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Documented examples

Each record describes something a country built that the indicators do not capture. The source provides the published number; the mechanism is our interpretation.

Scores describe outcomes. These records describe how a country acted, what it needed and what happened. 863 of 863 records include a mechanism. They do not affect scores.

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4 of 863 deliveries

Learning

1 delivery linked to Adult learning participation.

Belarussince 2021still operatingbears on Adult learning participation

Vocational training of the unemployed under the State Programme Labour Market and Employment Promotion

Belarus's labour, employment and social protection bodies referred 11,900 unemployed people to vocational training, retraining, upgrading and short courses in 2021 to 2024, 2,300 of them in 2024, and 91.9 percent of the 2024 referrals were training ordered by an employer with a guaranteed job.

2,300 people, unemployed people referred to vocational training, retraining, upgrading and training courses (measure 16), 2024. 11,900 people, unemployed people referred to the same training, cumulative, 2021 to 2024. Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Republic of Belarus, report on the implementation in 2021 to 2024 of the State Programme Labour Market and Employment Promotion for 2021 to 2025, retrieved 2026-10-17.

The move, and what it needed

District employment bodies refer registered unemployed people to short vocational courses, mostly training ordered by a named employer who guarantees the job afterwards, with the state paying tuition and a stipend.

Preconditions

  • A register of unemployed people kept by district labour offices
  • State and enterprise training centres able to run short worker courses
  • Employers in a mostly state-owned economy who accept a hiring guarantee

Limits: The ministry reports on its own programme, in a Russian-language PDF; the figures are on pages 6 to 7. Referrals are not completions or job outcomes. The scale is very small: 2,300 people in a country of about 9 million, which the report itself puts at 6 percent of unemployed people needing work, and registered unemployment in Belarus is low by design, so the count says little about adults in work. The same report gives a separate indicator, the share of employees who completed vocational training, at 16 percent in 2024, which sits closer to the construct but is employer training reported by the state, not a delivery. The 2021 start is the start of the current five-year programme; training of the unemployed by the employment bodies predates it and is not counted.

Adaptability

1 delivery linked to Disaster preparedness and recovery.

Belarussince 1990delivered and closedbears on Disaster preparedness and recovery

State programmes to overcome the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster

Belarus ran six state programmes on the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster from 1990 to 2025, on which the government reports spending more than 20 billion US dollars equivalent; 138,000 residents were evacuated and resettled from 450 settlements, and by 2025 about 1.3 million people a year, including more than 211,700 children and adolescents, received special medical screening.

1,300,000 people per year, people receiving special medical screening each year, 2025. 138,000 people, residents evacuated and resettled from contaminated territory, cumulative since 1986, reported 2025. Permanent Mission of Belarus to the United Nations, memorandum circulated as UN General Assembly document A/79/910, retrieved 2026-10-16.

The move, and what it needed

The Belarusian government organised recovery from a long-lived radiological disaster as a sequence of five-year state programmes, moving from resettlement and dose reduction in the 1990s to medical screening, radiation control of food and the economic redevelopment of affected districts.

Preconditions

  • A central budget able to carry a large share of spending for years after the shock
  • A national radiation-monitoring and food-control service that reaches farms and processors
  • A health system able to run annual screening of a fixed cohort of affected people

Where else it has been used: Ukraine and Russia ran parallel Chernobyl programmes, and Belarus and Russia also run joint Union State programmes; the Belarusian case differs in that the national programme lasted 35 years under one programme-and-target method.

Limits: The source is the Belarusian government describing its own programme in a diplomatic memorandum; the UN circulated it and did not verify it, and no independent audit or evaluation stands behind it. The numbers sit in a four-page PDF (pages 2 and 3). The first evacuations in 1986 were carried out under Soviet authority, so the 138,000 figure predates the Belarusian state programmes, and 200,000 more people left on their own. Screening counts are activity, not health outcomes. The spending figure is a cumulative dollar equivalent with no year-by-year series. The fall in people living in contaminated zones, from more than 2 million in 3,678 settlements to 930,500 in 2,022, reflects radioactive decay and rezoning as well as policy, so it is not used as the metric. The budget share fell from up to 22 percent in the early 1990s to just over 1 percent by 2025 according to Gosatomnadzor. The dedicated programme ended in 2025, and its measures were split across thematic state programmes for 2026 to 2030, so the separate programme no longer exists as a budget line.

