Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

Narrow the list

SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism7 of 863 deliveries

Anticipation

1 delivery linked to Government foresight capacity.

Iransince 2011still operatingbears on Government foresight capacity

Center for the Islamic Iranian Model of Progress (Markaz-e Olgu)

Iran's Center for the Islamic Iranian Model of Progress, set up by decree of the Leader on 2 Khordad 1390 (May 2011), drafted a document that sets the country's desired horizon for the next five decades, which the Leader issued for review on 22 Mehr 1397 (October 2018), and reports that it analysed 5,300 critiques and proposals on that draft and received 3,803 papers over its first fourteen annual conferences.

5,300 critiques and proposals, critiques and proposals on the 2018 draft model received and analysed, 2018-2025 (performance report 1390 to 1404). 3,803 papers, papers received, cumulative to the fourteenth annual conference, cumulative to the fourteenth conference. Center for the Islamic Iranian Model of Progress, performance report 1390 to 1404 (Persian, PDF, published 1405), retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The Leader created by decree a research centre with its own legal personality and a high council he appoints; the centre coordinates university and seminary researchers through think tanks and annual conferences to draft a fifty-year model meant to sit above general policies and development plans.

Preconditions

A head of state who commissions a long-range document and sets its review path through parliament, government and councils
A large network of university and seminary researchers who can be mobilised through calls and conferences
A status outside the elected government, which protects continuity but leaves promulgation to one person

Limits: The centre reports on itself, and the figures were read in a 78-page Persian PDF with pdftotext. The Leader's 2018 text, reproduced in the report, asked the centre to present an upgraded version within at most two years for approval and promulgation, with implementation from the start of the fifteenth solar century (1400, March 2021); the centre's own document page (https://www.olgou.ir/fa/olgoudocument.html) still says the document will be downloadable after promulgation, so no final version was in force at retrieval. That is a delivery overrun on the centre's core product, not a closure. The centre sits under the Leader, outside the elected government, and the model is a normative and ideological document rather than exploratory scenarios. The 5,300 figure counts comments received, not changes made, and the conference count measures academic participation, not foresight output. The report gives no budget or staff figure. The founding decree is on the centre's site (https://www.olgou.ir/fa/about/%D8%AD%DA%A9%D9%85-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%B3.html).

Coordination

1 delivery linked to University-industry collaboration.

Iransince 2020still operatingbears on University-industry collaboration

University contracts with society and industry, MSRT monitoring

Iran's Ministry of Science, Research and Technology recorded more than 8,700 contracts in progress between universities and higher education centres on one side and industry and executive bodies on the other in its 1400 (2021/22) monitoring, worth about 3,106 billion tomans.

8,700 contracts (lower bound, 'more than'), university contracts with society and industry in progress, 1400 (2021/22). 3,106 billion tomans, value of university contracts with society and industry in progress, 1400 (2021/22). Ministry of Science, Research and Technology (MSRT) of Iran, Office of Relations with Society and Industry, news release of 6 Dey 1400 (27 December 2021) on the 1400 contract monitoring, archived copy, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The Ministry of Science, Research and Technology sets a growth target for contracts between universities and outside clients, has every university report its contracts each year, and publishes rankings of institutions by contracts per faculty member.

Preconditions

Universities allowed to sign and keep revenue from outside contracts
Large state-owned industries and executive bodies with research budgets that buy from domestic universities
A ministry office with the authority to collect contract data from every university

Limits: The count is a lower bound ('more than 8,700') and the value an estimate ('about'), both from a ministry news release rather than a published dataset, and both rest on what universities report to the ministry. The contracts are with 'society and industry', so they include government ministries and executive agencies as clients, not only firms, and the release gives no split; nor does it say how much of the work is research rather than testing, consulting or training. The value is in nominal tomans during high inflation, so a rise between years says little about real volume. msrt.ir did not answer on 17 October 2026, so the source is the Internet Archive copy of January 2022. Mehr News reported later monitoring rounds at 11,212 contracts in 1402 and 11,568 in 1403, short of the plan's 10 percent yearly growth target, but no ministry page carrying those figures was reached. The start year is the September 2020 launch of the ministry's plan to transform university cooperation with society and industry as Mehr News reports it; the ministry page does not state it.

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Iransince 1980still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Technical and Vocational Training Organization public centres

Iran's Technical and Vocational Training Organization trained 376,248 people in its fixed public centres in the Iranian year 1394 (2015/16), up from 322,657 the year before, in industry, services, culture and arts, and agriculture courses, according to the Statistical Centre of Iran yearbook.

376,248 people, trainees in fixed centres of the technical and vocational training organization, 1394 (2015/16). 322,657 people, trainees in fixed centres of the technical and vocational training organization, 1393 (2014/15). Statistical Centre of Iran, Iran Statistical Yearbook 1395, chapter 17 (education), table 17-34, citing the Technical and Vocational Training Organization; copy hosted by the Iran Data Portal, Syracuse University, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The labour ministry runs a national training organisation with public centres in every province that offer short trade, retraining and skill-upgrading courses to adults and young people, and reports its trainee counts to the national statistics office each year.

