after the oil price fall, so it evidences that Iraq changed the rule, not that it changed it quickly. The period averages blur the dates: the 2020 average of 1,192 contains two weeks of the new rate, and the 2023 average of 1,312.5 contains about five weeks of the old one. The partial reversal was itself a decision by the cabinet and the central bank in February 2023, so the 'eroded' status records that more than half of the depreciation was given back, not that the institution failed to act. Neither number shows whether the devaluation closed the fiscal gap it was meant to close.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Iraqsince 2010delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Hartha power station units 2 and 3 rehabilitation, and its halt

Iraq's Ministry of Electricity set out in 2007 to restore 400 MW at Hartha power station units 2 and 3 by December 2010 under the Emergency Electricity Reconstruction Project, but when the project closed on 30 June 2015 no capacity had been restored, the works were about 70 percent complete, the cost estimate had risen from US$150 million to US$187.62 million with a US$98.97 million financing gap, and the contractor withdrew from the site.

0 MW, generating capacity of hartha units 2 and 3 restored at project close (target 400 mw), 2015-06-30. 187.62 million US dollars, latest estimate of total project cost, against us$150 million at appraisal, 2015-06-30. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Iraq Emergency Electricity Reconstruction Project (P087734), report ICR3577, 2016, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The ministry tried to finish a rehabilitation begun under sanctions by contracting one turnkey supplier to install equipment bought a decade earlier, and when disputes and budget shortfalls stalled the works, it could neither fund a variation nor terminate.

Preconditions

  • Legacy equipment that tied the contract to bidders familiar with its design
  • A government budget able to fund variations and security costs, which was missing after the 2014 oil price fall
  • A contract with clear termination and dispute rules, which the report says were lacking

Limits: The World Bank wrote the report and rated both itself and the borrower unsatisfactory or moderately unsatisfactory, and it says blame for the delays was shared between the ministry and the contractor (para. 53, PDF page 29). The 0 MW and 70 percent figures are in the results table (PDF page 7); the cost table and the US$98.97 million gap are in Annex 1 (PDF page 43); the halt is para. 46 (PDF page 25: 'works have practically stopped'). The cost estimate excludes about US$19 million the government paid for contractor security and an unsettled price adjustment. Much of the failure came from the design: the project had to reuse equipment bought in 1999 under the Oil for Food Programme, which narrowed bidding and bred disputes, and the security situation from 2014 raised costs. The status is 'concluded' because the financed project closed and its result, no capacity restored, stands; it is a delivery failure, not a reversal, since nothing delivered was later lost and the report does not say the rehabilitation was terminated. Whether the ministry later completed the units with its own money was not read at any Iraqi source. The units are part of one station, a modest project by value; the record evidences delivery failure on a rehabilitation, not on a new build.