Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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SearchCountryCapabilityStatusWith a mechanism2 of 863 deliveries

Coordination

1 delivery linked to Public-private collaboration.

Guinea-Bissausince 1989dismantledbears on Public-private collaboration

Guiné Telecom concession, and its collapse

Guinea-Bissau gave Guiné Telecom, an incumbent in which Portugal Telecom was the major stockholder, an exclusive concession to run national telecommunications in 1989; fixed telephone subscriptions peaked at 11,197 in 2002 and fell to 4,844 in 2009, after which the World Bank series reports zero, Portugal Telecom handed its shares back to the state, and both Guiné Telecom and its mobile arm Guinetel stopped operating.

4,844 subscriptions, fixed telephone subscriptions, last year with a non-zero value, 2009. 11,197 subscriptions, fixed telephone subscriptions at the peak of the series, 2002. World Bank, World Development Indicators, Fixed telephone subscriptions (IT.MLT.MAIN), from ITU data, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

The government granted a monopoly concession to a company it co-owned with the former colonial operator, so that a foreign partner would finance and run the national network; when the state stopped paying its bills and the partner stopped investing, the partner returned its shares and the state was left owning an operator it could not run.

Preconditions

A foreign operator willing to invest in a small market in return for exclusivity
A state able to pay for its own telecommunications use and to honour the concession terms
Political stability long enough for a concession's investment to pay back

Where else it has been used: In 2023 the government announced a tender to sell 80 percent of Guiné Telecom and Guinetel with IFC and World Bank advice, which repeats the original move of bringing in a private partner.

Limits: The subscription series measures the network, not the partnership: it does not show who invested, what the concession required, or why lines fell. Mobile service from Orange and MTN substituted for fixed lines in the same years, so part of the fall is substitution and not only failure of the incumbent. The zeros from 2010 onward probably mean that no operator reported, not a counted zero, which is why the record uses 2009 as the current value. The ownership facts come from other sources: the 1989 concession and Portugal Telecom's role as major stockholder are stated by the regulator, the Institute of Communications of Guinea Bissau, in an ITU-T workshop document of 2003 (ccTLD Doc 16); the transfer of Portugal Telecom's 40 percent of Guiné Telecom and 55 percent of Guinetel to the state, under an amicable agreement, is a Lusa report republished by RTP that carries no year in its text; and the dormancy of both companies and the 2023 privatisation call are press and law-firm reports (Forbes Africa Lusófona, 29 January 2023; CMS e-alert, 1 February 2023). Sources disagree on the stake: Lusa gives 40 percent, Forbes Africa Lusófona 49 percent.

Building

1 delivery linked to Large project delivery.

Guinea-Bissausince 1984delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

Bissau Port Project, delivered two and a half years late

Guinea-Bissau's port authority (JAPG) rehabilitated the old commercial wharf of Bissau Port, built river ports and ferry ramps and, with a new deepwater wharf financed in parallel by four Arab funds, completed the IDA-financed Bissau Port Project on 30 June 1990 against a planned 31 December 1987, at a final cost of US$20.0 million against an appraisal estimate of US$17.36 million.

20 million US dollars, final cost of the ida-financed bissau port project, 1990-06. 17.36 million US dollars, cost of the project estimated at appraisal, 1983. World Bank, Project Completion Report, Guinea-Bissau Bissau Port Project (Credit 1392-GUB), Report No. 9901, 16 September 1991, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The government split its port programme into an IDA part and an Arab-funded new berth awarded to the same contractor, so when the Arab funds suspended payments over the country's arrears the contractor slowed work on both, and IDA supervision kept the project going to completion.

Preconditions

A port authority set up as a separate agency able to borrow and contract
Several lenders financing separate parts through one contractor
A government able to keep current on earlier loans, which here it was not

Limits: The report is the World Bank on its own credit, and it notes that the government sent no comments for Part II, the borrower's review, despite repeated requests; consultants acting for the borrower prepared a final report the PCR drew on, so the borrower's own view is largely missing. The cost figures cover only the IDA-financed part (wharf repair, river ports, technical assistance and supervision of the new berth); the new deepwater wharf itself was financed separately by the Kuwait Fund, the Saudi Fund, BADEA and the OPEC Fund, and its cost and schedule are not reported here, though the report blames repeated suspensions of Arab Fund disbursements, triggered by the government's late repayment of earlier loans, for most of the delay. The 14.9 percent overrun is in dollars; the report says the credit, made in SDRs, covered the work without an overrun, and scope grew with four extra ferry ramps, container storage and more technical assistance. The project is small in absolute terms, about US$20 million, but Bissau is the country's main port and the report credits the project with a modern deepwater facility where only a badly damaged wharf had existed. The text is an OCR of a 1991 typescript.