Preconditions

A single state training body formed from earlier training funds, with workshops in every province
Public funding that keeps courses in public centres low cost
A national skills certification that gives short courses labour-market value

Limits: The figures are read from a PDF copy of the yearbook chapter on a university mirror, because the statistics office's own site did not open. The latest year in the table is 1394 (2015/16); the 1395 row is blank and no later edition was read, so the count is about ten years old. It covers the organisation's fixed public centres only, not its mobile units, prison and garrison courses or the licensed private institutes it supervises, and it counts trainees, not a share of adults. The yearbook defines trainees as people who learn a trade, retrain or upgrade skills for a set period, so the count mixes first-time vocational learners with adults returning to training, and it says nothing about course length or completion. The 1980 start is the yearbook's statement that the organisation was formed in 1359 by merging earlier training funds and centres.

Experimentation

1 delivery linked to Firms through regulatory sandboxes.

Iransince 2022still operatingbears on Firms through regulatory sandboxes

Mohit-e azmoon-e tanzimgari (regulatory sandbox) of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Central Bank of Iran's regulatory sandbox, run by its subsidiary the National Informatics Corporation as secretariat, received 10 applications in its first call (July to August 2022) and admitted two to testing, rejected seven and saw one withdrawn, and a second call drew five applications, all of which were under review when the secretariat published its one-year report in August 2023.

2 applications admitted, applications admitted to testing in the first call, 2022 (first call, July to September 2022). 10 applications, applications received in the first call, 2022 (first call, July to September 2022). National Informatics Corporation (sandbox secretariat of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran), one-year performance report of the CBI regulatory sandbox, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The central bank delegated a sandbox to its own technology holding company, which ran time-boxed open calls on named themes (lending, payments, regtech, suptech), screened plans through a technical committee and a steering council, and monitored admitted plans in six-month phases ending in a decision document meant to update rules.

Preconditions

A legal basis in the Monetary and Banking Law and a resolution of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace's regulation commission authorising the sandbox
A central bank subsidiary with staff to run calls, assess applications and monitor tests
Fintech firms whose products, such as peer lending, sat outside existing banking rules

Where else it has been used: Iran ran parallel sector sandboxes: the Securities and Exchange Organization opened a capital market sandbox, and the Ministry of Economy kept a coordinating meta-sandbox above the two.

Limits: The figures are read from a slide deck in Persian (page 15 of an 18-page PDF, a table of calls held), not from a statistical series, and the publisher is the central bank's own subsidiary reporting on a programme it runs. The National Informatics Corporation is the secretariat and executor named by the central bank, not the central bank itself; the central bank's own site (cbi.ir) refused the request and the sandbox portal (cbisandbox.nicholding.ir) did not resolve on 2026-10-16. The counts are of applications (plans), not of distinct firms, and the report does not name the admitted firms. Two admissions in a country of about 90 million people is a very thin flow. The report gives no admission figure for the second call; a press account of the same report says one of the five was later accepted, and another press account says seven plans were admitted in the first year, which the report's own table does not support. The secretariat's press accounts describe the second admitted plan as a cryptocurrency or e-wallet test while the report labels it PayTech, so the plan's subject is not settled. The lending-technology test led to a draft decision document sent to the steering council in mid-2023; whether a rule changed is not shown. No later count was found: the secretariat handed day-to-day operation to its innovation unit Faranik in December 2024, and nothing published since gives admissions or exits. The capital market sandbox of the Securities and Exchange Organization is not counted here.

Adaptability

2 deliveries linked to Institutional responsiveness, Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Iransince 2010operating below its peakbears on Institutional responsiveness

Targeted Subsidy Reform cash transfer, and its erosion

Iran's government replaced universal fuel and bread subsidies with a universal cash transfer of 455,000 rials (about US$40) per person per month from late 2010, then left the transfer unindexed, so that by 2019 its purchasing power had fallen to less than US$6 per person before a top-up was added in late 2019.

6 US$ per person (upper bound), purchasing power of the per-person cash transfer, 2019 (published as 'less than'), 2019. 40 US$ per person per month (about 455,000 rials), cash transfer per person per month at launch, 2010. World Bank, Poverty Global Practice, Middle East and North Africa: Islamic Republic of Iran poverty diagnostic (November 2023), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Iranian government raised domestic energy and bread prices in one move and paid the savings back as a flat universal cash transfer. It then left the transfer nominal, so inflation dissolved the benefit while energy prices drifted back toward subsidy.

Preconditions

A national population and household register able to pay nearly every resident within months
Large implicit energy subsidies whose removal freed fiscal room for a transfer
A fiscal position, later hit by sanctions and inflation, that made indexing the transfer unaffordable

Where else it has been used: Cited by the World Bank as a model for Angola's 2023 fuel subsidy reform (Policy Research Working Paper 10939). The retellings stress the 2010 compensation and rarely the later erosion.