Building

2 deliveries linked to Large project delivery.

Belarussince 2016delivered and closedbears on Large project delivery

M6 Minsk to Grodno transit corridor upgrade

Belarus's Ministry of Transport and Communications widened 154 km of the M6 Minsk to Grodno highway to dual carriageway under a loan approved in December 2014, against 86 km planned, after civil works for the planned sections were awarded for less than half the estimate; the corridor component cost US$242.15 million against US$259.28 million at entry, and the loan closed in June 2022 against an original June 2020.

154 km, length of single carriageway reconstructed and widened to dual carriageway, 2022-06-15. 86 km, length planned at entry, 2014-12-19. World Bank, Implementation Completion and Results Report, Belarus Transit Corridor Improvement Project (P149697), December 2022, retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The transport ministry tendered the corridor in lots to joint ventures of local state-owned contractors, and when bids came in far below estimate it used the savings to add 67 km of the same corridor without new financing.

Preconditions

  • Complete designs before effectiveness, so works could start as soon as procurement closed
  • A domestic road construction industry with capacity and equipment
  • A cost estimate high enough that competitive bids produced savings rather than claims

Limits: The figures are the World Bank's, from a completion report on its own loan, with costs reported by the borrower. The component costs are in Table 2 (printed page 9), the 154 against 86 km in para. 32 (page 14), the savings in para. 52 (page 21) and the dates on the datasheet (page 2). The low cost was helped by a government decision to exempt the works from VAT, so part of the saving is a transfer within the state, not efficiency. The actual cost excludes design, supervision and land acquisition, which the government paid separately. Works were not contracted until July 2016, more than a year after effectiveness, because of a dispute over whether state-owned Belarusian contractors were eligible, and the road safety centre was incomplete at closing. The report was written in 2022, after which World Bank engagement with Belarus stopped, so later maintenance of the road is unknown.

Belarussince 2013still operatingbears on Large project delivery

Belarusian nuclear power plant (BelAES), delivered behind schedule

Belarus started building its first nuclear power plant at Ostrovets in November 2013, a two-unit WWER-1200 plant totalling 2,400 MW. Its regulator's 2019 report scheduled unit 1 for 2019 and unit 2 for 2020. Unit 1 was commissioned in 2021 and unit 2 in October 2023, three years after the 2019 schedule.

2023 year, year power unit no. 2 entered commercial operation, 2023-10. 2020 year, year power unit no. 2 was scheduled for commissioning in the 2019 national report, 2019. Gosatomnadzor, Ministry for Emergency Situations of the Republic of Belarus, National Report on the implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (2025), retrieved 2026-10-02.

The move, and what it needed

The Belarusian state chose a single foreign state vendor to build a reference design turnkey, and built up a domestic regulator and operator in parallel under a sequence of IAEA review missions, accepting slippage on the vendor's schedule.

Preconditions

  • A strategic partner state willing to supply design, construction and credit together
  • A centralised state able to hold a decade-long build through political and diplomatic opposition
  • A reference plant of the same design already being built abroad (Leningrad NPP-2)

Limits: This is a schedule figure only. The record carries no official budget or final cost for the plant, so cost performance is unknown. The slip is measured against a schedule that the 2019 report itself calls 'updated'. This record uses the 2019 schedule because it is the one stated in an official source. The schedule is given in years, not months, so the three-year slip for unit 2 is approximate. The 2019 schedule speaks of commissioning while the 2023 figure is the start of commercial operation, so the two milestones may not be identical. Both figures come from the Belarusian regulator reporting on its own country's flagship project. The plant was built turnkey on a Russian design, financed from the republican budget and a Russian state export credit, as the 2019 national report states. The delivery is therefore only partly attributable to Belarusian institutions: they decided, licensed, supervised, financed and now operate it. The source does not show capacity factors or outages after commissioning.