Limits: The World Bank restates every figure here from secondary sources (Salehi-Isfahani et al. 2015, Enami and Lustig 2018, UNICEF 2019). It does not compute them, and no Iranian official series is cited. The two dollar figures are not comparable: US$40 converts at the 2010 rate, the 2019 figure is undated within the year and published only as 'less than US$6', and the rial's collapse after 2018 inflates the fall in dollar terms. The 'nearly in half' real decline from 2012 to 2016 is the cleaner measure, but it is published as prose and not as a number. The reversal is partial. The transfer still reached about 90 percent of households, and the government added a top-up in late 2019 and COVID-19 payments in 2020. The construct asks how fast rules change. This record shows a fast rule change in 2010 followed by about nine years in which the transfer was not changed as inflation rose. It is evidence of the second half, not a measure of speed. The figures are read from a PDF.

Iransince 2002delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

Earthquake Emergency Recovery after the 2002 Changureh-Avaj earthquake

After the April 2002 earthquake in Kermanshah and the June 2002 earthquake in Qazvin, Zanjan and Hamedan, Iran's Ministry of Interior project unit and the Housing Foundation repaired or rebuilt about 24,000 damaged houses to seismic standards by June 2009, using government funds and a US$180 million World Bank loan, of which US$174.9 million was disbursed.

24,000 housing units, damaged housing units repaired and reconstructed in compliance with seismic standards, 2009-06-30. 40,727 houses, houses damaged by the june 2002 earthquakes, 2002. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report ICR00001192, Earthquake Emergency Recovery Project (P080802, Loan IBRD-46970), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

Iran's Ministry of Interior set up a project unit and handed housing reconstruction to the Housing Foundation, which tied reconstruction materials to compliance with seismic codes and trained local engineers and masons to enforce them.

Preconditions

A standing national housing body (the Housing Foundation) with rural reach and a reconstruction mandate
Government funds already committed before external finance arrived
Access to multilateral lending, which later sanctions closed off

Where else it has been used: The Housing Foundation reused the model of owner-driven rebuilding to code after Bam in 2003, with a World Bank loan approved in 2004.

Limits: The figure is self-reported by the Bank and the borrower's project unit in a completion report, and no independent audit of the houses is cited. The report contradicts itself: the results table gives 24,000 actual against a 24,200 target, the narrative says around 24,200, and a footnote gives an appraisal estimate of 29,232. The project financed materials (steel, cement and equipment) for reconstruction rather than building every house, so the count is of houses it supplied. About 59 percent of the 40,727 damaged houses are covered. The response was regional, in four provinces. It was not national, and it is not the Bam 2003 reconstruction that Iranians would name first. Schedule slipped: the loan closing moved from June 2007 to June 2009, and the indicator was achieved six months after its target date. The disaster insurance component was dropped from Bank financing at the government's request. The evidence of preparedness is limited to seismic-code training for 350 staff against a target of 200 and a public awareness campaign, with no later test against a subsequent earthquake. The figures are read from a PDF.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Iransince 2000delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Tehran Sewerage Project (first phase: interceptors, trunk main and southern treatment plant)

The Tehran Sewerage Company built interceptors, trunk mains, tunnels and a wastewater treatment plant under the first phase of the Tehran Sewerage Project at a latest estimated cost of US$359.22 million against US$341.45 million at appraisal in 2000, with the treatment works costing 189 percent of their estimate and the loan closing on 30 June 2008, two years late, before the plant and the eastern trunk main were finished.

359.22 million US dollars, actual or latest estimated total project cost, 2008-06-30. 341.45 million US dollars, total project cost estimated at appraisal, 2000. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Iran Tehran Sewerage Project (P069941), report ICR1028, 29 June 2009, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The capital's sewerage company built the network in parallel with a design-build-operate contract for the treatment plant, letting the network race ahead on cheap domestic pipe while the plant ran late and over budget under inflation and a foreign-currency contract.

Preconditions

A domestic pipe industry able to supply at falling prices
Counterpart funds indexed for inflation, which were short here
A foreign-currency contract hedged against a weakening rial, which it was not

Limits: The World Bank, which lent US$145 million, wrote the report and rated the outcome Satisfactory. The component costs are in Annex 1 (PDF page 36); the US$28.7 million funding shortfall, high inflation (12 to 24 percent a year) and a euro-denominated plant contract as the cause of the two-year extension are in para. 50 (PDF page 20). The total stayed near the estimate only because interceptors and laterals came in at 61 percent of estimate while the trunk main (178 percent) and treatment works (189 percent) overran, so the aggregate hides the overrun on the hardest parts. The plant and the eastern trunk main were unfinished at closing, and the report says only that the company had resources to finish them; completion was not read at a current source. The figures are 2000 to 2008 and say little about Iranian delivery under sanctions since.